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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with 
properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their 
operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in 
the three chapters, as described below. 
Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest share -
holders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer 
securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: 
Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; 
and individuals trade shares and the current production I consumption good, fixing 
productiqn plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a 
shares I current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no 
(Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, 
and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation. 
Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, 
partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal 
registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an 
expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from 
estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is 
a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a 
merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar 
data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending 
benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also 
discussed. 
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The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of 
abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given 
a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and 
ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* c X on which the Pareto principle 
fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly 
decisive for X* over X-X*, and weakly antidecisive for X-X* over X*; therefore, 
alternatives in X-X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of 
alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in xn*-X(n+l)* are never socially 
ranked above x<n+l)*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are 
also discussed. 
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EQUILIBRIUM IN A STOCK MARKET ECONOMY WITH 
SHAREHOLDER VOTING 
Jack Williamson 
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 
California Institute of Technology 
Asha B. Sadanand 
Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration 
University of British Columbia 
This paper demonstrates the existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' 
equilibrium for a one period stock market economy in which there may be fewer 
securities than states of the world. There are two allocational mechanisms in the 
economy: Firms' owners may vote to change firms' production plans across states 
while keeping shareholdings fixed, and individuals may trade their shares and stocks 
of a current production/ consumption good while keeping firms' plans fixed. A 
shareholders' equilibrium is a set of firms' plans, and an allocation of shares and the 
current good which are stable with respect to both mechanisms. That is no (direction 
restricted) plan revision is supported by a share weighted majority of firms' owners, 
and there is no reallocation through trade which will make all individuals better off. 
We would like to thank Professors Kim Border, Robert Forsythe, Edward Green and 
Richard McKelvey for several illuminating conversations concerning this topic. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In a stock market economy, firms' owners secure (uncertain) future consump -
tion opportunities by foregoing current consumption and investing resources in 
production. Such economies are distinguished from Arrow-Debreu production 
economies by the absence of explicit markets for contingent claims--in particular, 
firms' shares cannot be unbundled. Only if there are as many firms with linearly 
independent production plans as there are future states of the world, it is possible for 
individuals to assemble packages of firms' shares which are equivalent to Arrow-
Debreu securities. Otherwise, the shareholders are typically faced with a non-trivial 
problem in group decision. 
It is well known that if there are fewer firms than statesl, the Fischer [1930] 
separation principle may fail. That is the objective of the firm may fail to be well 
defined, and proposals to change firms' production plans may meet with a divided 
response among the shareholders. An extensive technical literature has evolved 
concerning such questions as under what conditions might shareholders' opinions be 
unanimous, or what objective functions firm managers should be given. Nevertheless, 
in real-world practice shareholders do disagree, and such disputes are at least 
partially resolved in the corporate form of firm organization by majority rule processes. 
The results developed in this paper represent a new contribution to the theory 
of the firm in incomplete markets--the development of a financial model with an 
equilibrium solution in which shareholders of publically traded firms make multi-
dimensional production decisions by a majority rule process. These results are 
1. See, for example, Ekern and Wilson [1974]. 
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genuinely novel; there simply are no other stock market equilibrium existence results 
similar to those presented here. Furthermore, this paper illuminates the following 
socially important question: Are the majoritarian decision-making and stock market 
institutions utilized by publically traded corporations inherently unstable, or are frenetic 
100 million share days and frequent proxy fights attributable to unpredictable 
exogenous shocks to the environment? The conclusion suggested by the model 
developed here is that the institutions are not inherently unstable. 
A more detailed summary of the equilibrium results and a literature review are 
presented in Parts A and B of this section, respectively. Next, sections II and III 
formally set forth the basic structure of the model, section IV describes stock market 
trading in detail, and section V is concerned with shareholder voting. The results from 
these sections are then combined in section VI to give the existence of 
shareholders' equilibrium. Directions for future research are discussed in section 
VII. 
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A. SUMMARY OF NEW RESULTS 
If there are fewer securities than states of the world, managerial objective 
functions which require only market information may not be well defined for 
shareholder-owned firms. Under these circumstances, some collective decision 
making process presumably gives rise to firms' plans. Majority rule mechanisms play 
an important role in setting real-world fmns' production policies. This paper develops 
a stylized model of a two date financial economy in which shareholders both make 
production decisions by a share-weighted majority rule mechanism, and also trade 
their shares on a stock market. Existence of a stockholders' equilibrium is 
demonstrated, and a class of such equilibria are characterized. 
A shareholders' equilibrium is defined here to be an allocation of both the 
current consumption I production good and firms' shares (together with plans) such 
that: i) holding firms' plans fixed, there is no other Pareto optimal allocation which is 
also individually rational, and ii) holding individuals' portfolios fixed, there is no 
direction restricted revision of any fmn's plan which would be approved by a weighted 
majority of the fmns's shareholders. 
Firms' technologies are allowed to take a very general form; neither multi-
plicative uncertainty nor an exogenously fixed production pattern across states has 
been imposed. Shareholders are assumed to be myopic when exchanging shares or 
choosing firms' plans. Non-controlling interest equilibria are guaranteed by the 
requirement that all individuals maintain positive holdings in every firm; the size of 
these holdings can be made arbitrarily small as the number of participants in the 
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economy increases. Alternatively, individuals could be directly prevented from holding 
a controlling interest in any fmn.2 
In order to familiarize the reader with some of the more specialized aspects of 
the model, the following topics will be discussed in some detail below: The Equilibrium 
Concept, Myopia and Truthful Voting, Direction Restricted Voting, £-Majority Rule, 
Financing Firms' Production Plans; No-Bankruptcy Constraints, Separation of Voting 
and Trading, Non-Controlling Interest Equilibria, and Optimality. 
Equilibrium Concept 
Following the technique employed by Dreze [1972], the financial model 
presented here suppresses the notion of initial endowments for individuals or frrms. 
Instead of an endowment vector, it is assumed there is given some strictly positive 
aggregate social endowment of a single current production I consumption good. 
Suppose now that by some unspecified process--perhaps command by a central 
planner, or by sequential voting and trading--that the social endowment has been 
divided between production and consumption, firms' shares and stocks of the current 
good have been allocated to consumers, and production plans (including resource 
requirements) have been determined. 
The equilibrium existence question in this framework can be posed as follows: 
If each individual in the economy regards his component of such an allocation as a 
personal endowment which conveys property rights, does there exist an allocation 
which is also a majority rule shareholders' equilibrium? This type of equilibrium is 
2. It is assumed here that any shareholding greater than .5 is a controlling interest. 
Jordan [1978] defines a "controlling interest" in a given firm to be a shareholding 
greater than .5 which is sufficient--as specified in the company's bylaws--to 
determine the fmn's production plan. In his construction a controlling interest might, 
for example, require .9 of a fmn's shares. 
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defined as a portfolio consisting of shares and the consumption good for each 
individual, and a set of firms' production plans which simultaneously satisfy the 
following two conditions: i) holding firms' plans fixed, there is no other allocation of 
shares and the consumption good which is Pareto optimal and is also individually 
rational with respect to the current allocation, and ii) holding portfolios fixed, there is 
no direction restricted revision of any firm's current production plan which would pass 
a share-weighted majority vote of the firm's shareholders and which would not 
bankrupt any shareholder. 
Under standard regularity conditions, it will be. demonstrated that such non-
controlling interest shareholders' equilibria do in fact exist. Furthermore all such 
equilibria will be characterized as the set of fixed points of a correspondence 
constructed in a very natural manner. 
Myopia and Truthful Voting 
Each participant in the economy is assumed to behave myopically. In 
particular, all individuals behave as if they believed every decision making forum, be it 
a shareholders' meeting or stock market session to be the final allocational event in 
the economy. This convention is the same as that adopted by Dreze [1974], and is 
common in both the stock market equilibrium and shareholder unanimity literature) 
While this assumption affords significant analytical simplicity, it specifically 
rules out strategic behavior such as the acquistion of a firm's shares with the intent to 
gain voting power sufficient to change its production plan. The myopia assumption, in 
the general form stated above, also implies that during shareholders' meetings 
3. For example, Gevers [1974] and Ekern and Wilson [1974] employ similar myopia 
assumptions. 
7 
individuals will vote their true preferences. Given direction restricted voting (to be 
discussed below) Slutsky [1977], in his general equilibrium model with produced public 
goods, argues this assumption is a reasonable approximation of real-world voters' 
behavior. 
It will be assumed here that people vote their true preferences. This is more justifiable in 
the context of this paper than, for example, in the context of the Lindahl model. Fixed tax shares 
and majority rule limit the ability of an irrlividual to gain from misrevelation of preference. False 
voting along a single vector, if the level of goods determined by votes along the other vectors is 
unchanged, can only hurt the individual. To attain an overall benefit from false voting, the 
individual would require much information about the preferences of others. Since, in most 
situations, sufficient information is unavailable, it is at least a good frrst approximation to neglect 
this possibility. 
The transposition of Slutsky's remarks from his public goods model to the financial 
framework developed here should be clear. 
Direction Restricted Voting 
It is well known that unrestricted majority rule processes can give rise to 
voting cycles and nonexistence of equilibrium. One solution to this problem, which 
does not not call for unrealistic assumptions concerning either preferences or the pol -
icy space, has been proposed by Kramer [1972]. Kramer's mechanism requires that, 
in a policy space of dimension n, that n linearly independent directions, called voting 
directions, must be exogenously specifed. 
New proposals to depart from the status quo can differ from it along only one of 
the n voting directions. Under these so-called direction restrictions, together with 
ordinary continuity and quasiconcavity utility assumptions, Kramer demonstrates via 
a fixed point argument that there exist majority rule stable points (attained by some 
unspecified process--perhaps, for example, command by a cental planner). 
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It should be noted Kramer's pr:oof does not assert that starting from any given 
point in the policy space, there exists (much less that there will be spontaneoulsy 
proposed) some sequence of proposals which will converge to an equilibrium. This 
much stronger claim, if proved via familiar fixed point theorems, would require 
demonstrating topological regularity properties of the majority-rule attainability sets 
associated with arbitrary points in the policy space. These sets certainly do not 
appear to be convex, while subtler properties such as contactibility or acyclicity 
depend on the homology groups of the attainabilty sets. This line of investigation 
does not seem likely to yield results in the near term. 
In the corporate context at hand, the exogenously specifed voting directions 
can be given an interpretation which has considerable intuitive appeal. Since there are 
J firms and S future states of the world, the space of all firms' plans has dimension 
J*S. Thus J*S linearly independent voting directions must be specifed in order to span 
the space of firms' plans. While any basis for this space will satisfy the formal 
requirements for the set of voting directions, a particulary natural choice presents 
itself in a production economy. The directions have been defined here so that a 
proposal to revise the status quo production plans may change only the planed output 
of a single firm in a single future state of the world. Slutsky [1977] comments 
concerning the interpretation of the voting directions in his public goods model; these 
remarks can easily be transposed to a financial context. 
The voting vectors can be interpreted in various ways. In a general sense, they serve as a 
simple proxy for more complicated institutional structures found in actual voting situations. 
Unrestricted simple majority voting has the demand for public goods determined directly by vote 
of all individuals with no constraints on feasible votes. In reality, decisions are made by 
interacting branches of government and legislative bodies. Within any voting body, the results 
are strongly affected by committee structures, legislative leaders, and rules of procedure, 
formally or informally specified. These factors are extremely difficult to model in general. The 
imposition of voting vectors is at least a start in placing some institutional structure on the 
political process. Although highly simplistic, their use points out how an equilibrium can be 
created and manipulated through the institutions within which voting operates .. Specifically, the 
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direction of the vectors can be considered to arise from packaging of commmodities for stategic, 
administrative, or natural reasons. 
The direction restrictions are strong assumptions, particularly since myopic 
shareholders are prevented from directly proposing production tradeoffs across 
states. 4 Nevertheless, previous attempts to model majority rule processes in a 
corporate context (for example, Benninga and Muller [1979], Jordan [1978], and 
Gevers [1974]) have only provided non-existence results, or else have been restricted 
to the one-dimensional problem of setting the scale of an exogenously specified 
production plan. 
In assessing the appropriateness of the direction restrictions, it should also be 
kept in mind that deriving majority rule equilibrium res\}lts in a financial setting is a 
more intricate task than demonstrating existence in a purely political framework. The 
financial environment is more complex due to interactions between the market and 
voting processes: i) movement in the policy space of firms' plans in general entails 
new financing requirements, and ii) shareholders' voting weights may change as a 
result of trade. 
eMajority Rule 
The possibility that voters' weights may change poses no problem in attaining 
an equilibrium production plan while holding shareholdings fixed. This factor does 
come into play, however, when searching for equilibrium in both portfolio holdings and 
firms' plans. In fact, since shareholdings can change, the majority rule winner cor -
respondence may fail to be continuous. Consider, for example, a simple case in which, 
4. A coalition of strategic (non-myopic) individuals might accomplish a "diagonal" 
revision of a firm's plan through a sequence of proposals in the basis directions, even 
though each step considered on its merits alone would be deemed undesirable. 
10 
through a sequence of trading sessions, an individual (or coalition) comes to own a 
controlling interest in a firm. Imagine that before this individual gained control, the 
other shareholders have consistently defeated proposals to change the firm's plan. 
However, after gaining a controlling interest in the firm, he can now change the firm's 
plan drastically, subject only to the direction and non-bankruptcy constraints. 
In order to prevent this type of discontinuity, a modified form of majority rule, 
termed &majority rule, has been constructed here. Under smajority rule, the distance 
(in the policy space of firms' plans) from which a winning coalition can depart from the 
status quo is positively proportional to the size of the coalition's majority.S smajority 
rule satisfies the continuity properties necessary to demonstrate the existence of 
equilibrium. In equilibrium the assumption that e is greater than zero can be 
discharged. 6 
Financing Firms' Production Plans: No-Bankruptcy Constraints 
After the aggregate social endowment has been allocated to production and 
consumption, shares have been allocated to individuals, and firms' plans have been 
chosen, the model has been so devised that each firm's production plan turns out to be 
fully financed. That is, given a plan vector, each company has a stock of the first date 
production I consumption good which is just sufficient to undertake its plan. This 
construction reflects the real-world "fully financed and non-assessable" property of 
corporate shares. This property limits the liability of the owner with respect to 
additional contributions to the firm (or to other creditors). 
5. e, the proportionality factor, must be chosen small enough so that the coalition of 
the whole is not prevented from undertaking unanimously supported moves in the 
policy space. 
6. This fact was pointed out by K. Border. 
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However, if the shareholders of some firm vote to revise its plan, in general 
there will be either a surplus or deficit of the current good required for production, due 
to the assumed strict monotonicity of each firm's cost function. In the case of a 
surplus, as modelled here, there will be a refund to the firm's owners on a share-
weighted basis. On the other hand, if there is a deficit, the owners will be required to 
make share-weighted contributions from their personal stocks of the current good. In 
order that no owner should become bankrupt and thus unable to make required input 
contributions, the set of legal proposals to revise firms' plans has been appropriately 
restricted. In addition to the direction restrictions previously discussed, it is also 
required that any proposed plan revision, if it were to be fully adopted, must not 
bankrupt any current shareholder of the firm to which the proposal applies. 
The assumption that expansion plans must be financed entirely by share-
weighted personal contributions from firms' owners lends considerable analytic sim -
plicity to the analysis undertaken here. This is perhaps the simplest financing scheme 
which can be imagined under which the level of investment is endogenously chosen. 
However, the construction introduces some difficulties into the model. These 
problems are twofold in nature: technical and conceptual, and will be discussed in turn. 
First of all, an individual with stocks of the current good exactly equal to zero 
prevents any firm in which he owns a positive share, no matter how small, from 
increasing production--even if a majority of the other shareholders are in favor of doing 
so. 7 Furthermore, if such a (weakly) bankrupt shareholder were to trade away his 
shares in a particular firm, then that firm could suddenly undertake expansion. This 
7. Notice that an individual facing such circumstances imposes an unusual 
externality on the other firm owners. Also observe that the myopia assumption rules 
out the possibility that a shareholder with no current assets might hold other owners 
hostage. 
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possibility gives rise to a failure of lower hemicontinuity of the firm's legal proposal 
correspondence. In order to rule out such discontinuity it is necessary that each 
individual maintain (exogenously set but arbitrarily small) strictly positive holdings of 
every firm. 
Secondly, the financing scenario imperfectly reflects the distinguishing property 
of common shares, namely that stock ownership should entail no risk of ex post 
charges due to changes in a firm's fortunes or operations. 8 In the model developed 
here, of course, share ownership may well require making substantial input 
contributions to finance plan revisions--indeed, revisions to which some shareholders 
may be opposed.9 Of course shares may be traded away after plan revision, but 
shareholders typically will not agree concerning the effects of plan changes on share 
value. It would be desirable to retain the notion of limited liability of share ownership 
in the model. 
One possible way to shade the model in this direction would be to permit 
shareholders who are not liable to be bankrupted by a given plan revision to make 
input contributions for shareholders who would be bankrupted, in return for an 
increased share of the firm. Other possibilities would be to permit firms to issue debt 
or new shares to finance expansion. These possibilities are topics for future research. 
8. While real-world shareholders do not bear the risk of being assessed additional 
charges arising from plan revision, they do bear the risk of unwanted revisions. 
Corporate plan changes are frequently greeted with a divided response among 
shareholders. 
9. Individuals are assumed to be myopic with respect to this risk when acquiring 
shares. 
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Stylized Trading: The Individually Rational Pareto Correspondence 
Consider a simple exchange economy and an aggregate social endowment of 
J+1 goods, in particular, a current production I consumption good and the shares of J 
firms with linearly independent production plans.lO Next define the set of all possible 
allocations of these goods among the economy's I consumers. Finally, consider the 
Walras and core correspondences, each of which maps this set of possible allocations 
back into itself. These correspondences are the natural choices for modelling the 
process of decentalized reallocation among the consumers in an exchange economy. 
Unfortunately, neither the Walras nor the core correspondence is in general 
connected valued, much less convex or contractible valued. There are well known 
results which give sufficient conditions for the Walras correspondence to be singleton 
valuedll; however, the usual requirement, that all goods be gross substitutes, is not 
sensible in a stock market economy. Thus the topological hypotheses of the usual 
fixed point theorems rule out both of these correspondences as analytically tractable 
models of stock market trading.12 
However, K. Border and R. McKelvey have suggested that trade in a stock 
market economy might be sucessfully modelled by a more highly stylized, simpler 
construction--the individually rational Pareto correspondence. This correspondence 
10. In order to insure that firms' plans are linearly independent, each company will be 
required to produce an arbitrarily small, exogenously determined quantity of a unique 
good. These distinguished goods will be discussed in full detail in Section IV. 
11. See, for example, Arrow and Hahn [1971]. 
12. Of course, the possiblity exists that some equilibria may lie in the core or may be 
Walras equilibria. It is hoped that techniques which appear sufficient to demonstrate 
the existence of a continuous selection from the individually rational Pareto 
correspondence can be employed to explore the existence of such equilibria. 
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associates with a given allocation the set of all reallocations which satisfy: i) no one is 
worse off after reallocation than under the given allocation, and ii) from the vantage 
point of the reallocation, there is no other reallocation which would make someone 
better off without making anyone worse off.l3 
Notice that the individually rational Pareto corresopondence majorizes the core 
correspondence. That is, some allocations in the individually rational Pareto image of 
a given state of the economy or "endowment" could, in general, be improved upon by 
some coalition(s) smaller than the grand coalition. However, such behavior on the 
part of small coalitions is being ruled out here, presumably due to the cost of coalition 
formation or the inability of such groups to enforce binding agreements among 
themselves. 
Chipman and Moore [1971] and Zeckhauser and Weinstein [1974] have 
demonstrated by relatively straightforward intuitive methods, and under ordinary 
regularity assumptions, that the Pareto correspondence (defined over the set of the 
economy's possible allocations) takes images which are homeomorphic to the I-1 
simplex, where I is the number of consumers.l4 In particular, the Pareto 
correspondence is contractible valued; this result is extended here to the case of the 
individually rational Pareto correspondence. Dreze [1972] has demonstrated that the 
individually rational Pareto correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. These topo -
logical results, combined with various properties of the production plan voting 
13. Given some allocation, there are in general feasible reallocations which satisfy 
both, neither, or one or the other of these two conditions. 
14. Although there is an extensive literature concerning the mathematical theory of 
Pareto sets, much of this work is considerably less accessible than that of Chipman 
and Moore and Zeckhauser and Weinstein. 
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procedure and the set of states of the economy, yield the desired existence result via a 
fixed point theorem. 
Separation of Voting and Trading 
The underlying "dynamic" scenario alluded to here in which voting and trading 
are carried out on an alternating basis, one activity being conducted while the other is 
held fixed, was first fully developed by Dreze [1974]. As he points out: 
One could, of course, look for a stronger equilibrium concept, ruling out 
incentives for simultaneous adjustments in production plans and portfolios. But 
no natural definition of this stronger concept seems to present itself. 
Slustsky [1977] has also succesfully employed this "two-mechanism" method-
ology. He combined Kramer's [1972] notion of direction restricted voting, together 
with a separate process of simple exchange, to obtain general equilibrium results in an 
economy with production in the public goods sector. 
Non-Controllin~ Interest Eguilibria 
As previously discussed, the equilibrium concept defined here is only tenuously 
connected to a notion of individuals' initial endowments. After firm plans have been 
chosen and the aggregate social endowment has been allocated, individuals' holdings 
can (finally) be considered personal endowments. An equilibrium has been defined to 
be such an allocation from which individuals will not choose to depart, regarding their 
equilibrium holdings as endowments. 
However, a consequence of this construction is an uninteresting class of 
equilibria in which the stocks of the current good are held entirely by individuals who 
hold controlling interests in one or more firms. The extreme case of this phenomenon 
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occurs when one individual holds the entire stock of the current good and all the 
shares of every firm. In equilibrium such an individual will presumably have adjusted 
each firm's plan to his most preferred choice. Clearly no trade can take place in this 
situation since no other individual holds any commodities; similarly firm plans are 
stable since this one individual is the sole owner of every firm. This is indeed an 
equilibrium, but not an especially interesting one.l5 
The set of stockholders' equilibria for the financial model presented here has 
been shown to coincide with the set of fixed points of the correspondence V0 E1p, which 
characterizes individuals' opportunities to reallocate resources. However, fixed point 
existence results typically do not provide much information about the nature of the 
fixed points. It appears that without making additional assumptions, it cannot be 
determined whether or not all the equilibria are controlling interest equilibria. 
One possible approach to this problem is to introduce a stronger notion of 
individual endowments into the model. The initial description of the economy could be 
expanded to include a set of endowed plans for firms, and endowed portfolios of shares 
and holdings of the current good for individuals. Suppose the set of all states 
attainable from this endowment via the repeated action of V0 E1p were contractible. It 
would then be possible to apply the Eilenberg-Montgomery theorem directly to 
demonstrate the existence of equilibria supported by the endowment. Even if all such 
equilibria were controlling interest equilibria, this in itself would be a very interesting 
result. Unfortunately, the topological properties of the V0E1p attainability sets appear 
to be extremely complex. 
15. This problem does not arise in political or models such as Kramer [1972] or 
Slutsky [1977]. In these models, political contraints keep each voter's weight 
exogenously fixed. In both models, a one citizen-one vote rule prevents equilibria in 
which all voting power is concentrated in one individual. 
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Another strategy is to start from an initial endowment and search for equilibria 
which are the limits of sequences of reallocations achieved by alternating processes of 
trade and production planning. In fact, Dreze [1974] employed this technique, but 
technical considerations prevent its application here.16 In Dreze's model, firm 
production plans are realized as Lindahl equilibria of a synthetic public goods economy 
at alternate steps (interleaved with stock exchange price equilibria) of a so-called 
mixed tatonnement I non-tatonnement process. In order to obtain convergence 
results, Dreze imposes an individual rationality condition on the Lindahl equilibria and 
so can employ individuals' utilities as Lyapunov functions.17 This condition cannot be 
expected to hold in any sensible model of a majority rule firm decision-making process; 
after the ballots have been counted, some individuals may simply end up worse-off 
than they were under the status quo. 
The approach taken here is to rule out controlling interest equilibria by 
constraining the state space Z~ so that no individual can hold a controlling interest in 
any firm (through either his own or a central planner's actions). This is accomplished 
by a strict no short sales requirement: Each individual must always maintain at least a 
((50+E) /I)% share in every rum; where E > 0, and I is the number of individuals in the 
16. Dreze's equilibrium proof allows that individuals could be characterized by 
personal initial endowments, but he did not choose to formally introduce personal 
endowments. The notion of departing from some arbitrary initial point (partially 
defined by personal holdings of the current good and firms' shares) in the state space 
and converging to equilibrium is only developed as a technical device in the main 
existence proof. Before concluding that an equilibrium so obtained is "supported" in 
some sense by the initial point, it should be kept in mind that although the each inter -
mediate Lindahl equilibrium is constrained to be individually rational with respect to 
the preceding state (attained via exchange) in the sequence, Dreze's definition of 
Lindahl equilibrium is "consistent with arbitrary transfers of initial resources among 
consumers." 
17. Of course, it is not necessary to impose an arbitrary individual rationality 
condition on the exchange steps of the process. 
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economy. The required holdings tend not to be large. For example, if there are 101 
participants in the economy, it suffices that each individual holds .5% of every firm. 
Clearly as the number of individuals in the economy increases, the required minimum 
holdings decrease in size. Another possibility, which could be easily incorporated into 
the model, would be to simply prohibit any individual from holding fifty per cent or more 
of any firm's shares. 
This minimum holdings requirement does not appear to be an unusually strong 
or unrealistic assumption. Financial markets in the United States attract large 
numbers of participants; taking pension plans into consideration, literally millions of 
individulas own common shares. In an economy of this magnitude, the required 
holdings defined here are infinitesimal. Furthermore, by means of institutional 
arrangements such as mutual funds, millions of individuals do hold very broadly 
diversified portfolios. Finally, there are very few publically traded firms in which any 
one individual holds a controlling interest, and an attempt by any single investor to 
gain control of several publically traded firms would elicit the most aggressive 
regulatory scrutiny. 
No short sales requirements appear frequently in the financial equilibrium 
literature. Diamond [ 1967] assumes strict no short sales, but claims that the 
condition can be relaxed to weak no short sales. The strict assumption appears in 
Forsythe and Suchanek [1982]. No short sales restrictions also appear in Hart 
[1979]. Grossman and Hart [1979] require that each individual's holdings of each finn 
be bounded below; they comment as follows: 
Before stating our existence theorem, we must deal with one further difficulty which arises 
in economies with incomplete markets. In order to apply the usual fixed point theorems, we 
must insure that the economy is bounded. Unfortunately, it turns out that there is no natural 
bound on shareholdings. In particular, it is possible for one group of consumers to go very long 
on one share and very short on another, while another group of consumers does the exact 
opposite, without either group being in any danger of bankruptcy. Moreover, this not only 
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prevents the use of the standard fixed point theorems, it can also prevent the existence of 
equilibrium (see Hart [1975]). In order to avoid this problem, we will make the rather 
unsatisfactory assumption that there is an exogenously determined lower bound on 
shareholdings (see Radner[1972]). 
Similar assumptions occur elsewhere in the stock market literature. Gevers 
[1974] assumes that Yj "the number of shares of the same firm (j) owned by agent i 
when the market closes," is strictly greater than zero for all firms and individuals. 
Jordan [1978] bars short sales and requires that each individual finance investment 
from his first-date endowment. The strict no short sales assumption also appears in 
Forsythe and Suchanek [1982]. 
In conclusion, the existence results derived here assert there is a class of 
(albeit constrained) non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibria. Notice that 
these equilibria are indeed non-trivial. Since all individuals hold strictly positive 
portfolios, trade is eminently possible. Furthermore, no one individual controls any 
firm so that coalitions of individuals can revise firms' plan--if they so desire and 
command sufficient power. 
Optimality 
In general, except under Diamond's [1967] multiplicative conditions or the 
unanimity conditions of Ekern and Wilson [1974], competitive stock ownership 
equilibria will fail to be constrained Pareto optimal. The interested reader may wish to 
consult Forsythe and Suchanek [1982], Stiglitz [1972, 1981], and Jordan [1978] for 
detailed discussions concerning Pareto optimality in stock market economies. Dreze 
[1974] also presents an interesting example of an equilibrium in his model which is not 
optimal. At least holding firms plans fixed, an exchange equilibrium of the stock 
market is a constrained Pareto optimum--although stockholders typically will not 
share the same implicit prices for state-contingent consumption. 
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The above considerations notwithstanding, it should not be surprising that 
after imposing voting direction restrictions that the equilibria in this model may fail to 
be constrained Pareto optimal. See Slutsky [1977] and Kramer [1972] regarding the 
relationship between direction restrictions and optimality. It is interesting to observe 
that the direction restrictions appear to be related to Grossman's [1977] notion of 
Social Nash Optimality, in which a planner is constrained to a finite number of 
allocational activities. This relationship remains a topic for future research. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A very extensive body of literature comprised of over fifty papers in major 
Economics and Finance journals has evolved regarding both the existence and 
optimality of stock market equilibria, and the objective of the firm in incomplete 
financial markets. This review is not an attempt to summarize and critique all of this 
literature; indeed such a review would represent a monograph in itself. Rather, a 
number of carefully selected papers, which are especially relevant to the present 
results, will be reviewed. Each of these papers has generated significant interest, and 
should be carefully studied before undertaking research in this field. The papers which 
will be reviewed are: Diamond [1967], Dreze [1974], Gevers [1974], Ekern and 
Wilson [1974], Jordan [1978], and Benninga and Muller [1979] . 
a. P . Diamond. "The Role of a Stock Market in a Genera] Equilibrium Model." 
Diamond's [1967] prescient paper was the first work in which firms' production 
decisions were examined in the context of an incomplete stock market equilibrium. In 
his extension of the Arrow-Debreu model there is not a complete set of contingent 
claim contracts. Individuals can only insure incompletely against future uncertainty 
through share ownership. 
Diamond's model employs a generalized form of multiplicative uncertainty, 
termed stochastic homotheticity. In this framework a firm can never produce a new 
commodity. Every feasible output proposal for a given firm turns out to be a pattern of 
state-contingent income which is already available and priced in equilibrium (as a 
linear combination of existing shares of other firms). That is, every firm production plan 
leaves unchanged the feasible set of state-contingent incomes available to 
shareholders in the economy. It turns out that shareholder unanimity regarding 
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production plans is assured in Diamond's model. Unanimity conditions will 
considered further in the discussion of the Ekern and Wilson [1974] model below. 
Equilibrium in Diamond's model satisfies a novel optimality criterion--
introduced in the paper--termed "constrained Pareto optimality." The sense of the 
constraint is that, just as participants in the economy cannot open complete markets, a 
central planner cannot construct arbitrary patterns of state-contingent incomes from a 
complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities. Thus the set of feasible centrally planned 
allocations with which a given equilibrium might be compared is restricted to the 
subspace available through share ownership.l8 Stiglitz [1982] commented concerning 
Diamond's optimality criterion as follows: 
In the case of a simple stock market economy with a single commodity ... the notion of 
constrained Pareto optimality was introduced by Diamond [1967]. In an economy with a stock 
market, each individual purchases (his preferred) fraction of each of the firms. In addition, the 
individual may borrow or lend at the safe rate of interest. Diamond considered an economy in which 
these were the only securities allowed, and contrasted the market allocation where firms maximized 
their stock market value, with that where the government allocated all resources, but was severely 
restricted in its ability to distribute the output of the economy: each individual received a linear function 
of the output of the different firms. He then showed that, (a) if the technology of each firm exhibited 
stochastic homotheticity (so that the ratio of the output in any two states was independent of scale); 
and (b) each firm believed that its market value was proportional to its scale, then the market 
equilibrium would be a constrained Pareto optimum. 
Stiglitz [1982] and ·Hart [1975] later showed that in general Diamond's result 
cannot be generalized; the stock market allocation of resources is typically not a 
constrained Pareto optimum when there are two or more outputs. 
Near the end of his paper Diamond relaxes the decomposability assumption, 
so that spanning no longer holds in the model. In a footnote citing Mirrlees, he 
suggests that a firm manager acting in the interests of final shareholders could achieve 
18. Hereafter, "Pareto optimal" should be understood to mean "constrained Pareto 
optimal" in Diamond's sense. 
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a constrained Pareto optimum by maximizing a weighted sum (using post-trade final 
shareholdings as weights) of shareholders' private valuations of the firm's future 
production plan, where each shareholder uses his marginal rate of substitution vector 
between present and future consumption to discount future profits. 
Diamond suggests that the manager might simply poll the shareholders to 
elicit this private information, but does not address the issue of truthful revelation. 
Concern regarding the incentive thus provided for stockholders to misrepresent their 
true marginal evaluations is cited by several authors as a prime factor motivating their 
research. See, for example, Forsythe and Suchanek [1984]. 
b. J. Dreze. "Investment Under Private Ownership: Optimality. Equilibrium and Stability." 
The model developed here was directly inspired by Dreze's [1974] widely cited 
paper. It was decided to retain the as much of the Dreze framework as possible, 
except that the Lindahl mechanism for making firm production decisions has been 
replaced by a majority rule process. It was originally thought that this program would 
be a relatively straightforward exercise; such was not the case. However, it was 
possible to keep the basic structure of the Dreze model intact without significant 
additional assumptions, except for the strict no short sales and distinguished goods 
requirements. 
Dreze mentions that his model represents an attempt to extend the stock 
market results of Diamond [1967] to a more general form of technological uncertainty. 
While Dreze employs the simple two-date stock market I production model formulated 
by Diamond; firms are not restricted to his form of multiplicative uncertainty. Indeed, 
firms are permitted to have very general production technologies. Production sets 
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must be compact and convex, firms' cost function must be differentiable and strictly 
monotonic, and positive input is required for positive output. 
Perhaps the deepest insight contained in Dreze's paper is the separation of 
firm production planning and share trading. Another important technical discovery 
reported in the paper was that the space of allocations available through share 
ownership may fail to be convex. This non-convexity presents significant technical 
difficulties. 
Dreze defines a so-called stockholders' equilibrium as a price equilibrium 
for consumers (holding firms' plans constant) and a Lindahll9 equilibrium for firms 
(keeping shareholdings constant). The nature of the Lindahl equilibrium is carefully 
described in the paper. It is interesting that Dreze does not comment in detail 
regarding the revelation problem associated wtih such a system of production 
decision-making. However, in a footnote he mentions Gevers' concern regarding the 
Condorcet paradox in majority-rule firm planning. 
The definition of a (Lindahl) equilibrium for the firm states that the firm maximizes the present 
value of its production plan, using the shadow prices ... obtained as weighted averages of individual 
shadow prices ... reflecting the consumption preferences of the shareholders with the weights given 
by their respective ownership fractions.* (By theorem) efficient production decisions by the firms 
imply the existence of such prices. 
The definition does not place any restrictions on the allocation among consumers of the 
adjustments in current consumption required to offset the adjustment in input level ... Alternatively 
stated, the definition is consistent with arbitrary transfers of initial resources among consumers. 
* See the paper by Gevers [1974] on the remote possibility of obtaining these shadow prices, 
through majority voting ... 
Forsythe and Suchanek [1982] comment as follows regarding production 
financing and the absence of initial endowments in Dreze's model: 
19. See Johansen [1963] for a thorough discussion of the Lindahl equilibrium concept. 
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Dreze did not consider directly the question of production financing. In his formulation, 
consumers are not associated with initial endowments or initial shareholdings, nor are they identified 
with investment commitments that finance firms' production activities. Rather an aggregate social 
endowment (of a single non-storable production I consumption good) is specified from which firms' 
inputs are subtracted and the residual distributed among shareholders to yield either a portfolio or 
Lindahl equilibrium. To prove the existence of a stockholders equilibrium, however, Dreze 
demonstrates the convergence of a mixed tatonnement-nontatonnement process. 
At each step, the process is shown to yield a Pareto result is and constrained 
to be individually rational; thus individuals' utility functions can be employed to 
construct a Lyapunov function--which drives the convergence result. However, it 
should be noted that Dreze gives examples of stockholders' equilibria which fail to be 
either technologically efficient or constrained Pareto optimal.::l> 
c. L. Gevers. "Competitive Equilibrium of the Stock Exchange and Pareto Efficiency." 
Gever's [1974] paper analyzes the question, "Under what conditions is the 
allocation of resources through a competitive stock exchange Pareto-efficient in a 
suitably restricted sense?" Gevers acknowledges that his model closely resembles 
that constructed by Dreze, although some modifications to Dreze's myopia assump -
tions are required since Gevers considers shareholders' prediction of the value of 
production changes. Perhaps the easiest way to describe Gevers' model is to quote 
from the introduction to his paper: 
The paper is not concerned with the question of existence. It is easy to show, by means of 
examples, that the set of competitive allocations that can be sustained by a stock exchange is 
nonempty. However, no general proof of existence is offered (here). Some counter-examples based 
on the Condorcet paradox can be found in the appendix . 
... Section II is concerned with technological uncertainty when separate markets for contingent 
goods are lacking. . .. the various outputs of the firms are interpreted as physically identical goods, 
which are associated with several a priori possible states of the world Technological choices made at 
20. Additional discussion of Dreze's [1974] paper can be found in the Introduction 
preceding this section. 
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period one, and the state of the world that obtains at period two, determine together the amount of 
output which is actually delivered. 
The model rests on two main assumptions. The first one generalizes the customary assumption 
of free competition; when agents choose their portfolio, they take the price of every share as a datum; 
moreover, they do not perceive any influence of their portfolio choice on production plans of firms. 
The other assumption pertains to the market valuation of a share as it is perceived by the firm's 
decision-makers. The latter choose a production plan and the number of shares that must be floated in 
order to fmance it. When there is a market for every contingent good, the price of a share must be 
equal to the value of the dividends and thus must depend on the production plan. When no such 
markets exist, decision-makers may be assumed to believe that the observed price of a share would 
change in a definite fashion if they selected another production plan. 
This change in market valuation is in the nature of a conjecture; it is less so when short sales are 
permitted, and there are at least as many firms with linearly independent output vectors as there are 
states of the world, or when output ratios are fixed. In the latter case, meaningful aggregates can be 
defined; in the former case, each unit of the contingent good may be priced separately, albeit 
indirectly. 
Except for some unlikely cases ... stockholders generally disagree about the optimal production 
plan. . .. The literature suggests two ways of dealing with this problem (in group decision). 
Following one trend, one may consider the flllll manager as a 'dictator' who selects that production 
plan which suits him best The model may then be closed by exogenously assigning a manager to 
every firm. In a more traditional perspective, one may assume that the manager executes what the 
stockholders decide through majority voting. Further assumptions, under which these decisions 
result in an allocation that satisfies the first-order conditions for a constrained Pareto optimum, are 
described in detail. They are all highly unlikely to be satisfied exactly in reality. 
The model presented in section II of Gevers paper is similar to, although not 
directly comparable with, the model developed in this paper. In particular, he permits 
the flotation of new shares to finance production, while such financing is not allowed 
here. His model is also concerned with properties of price equilibria in an incomplete 
stock market; thus, as mentioned above, some specialized assumptions must be 
adopted to describe how individuals form opinions about the effect of production plan 
changes on stock prices. 
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These differences aside, Gevers does consider the possibility of production plan 
selection by share-weighted majority rule. His chief concern is whether or not a stock 
market I majority rule equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient. He concludes that 
optimality will not obtain except under extremely specialized circumstances. 
While Gevers does not directly focus on with the problem of existence, he 
mentions the "Condorcet Paradox" several times, and gives an example of an economy 
in which no equilibrium majority rule f"rrm plan can be determined. Gevers' model is 
sufficiently similar to the model developed here that the reasons for non-existence in 
his example must be investigated. 
In the example, presented in section (3) of the Appendix to his paper, there are 
three individuals, three states of the world, and one f"rrm. Each individual owns a one-
third share of the firms' output, and Gevers supposes that, "stockholders agree on 
some level of investment a, and they are discussing the output mix." The production 
function in the example is of the form b1+bz+b3 = a5, and so for a fixed level of 
investment, by appropriate choice of units, the "transformation locus" can be 
represented by the simplex in JR..3. 
Gevers goes on to restrict new proposals, in the example, to differ from the 
status quo only in a direction parallel to one of the edges of the simplex. He points out 
that each of the three individuals will have a most preferred production point in the 
simplex. Next, the following construction is suggested: For each vertex of the 
simplex, draw three lines from the vertex--each starting at the vertex passing through 
one of the individuals' optima and ending at opposite edge of the simplex. Thus, 
associated with each vertex is a "median line." Gevers claims, "If the median lines 
drawn from each vertex do not have a common intersection, ... there is no equilibrium 
production plan." 
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Although no proof is offered for this claim, suppose that it is true. The relevant 
question is then: Can Gever's non-existence example be translated to the model of 
this paper? Fortunately, such translation is not possible. His example is really an 
instance of a two-dimensional policy space, with three voting directions--clearly these 
directions cannot be linearly independent. However, the Kramer direction-restricted 
majority rule mechanism assumed in this paper requires that there be no more voting 
directions than the dimension of the policy space. Hence the instance of majority rule 
cycling identified by Gevers cannot occur under the scenario constructed here. 
d. S, Ekern and R. Wilson. "On the Theory of the Firm in an Economy with Incomplete Marlcets." 
The Eckern and Wilson [1974] paper was the first of the so-called unanimity or 
spanning papers. Eckern and Wilson extended the "no new goods" intuition inherent 
in Diamond's earlier work without having to make the same sort of restrictive 
technological assumptions. In this respect, the Ekern and Wilson program cannot be 
considered an unqualified success; for although their spanning condition is weaker 
than Diamond's separability assumption, spanning is still an extremely limiting 
assumption, which is unlikely to satisfied in any real-world environment. Radner 
[1974] comments concerning the spanning condition and its consequences, as follows: 
Roughly speaking, one can paraphrase the results of (the Eckern and Wilson paper) as follows. 
Suppose that the production possibility sets of all producers span a linear subspace of distributions 
across the states of the world, and that an equilibrium of the stock market and choice of production 
plans has the property that the equilibrium production plans span that subspace. Then the ex ante 
(endowed) stockholders in each firm are unanimous in their preferences among alternative production 
plans, and the ex post (equilibrium) stockholders of each flrm are unanimous in their preferences 
among (local) directions of change from the equilibriwn pnxluction plan. 
The Ekern and Wilson paper gave rise to an entire class of papers collectively 
known as the "spanning" literature. Forsythe and Suchanek [1981] summarize this 
literature in the introduction to their paper. 
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The general problem concerns firms' choices of production plans and investors' choices of a 
portfolio of firms' revenue shares in the absence of a complete set of contingent securities markets . ... 
(One approach to the problem) is to establish conditions under which firms can choose production 
plans with the unanimous approval of their stocldlolders . ... Unanimity prevails ... if and only if the 
Ekern and Wilson [1974] spanning condition is satisfied. Loosely stated, the spanning condition 
requires that any small adjusunent in stockholders' returns achievable by altering firms' production 
plans must also be achievable by portfolio changes. In short, the set of available state-distributions of 
returns cannot be affected by firms' decisions. That is, the value of any change in the production plans 
must equal the cost of making the portfolio change. Since the latter cost is calculated from observable 
market values, it is the same for all stockholders. Therefore, each firm's manager (assuming he is a 
stockholder) can use his own preferences when selecting a production plan, and an efficient allocation 
will be obtained. But the spanning condition is highly restrictive since it is rtot satisfied in many 
nonpathological economies. 
Eckern and Wilson provide a proof that unanimity necessarily obtains if 
shareholders are only concerned with the mean and variance of their portfolios. 
However, this result should be interpreted with care, since mean-variance utility 
formulations are consistent with expected utility maximization only in the case of 
random variables with no more than two moments. 
It is fair to say that while the spanning literature generated considerable 
technical interest, by and large the academic finance community came to regard the 
restrictive conditions required for unanimity results as exceptionally unrealistic. The 
spanning assumptions of Ekern and Wilson and Radner essentially require that firms 
cannot produce anything new. Grossman and Stiglitz [1976] have prepared a detailed 
critique of this assumption. 
e. J.S.Jordan. "Investment and Production in the Absence of Contin~ent Markets I." 
Jordan's [1978] paper is devoted to the institution of majority control of firms 
by investors, and the problem of achieving constrained Pareto optimal allocations 
through such institutional arrangements. As he states, the paper is a response to the 
highly restrictive conditions "under which the firm can choose a production plan with 
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the unanimous approval of its shareholders." Jordan constructed a model of great 
simplicity and generality which admits an example of a stock market economy for 
which no majority rule equilibrium production plan exists--and so is particularly 
relevant here. In light of the difficulty in obtaining this mimeo, it should prove 
convenient to quote at some length from the introduction to the paper. 
There are two periods, present and future, and in the future there are several equiprobable states. 
There is a single commodity in the present and in each future state. The present commodity is used as 
an input in the production of the future commodity by a single firm whose technology has constant 
returns to scale. Thus the alternative production plans can be summarized as a set of activities, where 
each activity consists of a vector of state-dependent outputs obtained from one unit of input There are 
several potential investors, each of whom is described by an endowment of the commodity in the 
present and in each future state, and a state-independent utility function. Each investor is assumed to 
know that the future states are equiprobable, so investors are homogeneous with respect to beliefs, 
but not with respect to endowments and utility functions. The decision problem is to select a single 
activity and each investor's investment An investment consists of an amount of the input provided by 
the investor, which entitles him to the corresponding amount of output in each state determined by the 
activity. Put somewhat differently, one 'share' in the fmn is defined as entitling an investor, in each 
state, to the output derived frome one unit of input. Since there are constant returns to scale, this 
defmition is unambiguous. In return for each share, an investor contributes one unit of the present 
commodity. An investment-production plan is Pareto optimal if there is no feasible alternative plan 
which is strictly preferred by some investor and not less preferred by any other investor. A 
mechanism is said to be efficient if it selects Pareto optimal plans. 
Gevers ... (has) observed that corporate majority rule, in which each investor has one vote per 
share, is subject to the same Condorcet paradox which arises in the general social decision problem. 
That is, given any activity y chosen by the fmn, there may exist an activity y' which is preferred by a 
coalition of investors with more than 50% of the shares. However, ... this is not a definitive 
objection to majority control since it ignores the informational and organizational impediments to the 
formation of majority coalitions. In order for the activity y to be effectively opposed, a majority 
coalition of investors must locate one another and agree to support an alternative activity y'. Since the 
Condorcet paradox depends on the existence of another potential majority coalition which opposes y', 
such an agreement is extremely problematic. 
If the majority consists of a single investor, these informational and organizational difficulties 
vanish. Accordingly, ... we will refine the concept of majority control to the concept of a 'controlling 
interest.' Given a mechanism for selecting investment-production plans, a controlling interest is 
defined as a fraction, strictly between 0.5 and 1.0, such that if a single investor owns more than that 
fraction of the total stock, the chosen activity must be his most preferred activity. For example, if a 
corporate charter specifies the election of directors in such a way that an investor who owns 90% of 
the total stock can nominate and elect the entire board, then .9 could be interpreted as a controlling 
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interest. However, it will be proved ... that even this extreme refinement of majority control is 
logically inconsistent with Pareto optimality . 
... Since there are no contingent markets, each agent's future consumption must equal his 
endowment plus his share of the output. Secondly, only one activity can be chosen (by the single 
fmn), so that all investors must invest in the same activity. This technological constraint causes the 
activity to have a public good aspect. In the absence of this second constraint, each investor could 
independently invest in his own most preferred activity, and the model would formally reduce to the 
trivial case of household production. We also assume that the current commodity is not redistributed 
among the investors. This exclusion of 'sidepayments' means that for any investment production 
plan, ... the i.th investor's 'net trade' ... can be interpreted as a stock market transaction, where the 
price of one share in terms of the present commodity is one. 
The convexity of the activity set and the concavity of the expected utility functions leads 
immediately to the first-order necessary conditions for optimality ... . Since returns to scale are 
constant, once the activity is chosen each investor's level of investment should maximize his expected 
utility. 
Jordan points out that the example of the Condorcet paradox presented by 
Gevers does not apply directly in his model, and then he prodeeds to develop such an 
applicable example. The example is based on three individuals, three states, and an 
activity set bounded by the "simplex" in JR3 of all non-negative vectors which sum 
componentwise to 6. The three investors are constructed to have identical utility 
functions, but have endowments which differ by a permutation of states. It is finally 
shown for any given technologically efficient activity that, " ... if each investor is 
permitted his most preferred level of investment, ... there exists another activity which 
is preferred by at least two investors who hold a majority of the shares (of the given 
activity). Jordan remarks: 
It should be emphasized that the majority rule paradox depends on each investor's ability to 
purchase his most preferred number of shares at a price of one unit of the present commodity per 
share. For example, suppose that investor 1 has historically been the owner and sole investor, so the 
activity is yl, when investors 2 and 3 arrive and request shares. Investor 1, in order to retain control, 
could refuse to sell shares or could sell at a price sufficiently high that investors 2 and 3 would 
demand less than a majority interest. (However) ... both strategems are inconsistent with Pareto 
optimality. 
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While Jordan's model differs from that developed here, there are sufficient 
similarities so that the possibility of the present model admitting a related non-
existence example calls for examination. It turns out that there is more "friction," or 
restriction of individuals' ability to change the state of the economy, built into this 
model. Such restrictions yield existence results which otherwise might not obtain. 
These frictions take· three forms: i) the direction and non-bankruptcy restrictions 
imposed on firm plan revisions; ii) the separation of exchange and plan revision, which 
prohibits simultaneous adjustment of plans and shareholdings; and iii) individuals' 
myopia during exchange and planning. 
Jordan's majority rule counter-example supposes some single constant returns 
activity (a pattern of production across states), say y, has been identified. Assume 
that individuals have contributed one unit of the current good for each unit of y,21 and 
that each individual has selected his optimal level of investment with respect to the 
activity, given his endowment and preferences. Then, as Jordan shows, there is some 
other activity y', such that at the (new) optimal individual contribution levels with 
respect to y', a majority of shareholders (measured at the share weights associated 
withy) will prefer y' to y. 
Contrast this situation with the current model. Suppose that with respect to an 
activity (production plan) y an exchange equilibrium has been attained; that is, the 
aggregate social endowment having been apportioned between current consumption 
and investment, some Pareto undominated allocation of shares and the current good 
has been achieved. Next, during the production plan revision process--which keeps 
shareholdings and cost shares constant--shareholders can only propose departures from 
the status quo which i) lie along one of the exogenously specified voting directions, 
21. This notion is well-defined by the constant returns assumption. 
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and which ii) do not bankrupt any current shareholder due to revised input obligations. 
Furthermore, voters are myopic in the sense that they do not forsee the possibility of 
trading their revised shares. Under these restrictions, a state that would not be 
stable in the Jordan framework might well be a shareholders' equilibrium. 
Thus, existence of some other activity y' which would be preferred by a share-
weighted majority of current shareholders is not directly relevant regarding the 
existence of equilibrium in the model presented here. As discussed above, partici-
pants in this model cannot change production plans and levels of investment with the 
same degree of freedom allowed in Jordan's framework--while activity y' and the 
associated optimal personal levels of investment might appear attractive, this state 
simply might not be attainable in the present model. These considerations do not 
accord with the conditions set forth in Jordan's example. 
Jordan nexts constructs a generalization of the share-weighted majority 
concept which he terms a "controlling interest", and it is shown that this mechanism, 
too, is inconsistent with Pareto optimality. He briefly summarizes these results by 
asserting, "The controlling interest paradox states that Pareto optimality cannot be 
generally acheived by any decision mechanism which permits an investor to control the 
firm if he owns a sufficiently large percentage of the equity." Further consideration of the 
controlling interest concept is left for the interested reader. 
Finally, Jordan observes that (at least in academic literature), "The acquisition 
of a controlling interest is not the only way in which an investor's influence can 
increase with his relative shareholding." He points out (as does Dreze) that in 
Dreze's framework, where production plans are chosen to maximize an average of 
investors' marginal rates of substitution, equilibria may also exist which are not 
constrained Pareto optimal. 
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f. S. Benninga and E. Muller. "Majority Choice and the Objective Function of the Finn Under Uncertainty." 
At first glance, Benninga and Muller [1979] might appear to have obtained an 
equilibrium solution for a general equilibrium production model in which shareholders 
make multi-dimensional production decisions by majority rule vote. However, upon 
closer inspection it becomes apparent that the paper essentially fixes firms' current 
production pattern and restricts the shareholders' problem to the one dimensional 
question of setting production levels by choosing the level of retained earnings. 
Furthermore, these authors impose a spanning condition which is even stronger than 
that employed by Eckern and Wilson. 
As Winter [1981] points out in his critique of their paper, the Benninga and 
Muller results concerning majority rule equilibrium are trivial consequences of 
Eckern's and Wilson's earlier unanimity results. Furthermore, Winter asserts--and 
Benninga and Muller [1981] agree in a later rejoinder--that the timing scenario in their 
model is both more complex and less general than the Arrow-Debreu framework. In 
particular, resources are not committed to production before the resolution of all 
uncertainty. In conclusion, the Benninga and Muller paper, its provocative title 
notwithstanding, does not demonstrate equilibrium of a multi-dimensional shareholder 
majority rule decision problem in the standard stock market I production framework. 
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II. THE MODEL 
DEFINITION (Stock Market Economy (X0 , U, C, ~)) 
Let there be given: 
• a finite set I = { 1, ... , I} of individuals, 
• a fmite set J = { 1, ... , J} offmnsl, 
• a two element index set { 0, 1 } of dates, and 
• a finite set S = { 1, . . . , S} of mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive second date states of nature. 
Suppose on the first date that none of the individuals knows with certainty which of 
the states of nature will be realized on the second date. 
Given such an environment, define a stock market economy to be a four-tuple of 
the form (X0 , U, C, ~). The various components of the economy should be interpreted 
in the following manner: 
i) X 0 is a non-negative quantity of a non-storable date 0 consumption/investment 
good; this good will also be referred to as the current good. X0 may be regarded as 
an aggregate social endowment. 
1. A fixed number of fmns has been assumed to preclude the possibility of innova-
tion or the entry of new firms. This is a standard assumption in the stock market 
equilibrium literature; see, for example, Diamond [1967], Dreze [1974], Ekern and 
Wilson [1974], and Sharpe [1964]. The assumption is required here for technical 
feasability. The model is already quite complex. The possibility of obtaining results 
appears remote if phenomena as intractable as innovation and entry were admitted. 
In defense of the assumption, it seems entirely reasonable to suppose there are fewer 
firms than states of the world--and this is really the key issue here. 
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The endowment X0 can either be consumed today by the economy's participants, 
or else invested in the J firms' technologies to yield returns of a single second date 
consumption good across the future states of nature. Investment decisions must 
be taken, and units of X0 committed, on date 0-- before the second date state of 
nature is known. 
ii) U = (U 1, ••• , U1) is a (1 X I) array of utility functions indexed by the set { 1, ... ,I} of 
individuals. Each element of this array is a map of the form U i: JR(l+S+J)+ ~ R+. 
In order to simplify notation, if q = (q1, ... , ~) e X1(JR(l+S+J)J, then U(q) will be 
written for the (1 X I) vector (U 1(q1), ... , U1(~)). 
Each individual i makes first date decisions to maximize the utility associated 
with three distinct consumption activities: 
1) consumption of the date-0 or current good, a non-negative 1-vector, 
2) contingent consumption of the date-1 produced good across the S 
future states of nature, a non-negative S-vector, and 
3) consumption of J "distinguished" goods indexed by the set of firms, a 
non-negative J-vector. 
Notice JR(l+S+J)+ is the domain of each utility function Ui. Regarding the second 
consumption activity, consider that actual physical consumption only occurs in the 
state of nature which happens to be realized on the second date. Notice, too, that 
the utility framework which has been adopted here is general enough to include 
expected utility maximization as a special case. Finally, concerning the third 
consumption activity, it may be convenient to think of the distinguished goods as 
being consumed on the second date. Formally, however, the timing of their 
consumption is of no particular consequence; furthermore the aggregate quantities 
of the distinguished goods can be arbitrarily small. These goods will be discussed 
in greater detail in later sections. 
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iii) C = (C1, ••• , C1) is a (J X 1) array of convex cost2 functions indexed by the set 
{ 1, ... ,J} of firms. Each component is a map of the form Cj: JR. s +----?JR.+. For con -
venience, ifb = (bl, ... 'bJ) E XfR5J, C(b) will be written for (Cl(bl), ... , Cj(bJ)). 
If bj e JR. s + denotes a vector of quantities of the second date consumption good 
across the states of nature, CjCbj) is defined to be the minimum quantity of the date 
0 production/consumption good required by firm j to produce bj. Notice that CjCbj) is 
always non-negative. 
For the purposes of the model to be developed here, a firm's cost function is 
assumed to constitute a complete description of the firm's technological possi -
bilities. Firms' technologies are assumed to be proprietary and non-transferable. 
Furthermore, the set of firms and technologies is assumed to be fixed; there is no 
technological innovation, and no entry of new fmns. 
iv) ~ = (y, o) is an exogenously set array of parameters. 'Y is an (I X J) matrix of 
minimum shareholdings. Thus 'Y'if where 0 ~ 'Yij ~ 1 and Jl. ry.i = L[i=l,.,I] 'Yij ~ 1, 
V j e J, denotes the minimum (percentage) shareholding individual i is required to 
maintain in finn j. Notice that the required minimum holdings are non-negative 
(short sales are prohibited), that no individual is required to hold more than 100% 
of any finn, and that the sum of the required holdings across individuals is less 
than 100% for any given fmn. The y matrix plays a technical role in the stock 
market economy model to be developed here; certain results will require that every 
individual maintain an arbitrarily small, but strictly positive, holding in every fmn. 
2. The assumption of convex costs is equivalent to the assumption of non-
increasing returns to scale. This assumption is standard in literatrure concerning 
equilibrium in stock market economies; see, for example, Diamond [1967] and Dreze 
[1974]. The reader is referred to Arrow and Hahn [1971] for a general discussion of 
the role of the non-increasing returns assumption in microeconomic production theory. 
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A firm's shares entitle their owner to both a constant fraction (across the states of 
nature) of the firm's output of the date-1 good, and to the same fraction of the 
"distinguished" good distributed by that firm. Individuals can consume the date-1 
good and the distinguished goods only by owning shares of firms. The share -
holders of a given finn vote for and finance the firm's date-1 production. Additonal 
characteristics of firms' shares will be discussed in later sections. 
8 is a (J X J) diagonal matrix of firms' distinguished goods endowments. In 
particular, 8jj denotes the quantity of the j 1!1 distinguished good endowed to the j!h 
finn. Notice that since 8 is diagonal, the j!h distinguished good is endowed only to 
the j.th firm. Each distinguished good is unique; the distinguished good associated 
with the j.th firm is distinct from that associated with the k.th finn. Finally, it is 
important to emphasize that each firm's distinguished good endowment is 
exogenously determined, and is not a decision variable for the economy's 
participants. It is not possible for a firm to produce additional quantities of any 
distinguished good. 
The distinguished goods play a technical role in the model; certain results require 
the assumption that each firm j produce an arbitrarily small, but strictly positive, 
quantity of the j!h distinguished good. For convenience, the notation 8 >> 0 will be 
employed to denote that the diagonal elements of 8 are strictly positive. 
The stock market economy construct is a highly stylized model of real world 
allocational institutions characterized by stock market trading and shareholder voting. 
The next step in the development of the model is to defme a convenient representation 
for a configuration or state of the economy. 
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DEFINITION (State Space Z~) 
Let (X0 , U, C, ~)be a stock market economy and define the associated state space 
Z~ according to: 
z~ = { (x, b, 8) E JR. (l+JS+IJ) + I 
i) x e JR. I+, where x is an (I X 1) row vector, 
ii) b e JR. IS +• where b is a (J X S) matrix, 
iii) 8 E X J s (I -1), and 8 ~~ "(, where 8 and 'Y are (I X J) matrices; and 
iv) x·1•+1rC(b)=X0.}. 
A state z = (x, b, 8) e Z~ should be interpreted as a complete description of the stock 
market economy (X0 , U, C, ~). The notation U(z) will be adopted as an abbreviation 
for U(x, 8 · b, 8· 8) if there is no possibility for confusion. 
While a particular state does not explicitly specify each individual's second date 
consumption, this information is well defined by a given state-- as will be described 
below. Finally, it should be pointed out that the word "state" will be used here in two 
contexts: "state z of the economy," and "state s of nature." It seems only a remote 
possibility that any confusion might arise from this dual usage. 
x = (x01, . . . , xn. . . . , x01) denotes an allocation of the date-0 or current 
consumption/investment good across individuals. Notice that x e JR.I+; condition i) 
reflects the assumption that negative quantities of the current good cannot be 
consumed. 
b = (b1, ... , bj, ... , b1)T is a (J X S) matrix of firms' production plans. In the case of firm 
j e J, for example, bj = (bJ1' ... , bjs• . . . , b15) specifies the quantities of the second date 
consumption good to be produced by firm j, contingent upon the realization of the 
various possible states of the world. Notice the general form of this technology; in 
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particular a given finn is not restricted to simply decide the scale of some exogenously 
determined pattern of production across states. Indeed, the production plan of a given 
firm may represent an aggregate of several distinct productive activites or enterprises 
conducted by the finn. Observe that, as set forth under condition ii) above, no firm can 
produce a negative quantity of the second date consumption good in any state of the 
world} 
e is an (I X J) matrix which specifies individuals' shareholdings of the various firms. 
Short sales are prohibited, the sum of all shares across individuals is 100% for every 
firm, and the minimum holdings requirements must be maintained. 
Condition iv) in the definition above is an accounting identity which specifes that the 
total quantity, summed across individuals, of the date-0 consumption/production good 
consumed plus the total quantity, summed across firms, invested in production must 
equal the aggregate social endowment X0 • There is no loss of generality in expressing 
this condition as an equality, rather than an inequality, since interior states attained 
by free disposal of the consumption/production good will never be realized when U is 
componentwise monotonic. 
A state specifies each individual's consumption. Recall that three types of 
consumption are possible: consumption of the current good, contingent consumption of 
the second date produced good, and consumption of the distinguished goods. The 
stock of the current good held by each individual is specified directly as the first 
coordinate of a state. Now, a state specifies both the shareholdings of each individual 
in each finn, and firms' plans-- and so well defines each individual's contingent con -
sumption of the produced good. Finally, since consumption of the distinguished goods 
3. Professor Strnad has pointed out that this assumption obviates the chief 
advantage of the corporate form of finn organization--owners' limited liability. 
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is proportional to holdings, the shareholdings information specified by a state together 
with the exogenously specified vector of distinguished goods suffice to determine 
individuals' distinguished goods consumption. 
REMARKS (Mechanisms for Changing the State of the Economy) 
The model admits two mechanisms whereby individuals can change the state of the 
economy on the rrrst date: a market mechanism, and a voting mechanism. The 
action of these mechanisms is restricted so that one can function only while the other 
is suspended. The notion of one-on I one-off exclusivity in an economy with dual 
allocational processes appears to have been first employed by Dreze [1974]. The 
workings of the two mechanisms will be discussed informally below, in anticipation of 
formal definitions which follow later in the text. 
Let a state z of the economy be given. In the market mechanism, keeping rrrms plans 
fixed, individuals may exchange their holdings of shares in the J firms and their stocks 
of the current good.-- thus arriving at some new state with the same rrrm plans as the 
original. No individual will be permitted to hold negative quantities of the current good 
or to sell shares short. Indeed, every individual must maintain a strictly positive 
minimum holding in each firm, as specified by the exogenously given matrix y. The 
model of trading employed here is highly stylized: It will be assumed that given a 
state z, the process of exchange generates some state which is both i) Pareto optimal 
among all states with the same plan matrix as z, and ii) individually rational, that is no 
individual is worse off than under z. 
Again, let some state of the economy be given. The second mechanism for change 
allows shareholders to change rrrms' production plans, while keeping their ownership 
fractions of the various rrrms fixed. Such changes could involve adjusting the quantitiy 
of the current good committed to production, the output patterns produced by firms 
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across the states of nature--but not the level of investment, or both. Reflecting real 
world corporate practice, it will be assumed here that changes in a firms' plan must be 
approved by a share weighted majority of its shareholders. This voting procedure will 
be constrained by two requirements, one of them a feasibility condition and the other 
imposed for technical reasons. Both conditions are implemented as restrictions on 
new proposals to depart from the status quo z. 
First of all, changes in a firm's plan will require adjustment of the quantity of the 
current production I consumption good. At a given state z, each firm possesses 
exactly a sufficient quantity of this good to undertake its plan as specified by z. If 
shareholders decide to revise the plan, depending on whether the new plan is more or 
less ambitious than the original under z, they must make additional share weighted 
contributions of the current good from their personal stocks (specified under z), or they 
will recieve share weighted refunds. In order to avoid potential embarassment of 
other shareholders, no plan to depart from the status quo may be proposed which 
would require a share weighted contribution sufficient to bankrupt any shareholder of 
record. Admittedly this restriction rules out various welfare improving schemes such 
as lending among shareholders, or new equity offerings--but the model is sufficiently 
delicate that such extensions are better postponed at least until some preliminary 
results have been achieved. 
The second proposed restriction has been adopted purely for technical reasons, in 
particular to circumvent the tendency for multidimensional majority rule mechanisms to 
cycle. Perhaps the least artificial device for ensuring the existence of majority rule 
equilibria is so-called direction restricted majority rule proposed by Kramer [1972]. 
Under this scheme, a collection of linearly independent voting directions, of rank equal 
to the dimension of the policy space, is exogenously specified. Proposals for policy 
change can differ from the staus quo can only along one of these voting directions. In 
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the problem under discussion, a natural collection of voting directions is apparent: A 
proposal to change frrms' plans can suggest revising at most the production of one frrm 
in one state of the world. 
It must be admitted that direction restrictions are restrictive. However, in the case at 
hand the departure from real world practice may not be as significant as might appear 
at first consideration. In particular, one of the kinds of plan revisions ruled out by the 
direction restrictions in the form adopted here is a coordinated revision of plans by 
several firms. This would of course require a vote of the combined shareholders of the 
several firms involved, a corporate event unlikely to meet with approval of antitrust 
regulators. The real cost of the direction restrictions insofar as accurate reflection of 
real world practice is concerned would seem to be the prohibition of production 
tradeoffs across states, and scale adjustment of a production pattern by a single firm. 
Yet, results cannot be obtained without assumptions; higher resolution stock market 
models appear to require more powerful majority rule existence theorems than are 
currently known.4 
DEFINITION (Exchange Equilibrium for a Stock Market Economy) 
An exchange equilibrium for a stock market economy (X0 , U, C, ~) is a state z = 
(x, b, 8) e Z~ such that there is no other state z' which is both: Pareto optimal over the 
subspace z~l b of all states having production plan b, and also individually rational with 
respect to z. More formally, there is no z' e Z~ I b which satisfies both: 
i) not 3 zt e Z~ I b such that U(zt) >> U(z'), and 
ii) U(z') ;:::;::: U(z). 
(Pareto Optimality) 
(Individual Rationality) 
4. Professor Strnad has suggested that limiting the voting powers of owners and 
adding management to the model might be a promising direction for future research. 
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Both of these criteria can be subsumed by the simpler condition: 
not 3 z' e Z~; I b such that U(z') >> U(z). 
DEFINITION (Voting Equilibrium for a Stock Market Economy) 
A voting equilibrium for a stock market economy (X0 , U, C, ~) is a state z = (x, b, 8) 
e Z~; which, keeping the stock ownership matrix 8 fixed, cannot be defeated by any 
other (direction restricted) state z# = (x#, b#, 8) e Z~; 19 in a share weighted standard 
majority rule vote by the shareholders of the firm facing the proposed plan revision. 5 
To be more precise let a standard basis { e 11, ... , ejs• .. . , e1sl. or set of voting 
directions, be given for RJS. The jslh coordinate axis in the space of firms' plans 
corresponds to the production of firm j in state of nature s. A state z e Z~; is a voting 
equilibrium just in case there is no distinct z# = (x#, b#, 8) e Z~; 19 which satisfies: 
i) b# = b + <X*ejs ~~ 0, for some j e J, s e S, (Direction Restriction) 
ii) x# = x + (C(b)-C(b')) ~~ 0, and (Non-Bankruptcy) 
iii) Jl. {ch}(z#l z) ·8j > .5. (Share Weighted Majority Rule) 
The (1 X I) vector Jl. *cch}(z#l z) is an indicator for the set of individuals i who strictly 
prefer z# to z, that is for whom: Ui(x#ci> (8#·b#)i, (8#·8)J > Ui(x'ci> (8'·b')i, (8'·8)} 
5. The requirement that a plan revision not bankrupt any current shareholders is 
reflected in the definition of a state of the economy. One of the defining conditions of a 
state stipulates that no individual can hold a negative quantity of the current good. 
Only states can be proposed as alternatives to the status quo state, thus capturing 
the no bankruptcy provision. 
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Notice that standard majority rule has been defined so that indifferent voters vote 
for the status quo, and ties go to the status quo.6 
DEFINITION (Shareholders' Equilibrium for a Stock Market Economy) 
A shareholders' equilibrium for a stock market economy (X0 , U, C, ~) is a state z e 
Z~; which is simultaneously an exchange equilibrium and voting equilibrium for the 
economy. 
DEFINITION (Non-Controlling Interest Shareholders' Equilibrium) 
A shareholders' equilibrium z e Z~; for a stock market economy (X0 , U, C, ~)is called a 
non-controlling interest equilibrium just in case there is at least one finn in which 
no single shareholder has a controlling interest, that is 50% or more of the firm's 
shares. 
6. The existence results developed here obtain whether or not indifferent voters 
vote for the status quo or the challenger. 
46 
PROPOSITION 2.1 (Existence of Non-Controlling Interest Shareholders' Equilibria) 
v 
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Figure 1. 
Let (X0 , U, C, ~) be a stock market economy. Suppose that: 
ii) Each component Ui of U is strictly monotonic, strictly concave, and satisfies 
the condition infr~ e JRO+S+J)+1u i(~) = 0. 
iii) Each component Cj of C is strictly monotonic, convex, and non-negative. 
iv) ~ = (y ,o) >> 0; the minimum shareholdings matrix and the distinguished 
goods vector are strictly positive. 
v) There is at least one firm in which all individuals must maintain share 
holdings of no less than .5/I; that is, 3 j e J ('<:/ i e I (Yij > .5 /I)). 
Then there exists at least one non-trivial shareholders' equilibrium z e Z~ for the 
given economy. 
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A detailed proof of the proposition forms the body of this paper; an outline of the proof 
will be presented here. 
If the aggregate social endowment X0 = 0, no production is possible, and firms' shares 
are simply rights to the distinguished goods. In this case the question reduces to the 
well-understood problem of demonstrating the existence of some state z which is 
stable with respect to the market process; see Debreu [1957]. Hence suppose 
X 0 > 0. 
In the diagram above, E1p denotes the individually rational Pareto correspondence on 
Z~, and V: Z~  Z~ is a function with the pleasing property that fixed points of V are 
voting equilibria, and vice versa. It will be demonstrated that the the set of equilibria 
for the given stock market economy coincides exactly with the set of fixed points for 
yoEIP· 
Thus the search for equilibrium can be reduced to demonstrating that V 0 E1p does in 
fact have fixed points in Z~. The desired existence result is obtained by application of 
the Eilenberg-Montgomery theorem, and so it is necessary to verify the hypotheses of 
the theorem. It is required to show that Z~ is compact and contractible, and that 
V 0 E1p is upper hemicontinuous, and non-empty, compact, and contractible valued on 
z~. 
The proofs that Z~ is compact and contactible are straightforward. To show V 0 E1p is 
upper hemicontinuous and non-empty, compact valued, it will be argued that E1p 
exhibits these properties, and that V is a continuous function. By continuity their 
composition shares these desired properties. Finally, as the 1-1 continuous image of 
a contractible set is itself contractible, the required contractible valuedness of V 0 E1p 
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will be proved by first showing E1p is contractible valued, and then arguing that V is 
1-1 on every set of the form E1p(z). Significant technical digression is necessary to 
derive some of these intermediate results, in particular that E1p is contractible valued, 
and that V is continuous. 
The contractiblity of E1p is shown by utilizing the fact that the utility image of the 
Pareto set of an exchange economy is homeomorphic to the simplex Sl-1; see Chipman 
and Moore [1971] and Zeckhauser and Weinstein [1974]. These results are extended 
to cover the case of the individually rational Pareto set in the stock market economy 
associated with a given state, holding firms' plans fixed. In fact, each such set is 
either a singleton or else homeomorphic to the simplex Sl-1. These results are 
homeomorphically pulled back to the "physical" allocation space of shares and the 
current good, yielding the desired result. 
The proof that V is continuous requires the construction of a modified form of majority 
rule, called here £-majority rule. Under £-majority rule, the distance (measured in the 
policy space of firms' plans) which a winning coalition can depart from the status quo 
is positively proportional, E > 0 being the proportionality factor, to the coalition's 
margin of victory. The £-majority rule mechanism also assumes that indifferent voters 
vote for the challenging proposal. 7 The assumptions that E > 0 and the assumption 
favoring challengers are both discharged after the appropriate fixed points have been 
generated. Finally, as noted previously, the voting mechanism employs the 
well-known direction restriction technique to obtain existence results. 
7. Notice that under £-majority rule forE > 0, ties are awarded to the challenger. 
This is not a separate tie breaking rule per se, but rather a consequence of the 
requirement that a challenger must obtain a strictly positive margin of victory to 
overturn the status quo. 
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III. THE STATE SPACE 
This section shows that the state space Z~; of a stock market economy is both 
compact and contractible. I These results are important since equilibrium states can be 
characterized as fixed points of an appropriately constructed correspondence defined 
on Z~;. Commonly employed fixed point theorems require domain conditions, typically 
compactness and some connectivity property such as convexity or contractibility. 
Compactness of Z~; is a relatively simple matter. Unfortunately, however, Z~; is not 
convex-- which precludes application of Kakutani's theorem. The problem of non-
convexity in stock market economies seems to have been first recognized by Dreze 
[1974]. Nevertheless, Z~; can be shown to be contractible, which admits the possi-
bility of using the Eilenberg-Montgomery theorem to obtain fixed point results. 
PROPOSITION 3.1 (Elementary Properties of Z~;) 
Let z = (x, b, 8) e Z~;. and suppose ~ ~~ 0; then: 
i) Z~; is compact. 
ii) Z~; I b is compact. 
iii) In general, Z~; is not convex unless each cost function Cj is linear. 
iv) Z~; Ill' however, is convex. 
1. Contractibility and related topics are discussed in Willard [1970]. 
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The proofs of parts i), ii), and iv) are straightforward. Notice compactness obtains 
from the boundedness of the aggregate social endowment X 0 , and from continuity and 
monotonicity of firms' cost functions. 
To show iii), let z = (x, b, 9) and z' = (x', b', 9') e Z~. If Z~ is convex then it must be 
the case that tz+(l-t)z' e Z~, V t e (0,1). In particular, this condition requires that: 
[tx+(l-t)x']-11 = X0-1rC(tb+(l-t)b'). (*) 
Now the left hand side of ( *) can be expanded according to: 
[tx+(1-t)x'}1I = t[x·ll]+ (1-t)[x'·li] 
= t[X0-1rC(b)] + (1-t)[X0-1rC(b')] 
= X0-[t1rC(b)+(1-t)lrC(b')] 
= X0-1r(tC(b)+(l-t)C(b')) (**) 
Now, since C has been assumed to be componentwise convex, C(tb+ (1-t)b') ~~ 
tC(b)+ (1-t)C(b'). And so, referring to the right hand side of(**), one can conclude 
that: 
[tx+(1-t)x'} 11 = X0-[1r(tC(b)+(1-t)C(b'))] ~ X0-1rC(tb+ (1-t)b'). (***) 
Since each component Cj of C is convex, the inequality appearing in ( ***) will be strict 
for some t e (0,1) unless every Cj is linear on the interval (bj,b'),j e J. QED. 
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PROPOSITION 3.2 (Contractibility of Z~;) 
Z~; is contractible, V ~ ~~ 0. 
Let z# = (x#, b#, 8#) e Z~; be given. Let kz# and id denote the constant map Z~; ---7 
{ z#} and the identity on Z~;, respectively. It suffices to show that kz# and id are 
homotopic, that is 3 a continuous H: Z~; X [0,1] ---7 Z~; such that H(·, 0) = kz# and 
H(·, 1) = id. 
For any z = (x, b, 8) e Z~; and t e [0, 1] construct H according to: 
H(z,t) = ((1-t)x#+tx+y(b,t), (1-t)b#+tb, (1-t)8#+t8), 
where y(b,t) is a (1 X I) row vector, each component being identical and specified by: 
(1/1) * lir(((l-t)C(b#)+tC(b))- C((1-t)b#+tb)). 
Recall that li 1 is a (1 X J) row vector and C(b) is a (J X 1) column vector, so the 
multiplicands appearing in the dot product above are conformable. Notice that y(b,t) 
~~ 0; V be JR(JxS)+, and t e [0,1] since each component cost function CjofC is convex. 
Furthermore, by inspection, y(b,O) = y(b,1) = 0. 
Clearly H is continuous on Z~; X [0,1], this property obtaining directly from the 
continuity of the cost functions Cj, V j e J. 
Now, 
H(z,O) = ((1-0)x#+Ox+y(b,O), (1-1)b#+1b, (1-0)8408) 
= (x#+y(b,O), b#, 8#) 
= (x#, b#, 8#), V z e Z~;. 
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And hence, 
H( · ,0) = kz#. 
Similarly, 
H(z,1) = ((1-1)x#+1x+y(b,1), (1-1)b#+1b, (1-1)8418) 
= (x+y(b,1), b, 8) 
= (x, b, 8), '\/ Z E Z~. 
H(·,1) = id. 
It remains to show that each function H(· ,t) does, in fact, take values in Z~. It suffices 
that: 
i) (1-t)x4tx+y(b,t) ~~ 0, 
ii) (1-t)b4tb ~~ 0, 
iii) (1-t)8#+t8 E S'Y' and 
iv) ((1-t)x#+tx+y(b,t)} ]J.I + RrC((l-t)b#+tb) = X0 
Notice that i) obtains trivially since x#, x, y(b,t) ~~ 0. To show ii) note that since z, z# 
e Z~, then both b#, b ~~ 0. Consider iii) follows directly from the convexity of Sy. 
Finally, to show iv), observe that substituting in the Lh.s. of the expression directly 
from the definition of y(b,t) gives: 
((1-t)x#+tx} RI + Rr(((l-t)C(b#)+tC(b))-C((1-t)b#+tb)) 
+ RrC((l-t)b#+tb) 
= ((1-t)x#+tx} RI + Rr((l-t)C(b#)+tC(b)) 
= (1-t)(x#. Rl+lirC(b#)) + t (x· R4RrC(b)), and recalling z, z# e Z~, 
= (1-t)X0 + tX0 , 
= X 0 , as desired. 
QED. 
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IV. STOCK MARKET TRADING 
Stock market trading has been modeled here by the individually rational Pareto 
correspondence E1p, defmed on Z~ .. This section demonstrates that a state z is an 
exchange equilibrium just in case it is a fixed point of E1p. It is also shown that E1p is 
compact, non-empty valued, upper hemicontinuous, and contractible valued. Note the 
strict concavity of U and a strictly positive distinguished goods vector are required to 
show the contractible valuedness of E1p. 
DEFINITION (Individually Rational Pareto Correspondence E1p) 
Given any C ~~ 0, defme the correspondence E~p: Z~ ~~ Z~ according to: 
E~p(z) = { z' E z~ I b I 
i) not3 z"e z~lb such that U(x", 8"·b, 8"·8) >> U(x', 8'·b, 8'·8), and 
ii) U(x', 8' · b, 8' · 8) ~~ U(x, 8· b, 8· 8)}, where 
z = (x,b,8), z' = (x',b,8'), z" = (x",b,8") E z~l b ~ z~. If there is no possibility for 
confusion, E1p(z) will be written for E~p(z). 
The correspondence E1p describes the set of feasible reallocations attainable through 
stock market trading. Condition i) requires that elements of E1p(z) are (y-constrained) 
Pareto optimal with respect to Z~ I b· That is, given an element of E1p(z), there is no 
other state z" of the economy which would make all participants better off, while not 
violating the minimum holdings constaint and at the same time keeping firms' plans 
fixed at the plan b specified by z. The Pareto condition can be expressed here by a 
strict inequality since U is componentwise continuous and strictly monotonic. 
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Condition ii) stipulates that points in E1p(z) must be individually rational with respect 
to z. That is, no individual is worse off under any given element of E1p(z) than under z. 
PROPOSITION 4.1 (Elementary Properties of EIP and the Characterization of Exchange Equilibria) 
Suppose that U is componentwise continuous. 
i) E1p is non-empty valued on Z~. 
ii) E1p is compact valued on Z~. 
iii) z e E1p(z) <=> {z} = E1p(z) <=> z is an exchange equilibrium, whenever o >> 0 
and U is componentwise strictly quasiconcave.l 
To show i) let z = (x, b, 9) E z~ be given. If z E EJp(z) the problem is trivial, so 
suppose z e E1p(z). Referring to the definition of E1p, if z fails to be an element of 
E1p(z) then 3 some individually rational z' e Z~ I b which Pareto dominates z. Since U 
is continuous and z~lb is compact, there is some such maximal z'--which therefore 
belongs to E1p(z). 
To show ii) let z = (x, b, 9) E z~ be given. Since EJp(z) ~ z~, and z~ is compact and 
hence bounded, it suffices to show that E1p(z) is closed. Let (z#n) be a sequence 
taking values in E1p(z), and suppose (z#J ~ z#; it will be demonstrated that z# e 
E1p(z). 
1. Even if individuals' preferences for consumption are strictly quasiconcave, their 
indirect preferences over the space of portfolios composed of firms' shares and the 
current good may fail to be strictly quasiconcave if firms' plans are linearly dependent. 
This seems to have been rrrst recognized by Dreze [1972]. The strictly positive vector 
o of firm specific distinguished goods forces the consumption opportunities afforded by 
share ownership to be linearly independent, regardless of rrrms' plans. 
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Recall EJp(z) c z~ I b> and that this set is also compact; thus z# E z~ I b· Suppose 
however that z# ~ E1p(z), then one of two cases must obtain: 
a) 3 z"e z~lbsuch that U(x",8"·(b,8))>> U(x#,8#·(b,8)),or 
b) Ui(x#, e#. (b,o)) < Ulx.e· (b,O)), for at least one individual i E I. 
In case a), since the inequality is strict and U is continuous, there is some real Tl > 0 
such that the inequality will remain true when zt is substituted z#, if zt e N'Tl(z#). But 
for n sufficiently large, z#n = (x#n,b#n=b,8#J e N'Tl(z#), which implies 3 z"e z~l b such 
that U(x",8"·(b,8)) >> U(x#n,e#n·(b,o))-- contradicting that z#n e E1p(z). 
On the other hand, should b) be the case, the continuity of U i and the strictness of the 
inequality imply there is some real ~ > 0 such that the inequality remains true if zt is 
substituted for z# whenever zt e N~;(z#). Thus as (z#~  z#, for n sufficiently large, 
z#n = (x#n,b#n=b,8#J e N~;(z#), which implies Ui(x#n,e#n·(b,o)) is strictly less than 
Ui(x,8·(b,8)), for at least one individual i e 1-- contradicting that z#n e E1p(z), and 
completing the proof of part ii). 
Finally, to show iii) suppose that z e E1p(z) ; it will be demonstrated first that {z} = 
E1p(z). For suppose not, then since E1p(z) ;II!: <j>, 3 some Z
1 e E1p(z) ~ Z~ I b such that Z1 
;II!: z. Now, by definition of EJp(z), U(x I' el ·(b,o)) ;:::~ U(x,8·(b,o)); in fact it must be the 
case that U(x',8 1 · (b,O)) = U(x,8·(b,8)). Otherwise, there is at least one individual i 
for whom Ui(X 1 , e~·(b,o)) > UiCx,8·(b,8)); but then the componentwise strict 
monotonicity and continuity of U, together with the divisibility of Zl; I b imply that z can 
be Pareto dominated by some state in z~ I b--a contradiction. Since U(x I' el. (b,O)) = 
U(x,8·(b,8)), and Z 1 ;II!: z the convexity of zl;lb and componentwise strict 
quasiconcavity of U on Z~ I b given 8 >> 0 imply 3 some z" e Z~ I b such that 
U(x",8"·(b,o)) >> U(x,8·(b,8)) and U(x 1 , 8 1 · (b,8))--contradicting the assumed 
optimality of z and Z 1• The remaining steps of the implication cycle are trivial. QED. 
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PROPOSITION 4.2 (Upper Hemicontinuity of E1p) 
E1p is upper hemicontinuous on Z~, \:1 ~ 2::2:: 0. 
Since E1p is compact valued, it suffices to show that the correspondence is closed. Let 
(zJ-~ z, z#n e E1p(zJ, and (z#rJ -~ z#. Must show that z# e E1p(z) , that is: 
i) z# E z~ I b• where z = (x, b, 8), 
ii) U(x#,S#·(b,o)) 2::2:: U(x,S·(b,o)), and 
iii) not 3 z" e z~lb such that U(x",e"·(b,o))>> U(x#,S#·(b,o)). 
In the case of i), notice that z# e Z~, since Z~ is compact; however, it must be verified 
that z#e z~lb> or that b#= b. Now, (zJ---+ z, so (btJ---+ b; as each z#n e E1p(ZrJ, 
then z#n E z~ I h.-- which implies b#n = bn. Thus, 
(z#n)---+ z# => (b#n=bJ---+ b# => b# = b, 
as desired. 
Condition ii) obtains directly form the continuity of each component Ui of U. 
Finally, to show iii), suppose not. Then: 
3 z" e z~lb such that U(x",S"·(b,o))>> U(x#,S#·(b,o)). 
Since this inequality is strict, and U is componentwise continuous, 3 open 
neighborhoods (relative to Z~) NTI(z") and N~;(z#) of z' and z#respectively for which(*) 
is true. Claim that since both z" and z# E z~ I b• 3 v > 0 such that if z+ = (x+, b+, e:l:) E 
N y(z#) and b+ ~~ b,then 3 zt = (xt , b+, e t) E NTI(z") and zt E Z~; I b*· Now, if the claim is 
true, given ~. v > 0 there is M e N such that n > M => z#n e N~;(z#) n Nv(z#). But 
then 3 ztn e NTI(z") such that btn = b#n and U(xtn,etn·(btn,o)) is componentwise strictly 
greater than U(x#n,e#n· (b#n,o))--contradicting that z#n e E1p(zn). 
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It remains to prove the claim; see the figure below. By continuity of C, there is A.> 0 
+--.....;:.....:........:........_..:........:.....:........:...~----r-:-.;......:.-~~---. Z~lbt 




such that I 8"·(C(b#)-C(b+))l < (2/3)11 whenever I z#-z+l < A.. Choose v < 
MIN { A.,Tl/3} . Given z+ e Nv(z#), construct zt according to: bt = b+, et = 8", xt = 
x"+8"·C(b")-8t·C(bt) = x"+8"· (C(b")-C(b+)). In order to show zt e Zt;lb*• consider 
that since bt = b+, zt e Zt; I b* if zt e Zt;. Since z+ e Zt;, trivially bt= b+ ~~ 0; it remains 
to verify that xt ~~ 0, and that xt· Jll = X0-JI.rC(bt). 
To show xt ~~ 0, consider that x"~~ 0 since z" e Zt;; as it has been assumed that b+ 
$$ b = b", monotonicity of C gives: C(b")-C(bt) ~~ 0. Thus one finds xt = 
x"+8"· (C(b")-C(b+)) ~~ 0, as desired. Turning now to the issue of xt· Jl. I, observe that 
xt· ]J. I can be expressed as: 
(x"+8"·C(b")-8t·C(bt)} ].I 
= x"· ].I+ (8"·C(b")} ].I- (8t·C(bt)} ]J.I 
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= X 0 - RrC(b
11
) + RrC(b11)- RrC(bt), 
which is simply X 0 - RrC(bt). 
In order to complete the proof of the claim, it is necessary to verify that I Z 11-ztl < 11· 
Observe that 
lz~~-ztl = l(x11,b11,9 11)-(xt,bt,9t)l ~ lx~~-xtl + lb~~-btl + l9~~-9tl. (**) 
Now, bll = b#, and bt = b+; thus, I b~~-btl =I b#-b:J:I < v < 11/3, since I z#-z+l < v. Notice 
also that 9t = 9 11 so that I 9~~-9tl = 0. Thus expression(**) can be rewritten as : 
I Z 11-ztl < I X 11-xtl + 11/3. 
This implies: 
I z II -z t I < I X II - (X II +9 II. ( c (b 11)-C (b+))) I + 11/3 < I 9 II. ( c (b 11)-C (b+)) I + 11/3 < 11' 
as desired. QED. 
DEFINITION (Constructions for Showing E1p is Contractible Valued) 
Given any state z = (x, b, 9) e Z~, where ~ ;;:::;;::: 0, let dhU[E1p(z)] denote the 
disposable hull of U[E1p(z)] relative to JRI+· Clearly dhU[E1p(z)] '# <1> since &P is non-
empty valued; in particular ro(z) e dhU[E1p(z)], where ro(z) denotes U(x,9·(b,o)). 
Notice also that dhU[E1p(z)] ~ IR1+, since each component of U is non-negative 
valued. Furthermore, dhU[E1p(z)] is compact since U is continuous and E1p is 
compact valued on Z~. Define the maps <;z, q>z, andXz on s<1- 1> as below.2 
2. Chipman and Moore[1971] employed similar constructions to investigate various 




i) <;z: S<I-1) -7-7 dhU[E1p(z)] ~JR. I+ such that: 
<;z(a) = { ro' e dhU[E1p(z)] I 3 A.~ 0 s.t. ro' = ro(z)+A.*a} 
Since dhU[E1p(z)] contains ro(z) and is compact, <;z is non-empty, compact, and 
convex valued by the disposability of dhU[Eu(z)]. Therefore <;z(a) is a line 
segment in JR. I+ of the form [ro(z), ro(z)+A."*a], for some real A."~ 0. 
ii) <pz: S(l-1) --7 dhU[E1p(z)] ~JR. I+ such that: 
<p z(a) = ARGMAX [ (J) I E <;z(a)] { ro'. ]J.I} 
<pz(a) is the maximum feasible (with respect to dhU[E1p(z)]) aggregate utility 
attainable by traversing utility allocation space in direction a e s<I-1) away from 
ro(z). <pz is a well defined function since the linear optimand ro' · Jl. 1 is strictly 
increasing over the interval <;z(a). 
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iii) xz: S(I-1) ~~ Z~; such that: 
Xz(a) = { z" e Z~; I b I ro(z") = <pz(a)} 
xz<a) is the set, keeping firms' plans fixed at b, of "physical" allocation pre-
images of the utility allocation cpz(a) associated with a e s<I-1). 
PROPOSITION 4.3 (Continuity of ~z• <f'z• and Xz) 
Suppose U is continuous, then'v' z e Z~;, such that~ ~~ 0: 
i) Each correspondence ~z: s<I-1) ~~ dhU[E1p(z)] is continuous. 
ii) Each function <pz: S(I-1) ~ dhU[E1p(z)] is continuous. 
iii) Each correspondence Xz: s<I-1) ~~ Z~; Ibis upper hemicontinuous. 
To show upper hemicontinuity of~. first observe that since dhU[E1p(z)] is compact, ~ 
is compact valued; thus it suffices to show the correspondence is closed. Let (an) be a 
sequence in s<1-1> such that (an)~ a0 , and suppose (ro#J ~ ro#0 , where ro#n e ~z 
(aJ. Must show o:/#0 e ~z<aJ. Now, . by definition of ~z• each ro#n is of the form 
ro+A..#n*an, for some ').,.#n e R+. Since (ro#n) = (ro+A..#n*aJ ~ ro#0 , and (aJ ~ a0 , it 





• Notice that A..#0 ~ 0 since each A,.#n ~ 0, by definition of ~z· Thus it only 
remains to show that ro+A..#0 *ao e dhU[E1p(z)] to guarantee membership in ~z(z). But 
as each ro#n e dhU[E1p(z)] and this set is compact, ro#0 = lim(ro#J e dhU[E1p(z)], as 
desired. 
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To show <;z is lower hemicontinuous, let (aJ ~ a0 and suppose ro#0 e <;z(a0). It is 
required to construct (ro#J ~ ro#0 such that ro#n e <;zCan). Now, by definition of c;z, 
ro#0 must be of the form ro+A#0*a0, for some A#0 e R+. If A#0 = 0 then ro#0 = ro, and 
simply define c#n = ro; it is trivial that ro e c;zCan). Hence suppose A#0 > 0, and in this 
case define A#n according to: 
A#n=ARGMINp,"?:O] {IA#0-A"I I ro+A#n*an) E dhU[EJp(z)]}, V' n E N+. 
Clearly A#n is well defined since dhU[E1p(z)] is compact. Define the sequence (ro#n) 
according to: 
It is straightforward that ro#n e c;zCan), from the definition of c;z and the construction of 
A#n· And so it remains to verify that (ro#J ~ ro#0, and it clearly suffices that 
(A#n)---t A#0 . Notice that, by construction of A#n and the disposability of 
dhU[E1p(z)], the terms of (A#n) are bounded above by A#0. So suppose (A#J -\--t A#0, 
then since the terms of the sequence are bounded above, 3 some convergent 
subsequence (A#nJ such that: 
Before proceeding it is necessary to establish the following claim: For any real ~. 
0< ~ < A#0, there is v > 0 such that whenever I at-a0l < v, there is some real At, 
0< At< A#0, such that I A t-A#0I < ~ and ro+A t*at e dh(ro#cJ c dhU[E1p(z)]. To prove 
the claim, let~> 0 be given and recall that a#0 e S(l-1) is a (1 X I) vector of the form a0 
= (a01 , ... , a0J)· Define a = MIN[ie I] { (~*aci> I (A#0-~)}, and choose v such that 0 < v 
< a . Consider that: 
I at-a01 < v which implies I a\-aa.l < v <a, and therefore 
(A#0~)(an+ I a t1aa.l) < A#0aci> V' i e I. 
Since this last inequality is strict, it is possible to assert that: 
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3 A.t e (0, A.#0 ) such that I A.t-A.#0 I < ~ and A.t(aa+ I ati-acil) < A.#0a00 V i e I. 
Therefore A.t(aa+ati-aJ < A.#oaci ~ A.tati < A.#0 a00 Vie I ~ A.tat is componentwise 
strictly less than A.#0a0 ~ c.o+A.tat << c.o+A.#0 a0 = ro#0 • And so, frnally: 
3 A.t e (0, A.#0 ) such that I A.t-A.#0 I <~.and c.o+A.tat e dh(ro#o), 
which completes the proof of the claim. 
It will now be shown that equation ( *) contradicts the claim above. Since 
(A.#rJ--7 A."0 < A.#0 , A."0 and A.#0 can be separated by open neighborhoods of diameter 
~· Notice that since (y --7 a0 , for any v > 0 3 M e N + such that whenever m > M, 
I am-aol < v. Thus regardless of how small vis chosen, there can be found some M 
such that if m > M there is no A.tm satisfying I A.tm-A.#0 I < ~. and c.o+A.tnflm e dh(ro#0 ). 
For the existence of such a A.tm would contradict the minimality of A_#= since dh(ro#J ~ 
dhU[E1p(z)]. As the claim has been contradicted, it must be the case that 
A.#m--7 A.#0 , as desired. Since ~z has been shown to be both upper and lower 
hemicontinuous, the correspondence is continuous as claimed. 
Recall that <t>z is defined by: 
cp z(a) = ARGMAX [ c.o • e c;.(a)] { ro' · Jl.I}. 
Since ~z is compact valued and continuous on S (1-1), and the optimand ro' ·11. I occurring 
in ( **) is a continuous function, the desired continuity of <pz obtains directly from 
Berge's Maximum Theorem; see Border [1985]. 
Finally, recall that Xz is defined by: 
Xz(a) = { z" E zl; I b I ro(z") = cpz(a)}. 
Since Zl; I b is compact and U is continuous it is straightforward to show that Xz is 
compact valued; hence to demonstrate upper hemicontinuity, it is only necessary to 
show that Xz is closed. Let (an) ---7 ao and (Zn) --7 Zo where Zn E xz<aJ; it is 
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required that Zo E xz( ao'). Clearly Zo E z~ I b by compactness, so turn next to the 
problem of showing ro(zo') = <pz(ao') . Since each Zn E xz(aJ it follows ro(zn) = <i>z(aJ; 
continuity of U and <i>z give that lim ro(zn) =lim <pz(aJ ~ ro(lim zn> = <pz(lim ~ ~ 
ro(zo') = <i>z(ao'), as desired. QED. 
PROPOSITION 4.4 (<pz is a Homeomorphism) 
Suppose that u is strictly quasiconcave, then T;f z E z~ such that y ~~ 0 and 0 >> 0: 
i) U[E1p(z)] is the homeomorphic image of S(l-1) under <pz, if ro(z) E U[E1p(z)]. 
ii) Otherwise U[E1p(z)] = U[{z}]. 
Let z e Z~, "( ~~ 0, o >> 0, be given. It has been previously demonstrated that if 
o >> 0 and ro(z) e U[E1p(z)] then E1p(z) = {z}, so that trivially U[E1p(z)] = U[{z}]; 
hence suppose that ro(z) E U[E1p(z)]. In order to show <i>z is a homeomorphism it is 
required to verify that: 
a) <i>z is a continuous function on s <I-1). 
b) <i>z is 1-1 on S(l-1). 
c) <i>z[S<I-1)] = U[E1p(z)]. 
d) <i>z-1: U[E1p(z)] ~ S<I-1) is continuous on S(l-1 . 
The continuity of <i>z having already been established, consider part b) and suppose <i>z 
is not 1-1 on S<I-1). Then 3 distinct a#, at e S<I-1) such that <pz(a#) = <pz(at) <=> 
ARGMAX[ro' e~(a~]{ro' ·JJ.I} = ARGMAX[ro'e~(at)]{ro'·1 1 } <=> co(z)+A.#*a# = 
64 
co(z)+A.t*at <=> A_#*a#= A.t*at. Since a#, at aredistinct directions in l~.I+ it must then be 
the case that A_#= A.t = 0 ~ ro(z) e U[Eip(z)]--a contradiction. 
It is straightforward to show that <pz[S<I-1)] = fr(dhU[Eip(z)]) r1 K+ro(z); to prove c) it 
remains to demonstrate that fr(dhU[Eip(z)]) n K+co(z) = U[Eip(z)] . Recall that the 
frontier (relative to JR. I+) of a set X c JR. I+ is defined by fr(X) = cl(x) r1 cl(JR. I+-X). 
To show U[Eip(z)] ~ fr(dhU[Eip(z)]) n K+co(z), let z' e E1~z) and note (1 +A.)U(z') e 
K+co(z), V A.;::: 0. Choose A.' = lub { A,# ;::: 0 I (1 +A.#)U(z') e dhU[E1p(z)] } ; A.' exists 
since dhU[E1p(z)] is compact and hence bounded. Notice that (l+A.')U(z') e 
fr(dhU[E1p(z)]), as can be established directly from the compactness and disposability 
of dhU[E1p(z)]. In fact, A.' = 0; for suppose not, then let 0 ·<A." < A.', and consider that 
(l+A.")U(z') >> U(z'). Furthermore, (1+A.")U(z') e dhU[E1p(z)] since (1+A.')U(z') e 
fr(dhU[E1p(z)]). But by definition of disposable hull, then 3 zt e E1p(z) such that 
U(zt) ;:::;::: (l+A.")U(z') >> U(z')-- a contradiction since both zt, z' e E1p(z). 
To show fr(dhU[E1p(z)]) n K+co(z) ~ U[E1p(z)], let co' e fr(dhU[E1p(z)]) r1 K+co(z); it 
suffices that 3 z" e E1p(z) such that U(z") = co'. It has been previously shown that 3 
z" e E1p(z) such that U(z") >> co . By the disposability of dhU[E1p(z)], WOLOG let 
U(z") be of the form (1+A.") co'. Consider that lub{ A_#;::: 0 I (1+A.#)co' e dhU[E1p(z)]} 
= 0, for otherwise co' E dhU[E1p(z)]. Since U(z") = (l+A.") co' e dhU[E1p(z)], this 
means A." = 0 so that U(z") = co', and so completes the proof of c). 
Finally, to demonstrate d), observe that whenever co(z) E U[E1p(z)] , <pz has been 
shown to be a 1-1 continuous function defined on the compact domain s<1-1) onto 
U[E1p(z)] ~JR.I+- But this means the inverse cpz-1: U[E1p(z)]----+ s<I-1) is necessarily 
continuous, see 17.14 of Willard [1970]. QED. 
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PROPOSITION 4.5 (Xz is a Homeomorphism) 
Suppose that U is strictly quasiconcave, then '\/ z e Z~ such that y ~~ 0 and o >> 0: 
ii) And if z e E1p(z) then E1p(z) is the homeomorphic image of S<I-1) under Xz· 
Let z e Z~, ~ ~~ 0 be given; it has been previously demonstrated that 
Xz: S(l-1) ~ ~ Z~ I b is upper hemicontinuous. In order to show Xz is a homeo -
morphism under the additional assumption o >> 0, it is required to verify that: 
i) Xz is a continuous function on s<I-1). 
ii) Xz is 1-1 on S<I-1) whenever z e E1p(z). 
iii) Xz[S<I-1)] = EJp(z). 
iv) xz-1: [EJp(Z) ~ s<I-1) is continuous on S(l-1) whenever z e Erp(z). 
To show i), it suffices to demonstrate that Xz is single valued. First it will be shown 
that Xz is convex valued. Let a' e S<I-1), and suppose z#, zt e Xz(a') so that ro(z#) = 
ro(zt) = <pz(a'). Since U is strictly quasiconcave, ro is also quasiconcave on Z~ I b; 
hence, for 0 s;; t s;; 1, ro(tz#+(1-t)zt) ~~ <pz(a'). By convexity of Z~ I b• tz4(1-t)zt e 
z~l b · But then ro(tz#+(1-t)zt) = <pz(a'), for otherwise tz#+(1-t)zt would Pareto 
dominate z# and zt in Z~ I b• a contradiction. To show Xz single valued, suppose not; · 
then for some a' E s<I-1), 3 distinct z#, zt E xz<a'). From the argument just above 
ro(tz#+(l-t)zt) = ro(z#) = ro(zt) = <pz(a'). However, since U is strictly quasiconcave and 
o >> 0, ro is also strictly quasiconcave on Z~ I b; therefore, ro(tz#+(l-t)zt) >>both ro(z#) 
and ro(zt)--a contradiction. 
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To show ii), suppose z e E1p(z) and that Xz is not 1-1; then 3 distinct a', a" e S(l-1) 
such that xzCa') = Xz(a") ~ 3 z', z" E z~ I b such that ro(z') = <pz(a') = ro(z") = <pzCa") 
~ ro(z)+(1+A.')a' = ro(z)+(1+A.")a" ~ A.' =A."= 0 ~ ro(z) = <l'z(a') = cpz(a") ~ 
z e E1p(z), a contradiction. 
To show iii), notice that if z e E1p(z) so that {z} = E1p(z), the issue is trivial; hence 
suppose z e E1p(z) . Let z' e E1p(z); since z e &p(z), ro'(z') >> ro(z) and so defines 
a direction a' e JR.l+ parallel to (ro(z), ro'(z')). Direct application of the def'miton of Xz 
gives Xz(a') = z'. 
Finally, in the case of iv), recall that a 1-1 continuous map from a compact space to a 
Hausdorff space has a continuous inverse. QED. 
PROPOSITION 4.6 (E1p is Contractible Valued) 
Suppose that U is strictly quasiconcave, then E~p: Z~ ~~ Z~ is a contractible valued 
correspondence, 'V y ?:.?:. 0, o >> 0. 
The issue is trivial in case z E E1p(z); otherwise, E1p(z) is the homeomorphic image of 
S(l-1) under Xz and so is contractible. Notice the assumption that the distinguished 
goods vector is strictly positive has been employed previously. QED. 
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V. SHAREHOLDER VOTING 
This section analyzes shareholder voting in a stock market economy. In 
particular, the direction restricted, share weighted majority rule equilibria are 
characterized as fixed points of a so-called voting corner function V defined on Z~;. 
The analysis proceeds by first demonstrating continuity of the feasible plan 
proposal correspondence. Next the E-majority rule formalism is introduced. Then the 
correspondences which specifiy the set of potential winning proposals along each 
voting direction are shown to be continuous, convex-valued and one-sided. Berge's 
maximum theorem gives the continuity of the functions which distinguish, for each 
voting direction, the most distant proposal capable of replacing the status quo. The 
composition of these functions then provides the desired continuous voting corner 
function. Finally, the set of voting equilibria is shown to coincide with the set of fixed 
points of the corner function. 
DEFINITION (Feasible Proposal Correspondences 13 and 13js) 
Let { e 1, ... , ejs• .. . , e15} denote the standard basis for the space JR. IS+ of firms' 
production plans . Suppose that ~ :2::2: 0, and let z = (x, b, 8) e Z~;. 
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i) Define the feasible proposal correspondence f3 : Z~; ~~ Z~; according to: 
f3(z) = { z# = (x#, b#, 9#) e Z~; I 
a) x# = x+9· [C(b)-C(b#)] ~~ 0, 
b) b# = b+aejs• for some direction ejs and a e R, and 
c) 9# = 9 ~~ r > > o} .1 
ii) Given a direction ejs define the correspondence f3js : Z~; ~~ Z~; according to: 
f3js(z) = f3(z) n { z# = (x#, b#, 9#) e Z~; I b# = b+aejs• a e 1R}. 
f3(z) should be interpreted as the set of feasible proposals which can be made by 
shareholders to depart from the status quo z. The three conditions in the definition 
above embody fundamental assumptions regarding shareholder voting and the 
financing of new production plans. f3j5(z) ~ f3(z) is the set of feasible proposals to 
change the production plan of a single finn j in a single future state of the world s. 
Condition a) in the definition of f3 states that the current consumption specified under 
any proposal must be obtained from the status quo current consumption vector by 
making appropriate share weighted refunds or assessing additional charges to current 
shareholders, reflecting changed production costs under the new proposal. 
Furthermore, the current consumption vector under any new proposal must be non-
negative across individuals. This is a non-bankruptcy condition. Note that changes in 
production plans must be financed exclusively by firms' current shareholders from their 
stocks of the date zero consumption I production good. No proposal can suggest 
production changes which would require (share weighted) contributions which would 
1. In the definition of f3(z), it may have been noticed that xis a (1 xI) vector while the 
expression x+9· [C(b)-C(b')] is (IX 1). Thus their sum is technically not well defined 
since the summands are not conformable. In the interest of notational simplicity, the 
reader is asked to make the obvious transposistion. 
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bankrupt any shareholder. Finns cannot issue debt or new equity, and neither can 
individuals borrow from one another. 
Condition b) specifies that any proposal to change the status quo production plan b can 
only differ from b along one of the basis directions for the space JRJS+ of firms' 
production plans. That is, insofar as production plans are concerned, a proposal can 
only suggest modifying the production of a single finn in a single futute state of the 
world. This condition has been adopted to utilize the direction restricted majority rule 
equilibrium existence results first proved by Kramer [1972]. It is well known that, in 
general, majority rule mechanisms may cycle over multi-dimensional choice spaces. 
Direction restrictions resolve the problem of non-existence of majority rule voting 
equilibrium without imposing stringent conditions on voters' preferences. 
Finally, condition c) states that a proposal cannot change the pattern of ownership of 
firms' shares from the status quo situation. This is an instance of the fundamental 
separation property of the stock market economy. There are two basic mechanisms 
for changing the state of the economy, voting and stock market trading. However, 
these mechanisms cannot operate simultaneously. During trade, firms' plans must 
remain fixed; and during production plan voting, no shares can be exchanged. 
An important technical complication arises in the model because ~ may fail to be lower 
hemicontinuous on Z~ unless every individual holds some (arbitrarily small) positive 
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fraction of every firm. This is the only reason that the the assumption y >> 0 appears 
at various junctures in the development of equilibrium existence results.2 
PROPOSITION 5.1 (Upper Hemicontinuity of the Feasible Proposal Correspondences) 
Suppose that C is continuous, then V ~ ;;::;;:: 0: 
i) f3: Zt; ~ Zt; is upper hemicontinuous. 
ii) Each correspondence f3js: Zt; ~ Zt; is upper hemicontinuous. 
Pan i) will be demonstrated here, the proof of the second pan being straightforward 
given the first. Let a sequence (zJ in Zt; be given such that (zJ-~ z0 • Since f3 is 
compact valued on Zt;, V ~ >> 0, it suffices that if (z#n) ~ z#0 , where z#n e f3(zJ, 
then z#0 e f3(z0 ). Thus, recalling the definition of of f3: 
f3(z) = { z' = (x',b',S') E Zt; I x' = x+S·[C(b)-C(b')], b' = b+aejs• e· = e}, 
it is required to show: 
2. Failure of lower hemicontinuity can occur as follows. Consider a sequence of 
points in Zt;, identical except for the shareholding matrices. At each term in the 
sequence, let some individual i have, exactly 0 units of the current good. Suppose 
individual i is always a shareholder of tmn j, and always the only (weakly) bankrupt 
shareholder. Since i is bankrupt, no proposal to increase j~ production is feasible. 
Now let i! holdings vanish in the limit. Suddenly-- and discontinuously-- the 
remaining non-bankrupt shareholders are free to make expansionary proposals. 
This discontinuity resembles the situation in exchange economies in which 
consumers' demand correspondences may fail to be lower hemicontinuous at the 
minimum wealth level which will permit consumption in their consumption sets. 








b#0 ~~ 0, 
b#0 = b0+<Xejs• for some a. e JR. and some voting direction ejs• and 
e#o =eo-
Recall that the set of voting directions { el> ... , ejs• .. . e15} is the standard (orthogonal, 
unit length) basis for JR. JS +• the space of firms' production plans. 
Since z#n e (3(zJ, each z#n is of the form xn+en· [C(bJ-C(b#J]. Thus a) obtains from 
the continuity of each component Cj of C, since both (zJ ~ z0 and (z#J ----+ z#0 • 
To show b) consider that x#n ~~ 0 since each z#n e (3(zn); thus (x#J ~ x#0 ==> x#0 ~~ 
0. Part c) obtains by a similar argument. In the case of d), since each z#n e (3(zn) then 
lim(b#J = lim(b0+<X.neJ = b0 + lim(<X.neJ, where <Xn e JR. and en e { e1, •.• , e15}. (Notice 
that, in general, en may depend on the sequence index n.) If b#0 = b0 , the problem is 
vacuous; therefore, suppose b#0 '#- b0 • In this case both lim(a.J and lim(eJ exist are 
non-zero, so it suffices that lim(en) = ejs• for some standard basis vector. Claim that 
as (eJ converges, eventually en= some one particular basis vector ejs· For otherwise, 
given any N e N +• 3 n,m > N such that~'#- enr Now since (en) is Cauchy, given any 
~ > 0-- and in particular, let ~ < 2(1/2) __ 3 M e N + such that whenever n,m > M then 
I en-em I < ~. But, as above, n,m > M can be chosen such that en'#- ew since both are 
standard unit basis vectors, I en-eml = 2(1/2) > ~. a contradiction which proves lim( en)= 
ejs and so concludes the demonstration of e). Finally, e) obtains since each z#0 e l3(zn) 
implies e#n =en; given that (zJ ----+ Z0 , then e#o = lim(e#J = lim(en) = e0 , as desired. 
Notice that the argument just given is consistent with ~ = 0; in particular individuals 
need not maintain strictly positive holdings of every firm in order to demonstrate the 
upper hemicontinuity of (3. QED. 
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PROPOSITION 5.2 (Lower Hemicontinuity of the Feasible Proposal Correspondences) 
Suppose that C is non-negative, continuous, and strictly monotinc; then V y >> 0, 
i) J3: Z~; ----7 Z~; is lower hemicontinuous. 
ii) Each J3js: Z~; ----7 Z~; is lower hemicontinuous. 
Part i) will be demonstrated here; the argument for part ii) is similar. Let (zrJ be a 
sequence in (the compact set) Z~; such that (zrJ ----7 z00 and choose z#0 e J3(zo). Will 
construct (z#rJ ~ z#00 where z#n e J3(zrJ. Temporarily adopt the notation 
(zrJ = ((xno bno So)). Notice that since z#0 e J3(zo) and z0 e Z~;. then z#0 must be of the 
form (x#00 b#00 S#o), where: 
a) x#0 = x0 + S0• [C(bo}-C(b0+aaejs)l for some a 0 e R and planning (basis) 
vector ejs• and 
Define an= ARGMIN[a'e lR.]{I a'-aJ I (xn+Sn·[C(bJ-C(bn+a' e js)], bn+a' e js• s.Je 
Z~;, and a' e [-1 a 0 l, I a 0 l]}. Equivalently, this definition specifies <Xn as the unique 
solution to: 
MIN [a'e Rl a'- a 0 l 
S.T. 1) Xn+ Sn· [C(brJ-C(bn+ a' e js)l ~~ 0, 
2) bn + a' ejs ~~ 0, and 
3) a' e [-1 a 0 1.1 a 0 1 ]. 
73 
Claim that an is well defined. Clearly a' = a 0 is the unique solution to the problem if 
neither constraint 1) nor 2) fails. Suppose, however, that 1) is violated in which case 
at least one component of the left hand side must be negative. Recall that the vector 
C of cost functions is non-negative and strictly monotonically increasing in each of its 
components (each defined over RS+) and Zn E z~ so that Xn ~~ 0 and en~~ 'Y >> 0. 
Thus a violation of 1) can occcur when choosing a' = a 0 only if a 0 > 0, and is 
sufficiently large that the expansionist plan bn+aaejs would bankrupt some shareholder 
of firm j. In this case, the unique optimal choice of a' must lie in [O,acJ. For if a' = <Xo 
violates 1), a' > a 0 surely will also; furthermore, a' is feasible since Zn e Z~, while 
choosing a' negative always results in a larger value for the minimand. Uniqueness of 
the solution, a', in [O,aol obtains since each component of the left hand side of 1) 
increases monotonically as the choice of a' is reduced from a 0 toward 0. Note 2) is 
satisfied by any a' e [O,acJ, for a 0 > 0. 
On the other hand, if 2) fails when a' = a 0 then since both bn> ejs ~~ 0, a 0 must be 
negative-- corresponding to a reduction of firm j's production in future state s. (Failure 
of 2) can occur only if the norm of the contemplated reduction aaejs exceeds the total 
planned production on dimension js under bn. The constraint says that the firm cannot 
produce negative quantities in any state.) In this case, the optimal solution must lie in 
[aa>O]. Forif a' = a 0 < 0 violates 2), so will a' <aD' Notice also that a' = 0 is feas-
ible since zn e Z~ , while positive choice of a' can only result in a larger value of the 
minimand than a'= 0. Uniqueness of a' obtains from the uniqueness of the solutions 
to bn + a' e js = 0 (restricting attention to the jlh component) as a' increases from a 0 
toward 0. Thus <Xn has been shown to be well defined. 
Now construct the sequence (z#~ according to z#n = (xn+Sn·[C(b~-C(bn+aypj8)], 
bn+a' e js• e.J. Clearly z#n E Z~, because both Zn E z~ and by definition of <Xn· 
Furthermore, inspection of the definitions of Zn and 13 will reveal that, as constructed, 
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z#n e l3(zn) since z#n is obtained from z0 by: i) changing the production plan of a single 
firm in a single future state, ii) making the required adjustments in shareholders' 
current accounts without causing bankruptcy, and iii) while holding 80 fixed. 
Claim that if (an)~ a 0 then since (zrJ = (x"' b"' 8rJ ~ z0 = (x() b() So) then (z#rJ = 
(x#Il' b#Il' S#o) -~ z#0 = (x#O> b#O> S#o). It suffices to prove the claim componentwise. 
Trivially, (8#o) ~ e#0 since e#n = en and e#o = eO' To show that (b#rJ -~ b#O> 
observe that (bo) ~ bO> and b#0 = b0+awjs• while by definition (b#rJ = (bn+ CXWjs)· 
Thus (b#rJ ~ lim(bn+anejs) = lim(brJ + lim(arJejs = b0+ac:Pjs• since it was assumed 
(an)~ aO' Finally, to show (x#o) ~ x#O> notice that: i) (xo)-~ x() ii) also recall 
that x#0 = x0+e0· [C(bJ-C(b0+ac:Pjs)l. and iii) observe by definition (x#rJ = 
(xn+Sn· [C(bJ-C(bn+a0ej8)]). Therefore, (x#rJ ~ lim(xn + en· [C(bnf-C(bn+a0ejs)J) 
= lim(xrJ+lim(erJ·[limC(bnf- fn£(bn+anej8)], which by the continuity of C equals 
x0+e0• [C(lim(brJ)-C(lim(bo)+lim(arJejs)] = x0+e0• [C(bJ-C(b0+ac:Pjs)] = x#O> 
completing the proof of the claim. 
It remains to show that (an)~ aO' Consider the three cases a 0 = 0, a 0 < 0, and a 0 
> 0. If a 0 = 0, each CXn = 0, directly from their definition, and convergence is trivial. If 
a 0 < 0, there is no possibility that the plan bn + a 0 ejs could bankrupt any individual. 
However, some an might have to be chosen larger (less negative) than CXo in the 
interval [a0 ,0] in order to insure that the expression bn+awjs is non-negative in its 
j s.th component, whenever the corresponding component of of bn is less than that of bO' 
Nevertheless, as (bo) ~ b() CXn can clearly be chosen closer to CXo without making 
the jslh component of bn+anejs negative, since the corresponding component of b0+a0 
ejs is non-negative. Hence (an)~ a 0 in this case. 
Finally, turn to the case a 0 > 0, and suppose (an) -/~ aO' Then since each 
an e [O,a0 ], there exists some convergent subsequence (am)-~ a" '# a 0 . In 
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particular, notice that a" < a 0 since it must be the case that a" e [O,a0 ). Define 
x" = x0+90·[C(bo)-C(b0+a"ejs)]; claim that at least one component of x" must be non-
positive. For otherwise, that is if x" is componentwise strictly positive, continuity of 
C and the convergence (am)~ a" imply that within any neighborhood of x" there 
are eventually terms x#m = Xm+9m·[C(bm)-C(bm+amejs)] of (x#m) which are 
componentwise strictly positive. Consider that since (am) ~ a" '# CXo> for m 
sufficiently large, the terms am must lie outside some neighborhood of aO' However, 
since a 0 > 0, optimally chosen am can be different from CXo only if the constraint 
x#m ;;::;;:: 0 is binding with respect to some component. Such cannot be the case if x#m is 
strictly positive, contradicting the constructed minimality of Urn· and proving the claim. 
Now, notice that since some component of x" is non-positive then at least one 
component of x#0 = x0+90• [C(bo)-C(b0+a<.Fjs)l must be strictly negative since a 0 > a" 
and 90 ;;::;;::y >> 0. But this contradicts the assumption that z#0 = (x#00 b#00 9#o) e Z~ ~ 
JR.(I+JS+IJ)+• and so concludes the demonstration of the last case. Notice that the strict 
no short sales assumption, 90 >> y >> 0, was required above. QED. 
DEFINITION (Preference Indicator Vectors) 
Let z, z# e Z~, and ~ ;;::;;:: 0. 
i) ch(z#l z) = { i e I I Ui(x#a. (9#·b#)i, (9#·8)J ;;:: Ui(xa. (S·b)i, (8·8)) }. This is 
the set of all individuals who weakly prefer (consumption available in) state z# 
to state z.3 
ii) ch*(z#l z) denotes the set of all individuals who strictly prefer z# to z. 
iii) 1 (ch}(z#l z) is the (1 X I) indicator row vector for the set ch(z#l z). 
3. In the context of shareholder voting, z# is typically a challenger which has been 
proposed against some status quo z. 
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iv) R * {ch}(z#l z) is the indicator vector for ch*(z#l z). 
DEFINITION (e-Majority Rule Direction Restricted Winner Correspondences v£js) 
Let b* = MAX { I b -b#l I 3 z = (x, b,e), z# = (x#, b#,e#) e Zr,;} .4 For any e > 0 
satisfying the condition: 
e<.5/b*, 
and any direction ejs for JRlS+• the space of ftrms' production plans, deftne the winner 
correspondences v£js: Zr,; ---?---? Zr,; according to: 
v£js(z) = { z# = (x#, b#, e#) E Zr,; I 
i) z# e j3(z) 
ii) b# = b+aejs; for some a e lR , and for direction ejs 
iii) R {chl(z#l z) · ej 2!: .5 + e I b-b#l } 
Whenever there is no possibility for confusion, vjs will be written for v£js· 
vj5(z) should be interpreted as the set of non-bankrupting proposals to change the 
production of ftrm j in state s, while making required share weighted adjustments in 
current consumption, which would defeat the status quo z under share weighted, e-
majority rule. 
4. Notice that b* is well defined by the compactness of Zr,;, and that b* does not 
depend on the choice of ~· 
77 
REMARKS (Properties of the Winner Correspondences) 
A few comments may help to clarify the rather involved definition above. 
Observe that the £-majority rule voting mechanism is defined by specifying the 
associated winner correspondences. 
£-majority rule is a technical device which facilitates the derivation of continuity 
properties of shareholder voting. As will be seen, £-majority rule can eventually be 
dispensed with. An equilibrium of a stock market economy with £-majority rule is also 
an equilibrium of the same economy with standard (E =0) majority rule. Notice that e 
is a parameter of the model, and is not a matter of choice for the participants. 
£-majority rule is a modification of standard majority rule which eliminates the 
possibility of tie votes and thus renders weighted majority rule continuous in voters' 
weights. The mechanism stipulates that the distance in policy space which a majority 
coalition can depart from the status quo is positively proportional to the size of the 
coalition's margin of victory or mandate, E being the proportionality factor. In the 
present instance, the policy space is the space of firms' plans. The condition that 
E < .5 I b* insures that the £-majority rule mechanism satisfies the Pareto principle; 
that is, keeping in mind the direction restrictions, the coaliton of the whole always 
possesses a sufficiently large mandate to attain any point in the policy space. 
Condition i), namely that z# e j3(z), entails the various requirements set forth 
in the definiton of j3. These are, first of all, that 9# = 9; in other words, the process of 
shareholder voting leaves share ownership unchanged. Secondly, the change from z to 
z# cannot have bankrupted any shareholders. Thirdly, there can have been no loss of 
resources or costs of voting in moving from z# to z; any changes in current 
consumption arising from the move must be due solely to changes in production costs. 
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Finally, membership in ~(z) requires that the production plan b# specified under z# can 
differ from b only along one of basis directions for R JS +· This means b# can differ with 
respect to b only in the production of one firm in one future state; the importance of 
such direction restrictions has been discussed earlier. 
Condition ii), that b# = b+aejs• for some a e R, simply specifies the single 
dimension along which b# and b can differ, namely the js!h dimension. Changes in the 
production plan matrix along dimension js should be regarded as changes in the 
planned production of one firm j in one future state s. Notice that corresponding to 
each planning direction there is an associated winner correspondence. 
Condition iii), that Jl. {ch}(z#l z)·9j ~ .5 + el b#-bl, is the fundamental 
characteristic of E-majority rule. Jl. {ch}(z#l z) is the indicator vector for all individuals 
weakly preferring challenger z# to the status quo z. It is assumed that indifferent 
voters vote for the challenger; while perhaps unusual, this assumption, too, will 
ultimately be relaxed. ej E Sl is an (IX 1) collumn vector which specifies, in 
percentage terms, individuals' holdings in firm j. Thus the dot product of Jl. {ch}(z#l z) 
with 9.i is the share weighted vote of all those individuals supporting z# over z. Notice 
that individuals who do not hold shares in firm j have weight zero under ei. In order 
for the coalition indicated by Jl. {ch}(z#l z) to prevail, their weighted vote must be at 
least .5 + E I b#-bl; consider that I b#-bl is magnitude of the proposed change in fum 
plans. The summand E I b#-b I should be interpreted as the size of the mandate 
required byE-majority rule for the adoption of the challenger. 
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PROPOSITION 5.3 (Upper Hemicontinuity of the Winner Correspondences) 
Suppose that U is continuous, and that the assumptions for Proposition 5.1 hold. 
i) Each Vjs: z~  z~ is upper hemicontinuous whenever E > 0, v ~ :;::::;::: 0. 
ii) If it is further assumed that tie votes are awarded to challenging proposals, the 
proposition holds for E = 0. 
Let (Zn) be a sequence in Z~ such that (zn) ~ z, and suppose (z#n) ~ z#, where 
z#n e Vjs(zn). Since Vjs is compact valued on Z~, it suffices to show that z# e Vjs(z). 
The requirements for z# to be a member of z# e Vjs(z) are that keeping 9 fixed, z# must 
be a non-bankrupting, js!h direction, E-majority rule winning proposal with respect to z. 
These requirements can be expressed more formally, in order, as follows: 
b) x# = x+9· [C(b)-C(b#)] ~:;::: 0, 
c) b# is of the form b+aejs :;::::;::: 0, and 
Condition a) obtains trivially since z#n e Vjg(zn) => 9#n = err Notice that b) follows 
from the previously demonstrated upper hemicontinuity of 13. For observe z#n e Vjs(zn) 
=> z#n e ~(zn); thus, z# e ~(z) which entails b) directly from the definition of ~­
Requirement c) obtains since each b#n must be of the form b0+anejs :;::::;::: 0 and the given 
facts that lim(b#n) exists while lim(bn) = b. 
It remains to show d), namely that z# is, in fact, an E-majority rule winning proposal 
with respect to z. Consider that since indifferent voters have been assumed to cast 
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their votes for the challenging proposal, 3 N e N + such that Jl. {ch}(z#l z) is 
componentwise (weakly) greater than Jl. {ch}(z#nl zn) whenever n > N. For suppose not; 
then since there are only finitely many voters, there must be some individual i and 
subsequences (z#m)-~ z# and (zrn)-~ z such that Ui(z#) = Ui(x#a.S#·(b#,o)J < 
Ui(xa. 8 · (b, o)J = U i(z), while Ui(z#rn) ~ Ui(zrn), 'r:l m. However, continuity of Ui then 
requires Ui(z#) ~ Ui(z), a contradiction. Thus for n > M: 
Jl. {ch}(z#l z)·Sjn ~ Jl. {ch}(z#nl zn)·Sjn~ .5+1 b#n-bnl, 
since z#n e Vjs(zn) 
Note however that if e = 0, the assumption that tie votes are awarded to the 
challenger is required. In line ( *) above if e = 0, z# '# z, and it happens that 
Jl. {ch}(z#l z) ·Sj = .5, then z# e Vjs(z) unless ties go to the challenger. When e > 0, the 
question of tie votes is moot since a vote of .5 is never sufficiently large to depart from 
the status quo. Finally it is interesting to observe that if e = 0 and ties are awarded to 
the challenger, Vjs will fail to be lower hemicontinuous. QED. 
PROPOSITION 5.4 (Lemma 1 for the Lower Hemicontinuity of Vjs) 
Suppose that U is strictly quasiconcave and {3 is continuous. Let z e Zt;, where 
y>> 0, and o ~~ 0. Assume z# e Vjs(z), and suppose there is some voter i e ch(z#l z) . 
Given any real 11 > 0, 3 ~i e (0,11) such that for any z' e NIJ..i(z) there exists 
zti e N11(z), perhaps depending on z', which satisfies: 
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ii) zti e 13js(z'), and 
U1 < z; t;) 
U; (z:') 
B. 
· ··~-------~ .. ···•·· ···· ·· ·· · · ···· ········· ·· ·· ··· ··· ·· .· . . . · .· . . . · .· . 
. ·. ·:.· ... 
~~~~or-:--------:~~~----- p js(z;') 
p js (z;) 
Figure 4. 
These results obtain from the strict quasiconcavity of Ui and the continuity of j3. 
Recall that z# e vj8(z) => z# e 13js(z). Since z# e vjs (z), necessarily z# e 13js(z). Claim 
3 J..lil < 0, such that z# e NJ.Lt(z) => 13js(z#) n N,(z) :¢: <j>. Suppose the claim is false, 
and consider a decreasing sequence of possible choices for J..lil converging to zero. 
Then there is a sequence (Zrt') ~ z such that 13js(z0 ') n N,(z#) = <j>. Since 13js is 
lower hemicontinuous on Z~, while (Zrt') ~ z and z# e j3(z), then 3 a sequence 
(zto)-~ z#, where zt0 e j3(zto) -- a contradiction since j3(zto) was assumed to be 
bounded outside N,(z#). WOLOG let J..lil < '11· 
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By continuity of Ui, given 11 > 0 there exists l-!i2 ~ 1-!il such that z' e NJ.L;2(z) => 3 zt e 
N 11(z#) r1 J3js(z) and Ui(zt) ~ Ui(z'). Since Ui(zt);;::: Ui(z'), if zti e N11(z#) r1 J3js(z) such 




Finally, it remains to show that zti can be chosen such that condition iii) is satisfied. 
Choose IJ.i < MIN { IJ.t ,1112} and let zti be the point of cl(N~i(z)) r1 J3js<z') which is 
closest to z'. In this case, lz'-ztl < lz-z#I-V31J.&IJ.i< lz-z#l, as desired. QED. 
PROPOSITION 5.5 (Lemma 2 for the Lower Hemicontinuity of vjs) 
Let (zJ be a sequence taking values in Z~, ~ ;;::: 0, such that (zn) ~ z, and.suppose 
z# e vjs(z). Then given any real 11 > 0, 3 M e N + such that whenever n > M, 
3 z#n e N 11 (z#) r1 Vjs(zn). 
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Let Tl > 0 be given. By previous lemma, corresponding to each individual i e ch(z#l z) 
there is some J.li, where 0 < J.li < Tl, such that if z' e N~;(z), 3 zti e N11(z#) satisfying: 
ii) z\ e 13js(z'), and 
Define f.l = MIN {J.Li I i e ch(z#l z)} and for any z' e N~(z) let, 
zt = ARGMIN{ I zt1 z' I I i e ch(z#lz)}. 
Then claim for any z' e N~(z), 3 z\ e N11(z#) which satisfies: 
v) z t e 13js(z'), and 
vi) I z' -ztl < I z-z#l. 
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Existence of such zt obtains since each zti e N11(z#). Inequality iv) follows from the 
quasiconcavity of Ui; ifi e ch(ztd z') and zt e [z', zti], then i e ch(ztl z'). Conditions 
v) and vi) are simply instances of ii) and iii) respectively, since zt is chosen from the 
Zt.§. 1 • 
Now, since (zJ~ z, there is some M'e N +such that n > M' => Zn e Nll(z). For 
each such zn, recalling the discussion of the previous paragraph, 3 z#n e N11(z#) such 
that: 
Hence, 
Counting the occurrences of inequality symbols in the expression above from the left, 
the first follows from vii) by taking the dot product of each side by Sj, the second 
obtains since z# is an e-majority rule winner with respect to z, and the third is a 
consequence of ix).5 
Finally since ({}jJ ~ Sj ::~: 0 and the last inequality in ( *) is strict (notice this 
strictness obtains from the assumption that e > 0), 3 M ~ M' such that n > M => 
1 {ch1<z#nl zJ · ejn > .5+ I b#n-bnl, 
or equivalently that z#n e vj5(zJ, as desired. QED. 
5. Recall that ej is an (IX 1) column vector which specifies shareholdings across 
individuals in firm j. The lemma assumes z# e Vj5 (z) , that is that z# is a proposal 
to change the production plan of firm j in state s, and furthermore that z# is an £-
majority rule winner with respect to z. 
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PROPOSITION 5.6 (Lower Hemicontinuity of vjs) 
Suppose that U is strictly quasiconcave and {3 is continuous. 
i) Vjs: Zt; ~ Zt; is lower hemicontinuous whenever E > 0, V 'Y >> 0, 8 ;:::;::: 0. 
ii) If it is further assumed that tie votes are awarded to status quo proposals, the 
proposition holds in case E = 0. 
Figure 6. 
Let (zn) ~ z be a convergent sequence in Zt;, and suppose z# e vj5(z). It is required 
to exhibit a convergent sequence (z#J ~ z#, such that z#n e vj5(zJ. Choose z#n e 
ARGMIN {I z"-z#l I z" e vj5(zn)}, this set being non-empty since vjs is compact 
valued. Suppose (z#n) -\.~ z#; by compactness of Zt;, 3 a convergent subsequence 
(z#nJ ~ z' '# z#. Let Tt > 0 such that NTI(z') n NTI(z#) = <j). Clearly there is some 
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M 1 e N + such that whenever m > M 1, z#m e N11 (z'), in which case I z#m_z#l >11 . 
Since (znJ ~ z and z# e vj5(z), by previous lemma6 3 M2 such that m > M2 => 
3 ztm e N11(z#) r. vj5(znJ, in which case I ztm-z#l < 11· Let M = MAX {M1, M2}, and 
note that form> M, I z#m_z#l >11 > I ztm-z#l; however, since both ztiiP z#m e vj5(znJ, 
this inequality contradicts the constructed minimality of the distance from z#m to z# 
among the members of vj5(znJ. Hence, (z#J must converge to z#, as desired. 
Regarding part ii), notice that when E =0, Vjs may fail to be lower hemicontinuous 
unless ties are awarded to the status quo. It is interesting to note the opposite 
situation prevails concerning the upper hemicontinuity of Vjs· QED. 
PROPOSITION 5.7 (Additional Properties of the Winner Correspondences) 
Suppose that E > 0, and U is componentwise continuous on f3j5(z), then : 
i) vjs is nonempty valued. 
ii) vjs is compact valued. 
If, in addition, U is componentwise quasiconcave on f3j5(z) then : 
iii) vjs is convex valued. 
iv) vjs is one-sided valued; that is, the projection of Vjs(z) onto the space of f'mns' 
plans lR JS + is an interval in jslh coordinate axis, and z itself is one endpoint of 
the interval. 
Let z e Z~ be given. Sin~e indifferent voters vote for the challenger, weighted vote for 
z e vj5(z). This same assumption together with the continuity of U give compactness 
6. - Recall that the strict no short sales assumption 'Y >> 0 was employed in the proof 
of Lemma 1, upon which Lemma 2 depends. 
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ofvjs(z). Convexity and one sidedness are direct consequences of quasiconcavity.7 
QED. 
DEFINITION (Star Arm Endpoint Function v*js) 
Suppose that U is componentwise quasiconcave on J3js(z), "if z e Z~. Let e ~ 0 be 
given, and define the function v*js: z~  z~ according to: 
v*js(z) = ARGMAX { I z '-z I I z' e vEjs(z) } . 
It is not anticipated that it will be necessary to distinguish v*js by e, and so this 
notation has not been introduced. Notice that v*js is well defined as a function, that is 
the ARGMAX in the defming equation exists uniquely, because of the one sidedness 
ofvEjs(z). Unless U is quasiconcave, v*js may be multi-valued. 
PROPOSmON 5.8 (Continuity of the Star Arm Endpoint Function) 
Suppose that U is componentwise quasiconcave on J3js(z); "if z e Z~. Then given any 
e > 0, v*js: z~  z~ is continuous. 
By direct application of Berge's Maximum Theorem, and the previous results that vEjs 
is both upper and lower hemicontinuous on Z~ whenever e > 0. QED. 
7. McKelvey [1986] also discusses the one sidedness of majority rule winner 
correspondences. 
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DEFINITION (Voting Corner Function) 
Suppose U is componentwise quasiconcave on f3js(z); "'if z e Z~ "'if js e { 1, ... , JS}. 
Let V £: Z~---) Z~ be defined by: 
V £(z) = (v*u o ... o v*js o ... o v*JsXz). 
As before, the quasiconcavity of U is required so that each component v*js and hence 
V £ is well defined as a function. Notice that Y £ is continuous whenever E > 0. 
PROPOSITION 5.9 (Characterization of Voting Equilibria) 
i) The set of direction restricted £-majority rule voting equilibria on Z~ is exactly 
the set of fixed points of v£ on z~. 
ii) The set of fixed points of Y £ is independent of the order of composition of the 
f . * unctions v js· 
iii) Every V £ equilibrium is also a Yo equilibrium (that is, a direction restricted 
majority rule equilibrium with E =0), if ties are awarded to the status quo. 
iv) Every V £ equilibrium is also an £-majority rule equilibrium with indifferent 
voters choosing the status quo. 
Parts i) and ii) are straightforward consequences of the definition of V £" If iii) is false, 
some z# is a fixed point of V £• but not of V (} Then 3 a voting direction ejs• a state z' e 
f3j
5
(z), and a'e 1R such that b'=b#+a'ejs and Jl{ch}(z' I z#)·Sj > .5. Strictness of this 
last inequality obtains from the assumption that ties are awarded to the status quo. 
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Let ~ = Jl. {ch}(z' I z#)·Sj-.5; clearly~ > 0. Notice that V z between z# and z', 
Jl.{ch}(zlz#)·Sj;::: Jl.{ch}(z'lz#)·Sj=~+.5. LetO<a.t< ~/e such that both zt= (xt,bt,S#) 
e 13js(z), where bt = b#+atejs• and also xt = S#·[C(b#)-C(b#+atejs)]; clearly such 
choice is feasible. 
Since zt lies between z# and z' along 13js(z), the quasiconcavity of U implies 
Jl.{ch)(ztlz#)·Sj;::: .5+~ > .5+e*at = .5+e*lbt-b#l. Butthismeansztisan 
e-majority winner over z#, that is zt e Vjs(z#)--contradicting that z# is a fixed point of 
V e• which completes the proof of iii). To show iv) consider 'v' z,z' that Jl. {ch)(z' I z)· Sj ;::: 
Jl. * {ch}(z' I z)·Sj, where Jl. * {ch)(z' I z)·e.i denotes the share weighted vote for z' when 
indifferent voters vote for the status quo. QED. 
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VI. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM 
This section employs previous results concerning exchange and voting 
equilibria to demonstrate the existence of shareholders' equilibria for a given stock 
market economy. The analysis proceeds by showing V £0 E1p satisfies the hypotheses 
of the Eilenberg-Montgomery theorem~ in particular that the correspondence is 
contractible valued. The contractible valued argument requires that V £is 1-1 on the 
individually rational Pareto sets. Finally, it is argued that fixed points of V £ 0 E1p are 
indeed shareholders' equilibria for the given economy. 
PROPOSmON 6.1 (V£ is 1-1) 
Let z = (x, b, 8) E Z~, ~ ;;:: 0, and suppose E ;;:: 0. 
i) V £is a 1-1 function on every set of the form E~p(z). 
ii) In fact the proposition is true for any subset of z~ I b· 
By induction on Q = J*S, the number of planning directions. For notational simplicity, 
renumber the set of index directions according to (1,1) ~ 1, ... , (j,s) ~ q, .. . , and 
(J,S)~ Q. Thus denote (temporarily) v* 11 by v\, . .. , and, ... , v*Js by v* Q- The 
proposition will be demonstrated for E~p(z), the extension to ii) being entirely 
straightforward. Let z E Zt; be given. 
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n=l 
Claim that v*1 is 1-1 on E1p(z). For suppose not, then 3 distinct z#, z' e E1p(z) such 
that v* 1(z#) = v* 1(z') = zt. Since E1p fixes firms' plans, it must be the case that all 
elements of E1p (z) share the same firm plan with z= (x, b, 9); in particular, : 
b# = b' =b. (*) 
Similarly, since v\ fixes shareholdings, it must also be the case that the third 
components of the v* 1-preimages of zt, namely z# and z', are identical and equal to et, 
that is: 
(**) 
However, as z# and z' have been assumed distinct, it neccesarily follows that x# '* x'. 
Now, since v\ maps both z# and z' to zt, the first components x# and x' (resp.) must 
both be mapped to the corresponding component of zt, namely xt. Recall the first 
component action ofv* 1 is restricted not to alter x# and x' except insofar as the vector 
of share weighted production costs of b# and b' (resp.) differ from bt, which is to say: 
v* 11 x= x#~ xt => xt = x#+e#. [C(b#)-c(bt)], and 
v* 11 x= x' ~ xt => xt = x'+e' · [C(b')-C(bt)]. 
Setting equal the r .h.s. of the above equations gives: 
x#+S#· [C(b#)-C(bt)] = x'+S' · [C(b')-c(bt)]. 
Substituting forb# and b' from(*), and for 9# and 8' from(**) one obtains: 
x#+et. [C(b)-C(bt)] = x'+et. [C(b)-c(bt)], 
which implies x# = x', a contradiction. 
n=q 
Suppose as an inductive hypothesis that v* q 0 ... 0 v* 1 is 1-1on E1p(z). 
n=q=>n=q+1 
Claim that v* q+1 ° ... 0 v* 1 is 1-1 on E1p(z); notice it suffices that v\+1 is 1-1 on the set 
(v* q o ... 0 v* 1)[E1p(z)]. Suppose the claim is false, then 3 distinct z#, z' e 
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(v* q 0 •• • 0 v\)[E1p(z)] such that v\+1(z#) = v\+1(z') = zt. Since the third component 
action of E1p can alter firms' plans on at most the q+ 1i! planning direction, z# and z' 
can have identical images under v* q+l only if b#)q+l( = b' )q+l(· Furthermore, b#q+l = 
b'q+l• because: i) both z# and z' have (v\ 0 ... 0 v\)-preimages in E1p(z) characterized 
by identical firm plans on all directions, and in particular on direction q+1; and ii) none 
of the maps v\, ... , v\ could have changed firms' plans except on directions q, ... , 1 
(resp). Thus one can assert: 
b# = b' =(say) b". 
As before, since v* q+l fixes shareholdings, it is necessary that: 
8#=8' = 8t. 
Since z# and z' have been assumed distinct they must differ with respect to some 
component, which requires by process of elimination that x#:# x'. But in this case: 
xt = x#+8#· [C(b#)-C(bi)] = x'+8' · [C(b')-C(bt)], 
and substituting from(***) and(****) gives: 
which implies x# = x', a contradiction. 
* * * * Having demonstrated the inductive step, V e = v Q 0 ... 0 v q+l 0 v q 0 • • • 0 v 1 can now 
be asserted to be 1-1 on E1p(z), as desired. QED. 
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PROPOSITION 6.2 (Contractibility Lemma) 
Let Z ~ lR K and X c Z, such that X is contractible. Suppose that f: Z ---t Z is 
continuous, and that fl xis 1-1. Then Y = f[X] is contractible. 
f[Z] 
Since X is contractible, 3 a homotopy H between idx: X ---t X and some constant 
map kXD: X ---t X such that kXo: (x) = x0 e X, V x e X. In particular, H: X X [0, 1] 
---t X is continuous and satisfies: H(x,O) = x, and H(x,1) = x0 , V x e X. 
To show Y = f[X] is contractible, it suffices to construct a continuous function 
G: Y X [0,1] -~ Y such that G(y,O) =y and G(y,1) = y0 , for some Yo e Y. That is, G 
is required to be a homotopy between idy: Y ---t Y and kyo: Y ---t Y. Choose Yo= 
f(xJ; trivially Yo e f[X] = Y. Construct G according to: 
G(y,a) = f(H(x,a)); V y e Y, V a e [0,1], where y = f(x). 
Notice G is well defined since f is 1-1on X; continuity obtains directly form the 
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continuity off and H. Finally, observe that G(y,O) = f(H(x,O)) = f(x) = y, and G(y,1) = 
f(H(x,1)) = f(xJ = y0 , as desired. QED. 
PROPOSITION 6.3 (Properties of Ve0 E1p) 
Let ~ >> 0, and E > 0. 
i) V e0 E1p is upper hemicontinuous on Z~;. 
ii) V e0 E1p is non-empty and compact valued on Z~;. 
iii) V e0 E1p is contractible valued on Z~;. 
To show part i), recall that under the stated assumptions E1p has been shown to be an 
upper hemicontinuous correspondence, and V £ is a continuous function. Hence the 
composition is upper hemicontinuous. In the case of ii), recall also that E1p has been 
shown to be non-empty and compact valued. Hence V e0 E1p is non-empty valued, and 
compactness follows from the continuity of V e· Finally, to prove iii), recall that E1p has 
been shown to be contractible valued. Since Ve is 1-1 on every set of the form E1p(z), 
the contractibility lemma presented just above yields the desired result. QED. 
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PROPOSITION 6.4 (Fixed Points of Ye0E1p) 
Let~>> 0, and suppose E > 0. 
i) There exists at least one fixed point of V e0E1p in Z~. 
ii) In particular there is at least one fixed point of V £0E1p in Z~, given some firm j 
in which every individual i holds at least a 'Yij > .5/I share. 
It has already been demonstrated that Z~ is both compact and contractible. The 
proposition immediately above asserts that V e0 E1p satisfies the hypotheses of the 
Eilenberg-Montgomery theorem; therefore, the correspondence possesses a fixed 
point on Z~. Since the proposition is true for any strictly positive minimum 
shareholdings matrix y, it is true in particular for a choice of y which precludes any 
individual from accumulating a controlling interest in some firm j. QED. 
It is now possible to state and prove the main result--the existence of non-
controlling interest shareholders' equilibria. Fortunately the difficult work has already 
been done; all that remains is to assemble the pieces. 
PROPOSITION 6.5 (Existence of Shareholders' Equilibria) 
Let ~ > > 0 be given. 
i) The set of fixed points of V e0E1p , E > 0, coincides exactly with the set of 
shareholders' equilibria for a stock market economy with £-majority rule voting. 
96 
ii) If there is at least one firm j such that 'Yij > .5 /I for all individuals i, then every 
fixed point of V e0 E1p is a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium. 
iii) Every shareholders' equilibrium of a stock market economy with £-majority 
rule voting is a shareholders' equilibrium of the same stock market economy 
with standard majority rule voting. 
To show i) suppose some fixed point z = (x,b,9) of Ye0E1p is not an £-majority rule 
shareholders' equilibrium. Then either there is some distinct z' = (x',b,9') e z~lb 
such that U(z') >> U(z) ~ z' e E1p(z) , or else there is some distinct z" = (x", b", 9) 
e ~(z) preferred by a share weighted £-majority to z. Now if z' strictly dominates z 
and b' = b, then monotonicity of preferences forces 9' '# 9; the utility improvement 
achieved by the move to z' must have resulted from the exchange of both shares and 
the current good. Furthermore since z' strictly dominates z, z e E1p(z). Since V £ fixes 
the third coordinates of its arguments, there is no element of E1p(z) which can be the 
Ve-preimage of z, contradicting the assumption that z was a fixed point of Ve0 E1p. On 
the other hand, suppose some £-majority favors z" to z. Claim that if z is a fixed point 
ofVe0 E1p, then z e E1p(z). But if z e E1p(z) then z =E1p(z), and so if z is a fixed point 
ofVe0E1p, then z = Ve(z) which implies z" cannot be preferred to z. 
Next it must be shown that every £-majority shareholders' equilibrium is a fixed point 
ofVe0 E1p. If no z' = (x',b,9') e z~lb dominates z, then z= E1p(z), and ifnoE-majority 
prefers any z" to z, then Ve(z) = z-- which establishes that z is a fixed point of Ye0 E1p, 
as desired. 
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Part ii) follows from the observation that if no E-majority chooses to depart from z, no 
simple majority will either. Finally, regarding part iii), notice that as the number of 
individuals I grows large, the minimum holdings sufficient to prevent a controlling 
interest becomes small. QED. 
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VII. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this section is to call attention to several unanswered 
questions in the theory of financial equilibrium, which this paper has only begun to 
explore. 
• This research indicates there is exists a continuous selection from the Pareto 
correspondence, that is a continuous function on Z~ which always takes a value 
in the individually rational Pareto set of its argument. It would be particularly 
interesting if the methods employed to show the existence of such a selection 
could be extended to show the existence of a selection from the core 
correspondence. 
• The results obtained here could be strengthened if the problem of bankruptcy 
were modelled in a less stylized manner. In the current version of the model, 
no proposal can be made which, if passed, would bankrupt any shareholder. 
Several more realistic financing schemes can be imagined; for example, 
distressed shareholders might be bought out by other shareholders in return for 
a greater share of the firm. Adjustments to the financing scenario might also 
make it possible to eliminate the role of the minimum holdings requirement in 
guaranteeing continuity of the non-bankrupting proposal correspondence. 
• It appears that a reasonable degree of effort would allow the distinguished 
goods to be dispensed with. Presumably, given a sequence of distinguished 
goods vectors converging to zero, the limits of the associated sequence of 
equilibria would be equilibria of the limit economy. 
• Perhaps the most significant generalization of this model would be the 
introduction of individual initial endowments, and a demonstration of some 
relationship between endowments and equilibrium. The prototypical example 
of such a relationship can be found in simple exchange economies, in which 
equilibria are supported by initial endowments. In translating this concept to 
stock market economies, several technical and conceptual problems arise from 
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production financing, and the possibility that individuals may be made worse off 
by production plan voting. 
• Another direction for possible future research is suggested by the observation 
that the voting direction restrictions assumed here appear to be related to 
Grossman's [1977] notion of Social Nash Optimality, in which a planner is 




















the non-negative integers 
the non-negative orthant of n-dimensional Euclidean space 
the jslh standard orthogonal unit basis vector for R IS+ 
the n-1 dimensional simplex in Rn+ 
an arbitrary point on the simplex 
I = { 1, ... , i, . .. , I}, a finite set of individuals 
an arbitrary individual 
J = { 1, ... , j, ... , J}, a finite set of firms 
an arbitrary firm 
S = { 1, .. . , s, ... , S}, a finite set of second date states of nature 
an arbitrary state 
state space, Z~; ~ R (I xIS x IJ) + 
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{z' = (x',b',8') e Z~; I b' = b, where z = (x, b, 8) e Z~;} 
{z' = (x',b',8') E Z~; I 8' = 8, where z = (x, b, 8) E Z~;} 
current consumption vector (1 xI), an element of Rl+ 
typically L[i=l,.,I] x<P occasionally the limit of a sequence (xo) 
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individual i's consumption in state s 
(J x S) production plan matrix, bjs is firm j's production in state s 
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individual i's share offmnj, 8j~ oj> o 
(1 x J) row vector, individual i's stock portfolio 
(I x 1) column vector, fmn j's shareholders of record 
(1 x I) row vector, itb row of 8· b, i's consumption across states 
(I x J) minimum shareholding matrix, typically y >> 0 
j1h column of y, individuals' required minimum holdings of firm j 
yj "bordered" S(l-1) simplex 
S(l-1)"fl X · · · X s<I-l)'Y.i X ·· · X s<I-1)"ff 
(J x J) diagonal matrix of fmns' distinguished goods production 
finn j's production of distinguished good j ; OJc =0, j '# k 
= Oj typically Oj > 0 
(1 xI) row vector, itb row of 8· o, i's distinguished goods 
individual i's consumption of distinguished good j 
= (y, o), shareholdings and distinguished good parameters 
individual i's utility function over JR.(l+S+J)+ 
cost function for finn j 
finn j 's cost of producing plan bj 
(J x 1) column vector of fmns' production functions 
= (C1(b1), .. . , Cj(b), ... , Cj(b1))T 
a stock market economy 
= U(z) 
= { co' e JR. I+ I co' ~~ co(z)} 
the individually rational Pareto correspondence on Zl; 
the disposable hull of U[E1p(z)] relative to JR. I+ 
frontier of dhU[E1p(z)] 
a correspondence S(l-1) -+-~ dhU[E1p(z)] !:: JRI+ 
Xz 
xz<a) 





ch(z' I z) 
ch*(z' I z) 
ll. {ch}(z' I z) 
ll. * {ch}(z' I z) 
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= { ro' e dhU[E1p(z)] I 3 A~ 0 s.t. ro' = ro(z)+A*a} 
a homeomorphism S<I-1) ~ dhU[Erp(z)] s;;;;; JR. I+ 
= ARGMAX [(!)I e <;:o(a)] { ro' .Jl. I} 
a correspondence s<I-1) ---7---7 Z~; 
= { z" e Z~; I b I ro(z") = <pz(a)} 
set of unit orthogonal voting (basis) directions for JR. JS + 
feasible proposal correspondence, 13: Z~; ---7---7 Z~; 
set of feasible proposals given status quo z e Z~; 
j s th direction feasible proposal correspondence, 13js: Z~; ---7---7 Z~; 
= {z' = (x',b' ,S') e l3(z) I b' = b + Aejs• A e JR.} 
the set of voters weakly preferring z' to z 
the set of voters strictly preferring z' to z 
= (1 xI) indicator vector for voters weakly preferring z' to z 
= (1 xI) indicator vector for voters strictly preferring z' to z 
the jslh direction E-majority rule winner correspondence 
set of jslh direction E-majority rule winners given status quo z 
the element of Vjs(z) most distant from z 
the correspondence on Z~; defined above 
= v*11 ° ··· o v*js o ·· · 0 v*1s, the voting corner function 
equilibrium characterization correspondence 
REMARKS (Notation) 
On occasion in continuity proofs, the notation (zn) = ((xll' bll' Sn)) ----7 z0 = (x()t b()t Sc) 
denotes that the sequence (zn) in Z~; converges to Za In these instances, x0 should be 
interpreted as the (1 xI) vector of individuals' holdings of the current good associated 
with the n!h term z0 of the sequence. Similarly x0 should be interpreted as the (1 xI) 
vector of individuals' holdings of the current good associated with the limit z0 of the 
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sequence and not the aggregate quantity of the current good held by individuals in 
state z = (x, b, 8 ). In the same circumstances b0 denotes the (J X S) production plan 
matrix associated with zD> and not the production plan of firm n. Finally, in such 
cases, 8 0 denotes the (Ix J) shareholding matrix associated with ~and not the stock 
portfolio of individual n. It is not expected that this usage will give rise to any 
confusion. 
The notation o >> 0 denotes that the diagonal elements of the diagonal matrix o are 
strictly positive, and not that every every element of the matrix is strictly positive. 
Otherwise ">>" should be interpreted in the usual manner. 
It may be may noticed that expressions of the form x + S·C(b), where x is (1 xI), e is 
(I x J), and C(b) is (Jx 1), are non-conformable. Since S·C(b) is (Ix 1), strictly 
speaking the sum is not well defined. In the interest of notational simplicity, the 






(J x 1) column vetor of 1~ 
(1 xI) row vector of 1~ 
transpose of matrix or vector M 
dot product 
multiplication 
composition, (fOg)(x) = f(g(x)) 
componentwise greater than 
componentwise greater than or equal 
componentwise greater than or equal, but not identical 
correspondence arrow 
Cartesian product 
1-fold Cartesian product of setS 
topological closure 
empty set 
open 11-neighbOrhood of z in the Euclidean metric topology 
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THE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES 
IN VOTER REGISTRATION DRIVES 
Jack Williamson 
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 
California Institute of Technology 
Summer 1986 
This paper analyzes the efficient management of Aggregately Targeted, Individually 
Selective (A TIS) partisan voter registration drives with fixed operating budgets. 
Sufficient conditions are derived for unique optimal deployment of mobile registrars 
within contested districts. To implement these conditions, each census tract is 
assigned an index of expected plurality return to registration investment; these 
indices are computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout 
parameters. The optimum registration intensity equals the logarithm of a tract's 
index plus a constant term. Using Los Angeles County Registrar 1984 registration 
data, registration drives conducted in several Assembly districts are tested for 
consistency with these conditions. The marginal benefit of additional registration 
spending, compensation plans for mobile registrars, and the Nash equilibrium 
solution for the general campaign problem are also discussed. 
I would like to thank Professor Bruce Cain and Dr. Kenneth F. McCue for suggesting 
this problem, and for several helpful conversations. Dr. McCue very generously 
provided the data set which made possible the testing of the model developed here. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Political parties and civic organizations devote a great deal of money and effort 
to registration drives. During the half century since the New Deal, the Democratic 
Party has relied heavily upon minority communities, low-income clienteles, and the 
youngest eligible age groups for electoral support. Individuals with these 
characteristics tend to exhibit relatively low rates political of participation 1; this 
consideration, together with the formidable barrier registration poses to voting2, have 
long made registration drives a sine qua non for the Democrats. 
Shifting political circumstances have forced the Republicans to think differently 
about the value of registrion efforts. In the past Republican strategists have tended to 
assume registration efforts were redundant, as GOP supporters would presumably 
self-register even in the absence of registration efforts. However, recent research3 
indicates voter participation is significantly diminished by residential mobility and the 
attendant necessity for re-registration. Given the unabated post-war trend toward 
increased geographic mobility, voter registration drives now represent an important 
new factor in the Republicans' strategic calculus. 
Furthermore, there have been recent demographic changes in Republican 
support. In particular, Ronald Reagan's second Presidential campaign was the first 
instance in the post-war period of a Republican Presidential candidate being favored 
by a higher percentage of voters under 30 than over 30. The party also has shown it 
1. See Verba and Nie [1972], and Wolfinger and Rosenstone [1980]. 
2. Wolfinger and Rosenstone [1978], and Erikson [1981] discuss the inhibatory 
effects of registration requirements on political participation. 
3. See Glass, Squire, and Wolfinger [1984]. 
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believes it can make significant inroads into the growing Hispanic electorate. The 
lower participation rates of these groups compared with the party's traditional 
supporters would appear to make registration efforts more rewarding than was 
formerly the case. 
Thus registration drives have become an important instrument in the parties' 
strategic arsenals. For example, in California during the period between the 1984 
primary and general elections, 720,000 Republican registrations were recorded 
statewide, while the Democrats' registration total was 660,000 registrations. 
Overall, the number of new California voters, including self-registrants and group-
registrants by all groups, rose by 1.5 million during this period.4 Cain and McCue 
[1985a]. based on a sample of Assembly districts in Los Angeles County, report that 
nearly two-thirds of all registrations for the two major parties between 1982 and 1984 
were group registrations. Extrapolating this two-thirds group-registration percentage 
to the statewide context, the significant social impact of voter registration drives, and 
the importance to partisan organizations of efficient registration drive management 
become apparent.5 
New sources of data, particularly identification codes on registered voter 
tapes, now allow the determination of the group (if any) which registered each voter, 
and the new registrants' turnout propensity. When merged with indicators of 
partisanship and participation such as census data and past election returns, these 
group-registration data are particularly valuable for developing targeting criteria for 
registration drives, and for examining whether parties are currently conducting 
4. These figures are reported in Cain and McCue [1985]. 
5. The same authors have also reported [1985b] that 58% of the 108,653 individuals 
in Los Angeles County who registered to vote in the period after the 1980 election and 
up to 29 days before the 1982 November election were group registered. 
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registration drives as efficiently as possible. An implication of this research, then, is 
that parties could, by utilizing similar techniques, improve the effectiveness of their 
registration drives. 
In conclusion, this paper has six major goals: 
i) To develop and test a model, based on a set of elementary principles, which 
will describe the registration activities of political parties. 
ii) To advise partisan voter registration drive managers regarding the efficient 
allocation of scarce registration resources, given demographic and past 
participation information for the census tracts which comprise contested 
districts. 
iii) To determine the registration drive manager's optimal response, given a 
fixed budget, to registration efforts of other political organizations, both 
partisan and non-partisan. 
iv) To estimate the registration costs of mis-managed registration efforts. 
v) To determine the optimal compensation plan a partisan organization should 
offer its mobile registrars. 
vi) To discuss the Nash equilibrium solution for the simultaneous move game 
which determines parties' registration expenditures. 
A literature review follows in section II, next section III develops the 
registration drive manager's problem from basic assumptions to optimal strategy, and 
section IV is concerned with describing the data set and comparing realized versus 
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potential registration performance. Finally, section V indicates directions for future 
research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Four branches of the political science literature are especially relevant to the 
analysis of the optimal management of voter registration drives: 
A) The literature concerning the application of optimization techniques 
to practical problems encountered in political campaigns. 
B) A second group of papers relating registration requirements and 
political participation. 
C) A third body of work which addresses the broader problems of 
predicting political participation on the basis of demographic 
variables. 
D) Recent research which has indicated some of the qualitative 
properties of registration production technology. 
Papers from the first category are relevant to the registration drive problem 
primarily because they emphasize that political campaign problems are amenable to 
. mathematical programming methods. The second group of papers helps to answer the 
question: Why should parties be concerned with conducting registration drives at all, 
much less with conducting them optimally? The third type of literature proves useful 
for putting the theoretically optimal registration strategy into real world operation. 
Finally, the fourth body of work undertakes a detailed investigation of the efficacy of 
different types of registration drives; these results can be of value when tailoring a 
registration drive to a specific target population. 
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A. OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 
The process of formally articulating goals, and assessing available resources, 
information and technology, and then exploiting classical optimization techniques has 
proven to be successful in business, engineering and military contexts.Pioneering 
research by Kramer suggested that similar systematic methods could be brought to 
bear on the problems of campaign management with great advantage. 
• G.H. KRAMER, "A Decision Theoretic Analysis of a Problem in Political 
Campaigning," 1966. 
• -----, "The Effects of Precinct-Level Canvassing on Voter Behavior," 1970. 
B. REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS AND PARTICIPATION 
These papers highlight the formidable barriers to voting posed by registration 
requirements, and hence demonstrate the importance of registration drives to parties 
in terms of increased expected plurality. 
• R.S. ERIKSON, "Why Do People Vote? Because They Are Registered," 
1981. 
• D. GLASS, P. SQUIRE and R. WOLFINGER, "Residential Mobility and 
Voter Turnout," 1984. 
• S. KELLEY, R.E. AYRES and W.C. BOWEN, "Registration and Voting: 
Putting First Things First," 1967. 
• R.E. WOLFINGER and S.J. ROSENSTONE, "The Effect of Registration 
Laws on Voter Turnout," 1978. 
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C. PREDICTING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
In order to implement an efficient registration effort, the manager must 
estimate several parameters which describe political participation across the census 
tracts which comprise his district. The estimation of such parameters from backround 
characteristics is a classical problem in political science. 
• S. VERBA and N.H. NIE, Participation in America, 1972. 
• R.E. WOLFINGER and S.J. ROSENSTONE,Who Votes, 1980. 
D. REGISTRATION PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY 
This research develops a fourfold taxonomy of registration efforts, and 
investigates political differences among the registrants yielded by different types of 
drives. Of particular interest is the identification of the problems of self-registrant 
cannibalization, and the inverse relationship between registrants' interest in politics 
and the degree of assistance provided them in the registration process. This line of 
research may lead to innovations in registration technology, such as compensating 
mobile registrars based on demographic attributes of the registrants they produce. 
• B.E. CAIN and K.F. McCUE, "Do Registration Drives Matter: The 
Realities of Partisan Dreams," 1985. 
• ------, "The Efficacy of Registration Drives," 1986. 
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III. THE MODEL 
The model is a stylized representation of the resource allocation problem faced 
by a partisan voter registration drive manager over one campaign season. The 
manager has at his disposal an exogenously specified fixed budgetl, and a single 
registration production technology-- the posting of mobile registrars in public places. 
His fundamental objective is to maximize the expected contribution made by the 
registration drive to his party's election day plurality. 
In operational terms, the manager's task is to determine the most efficient 
deployment pattern of registration workers across the census tracts which comprise 
the contested district.2 He has at his disposal demographic information and past 
voting records, and thus can estimate productivity indices for the various tracts. His 
decision problem may be further complicated by registration drives conducted by a 
second political party and by a non-partisan organization. 
1. The manager may seek to expand the scale of the registration drive by additional 
fund raising, or by requesting approval for further expenditures of existing campaign 
funds. This presents an instance of the general campaign problem: What is the 
optimal allocation of campaign resources among various political activities such as: 
fund raising, canvassing, registration, direct mailings, and public appearances? 
The general problem is particularly refractory to formal analysis since the benefits of 
campaign activities are extremely difficult to estimate. In the interests of anlytic 
tractability and solving a ~ell-defined practical problem, attention will be focused on 
managing a fixed-budget registration drive. 
2. Another important aspect of the manager's job is the selection of the best sites 
within tracts at which to post mobile registrars. Some locations can be expected to be 
more heavily trafficked, or to attract a more desireable demographic mix of potential 
registrants, than others. However, in the analysis to be developed here, this facet of 
the manager's problem will not be explicitly modelled. 
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III.A. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
Modelling the registration drive manager's problem at first appears to be a 
relatively transparent undertaking. However, analagous to the development cycle 
encountered in many software engineering tasks, as the registration problem is 
formalized, unanticipated difficulties arise, what were originally thought to be minor 
complications turn out to be serious inconsistencies, and so on. This pattern will be 
familiar to anyone who has ever written a single line of program code. 
In particular, a complete specification of the registration task and the 
production technology requires a suprising degree of attention to detail and a number 
of simplifying assumptions. Nevertheless, the assumptions adopted here seem to 
accord well with current political practices in California. Ultimately the problem 
formulation allows a satisfying cancellation of complexity-- yielding a straightforward 
solution to the registration drive manager's problem. 
The purpose of this section is to familiarize the reader with the fundamental 
constructs of the model-- the participants and their environment, their goals, and the 
timing scenarios. With this broad perspective in mind, the role of additional 
specialized assumptions can be better appreciated as they are presented in later 
sections. 
III.A.l Participants in the Registration Contest and their Environment 
There are two classes of participants in the model: individuals and organiza -
tions. Consider the individuals' defining properties first. Individuals will be modelled 
quite simply here; the detailed specifications of consumption preferences and 
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information sets charactersitic of microeconomic models are not relevant in the present 
context. 
Suppose there are a total of Q qualified individuals, out of a total population P, 
residing in a political jurisdiction or district) An individual is said to be qualified if he 
is already registered to vote or satisfies the citizenship, residency, and age 
requirements for registration. Let an individual be called eligible if he is qualified but 
not yet registered. The district is comprised of I = {1, ... , i, ... ,I} neighborhoods or 
census tracts; approximately 5,000 individuals reside in a typical census tract. A 
given individual can be registered at most once, and must be registered in the tract in 
which he resides. Denote by Qi and Ei the qualified and eligible population of tract i 
respectively. Suppose that each Qi remains fixed for the registration period. 
In addition to registration and residence status, there are three other para-
meters required to completely describe an individual: 
• His partisanship. 
• Whether or not he will register to vote on his own initiative (self-register). 
• Whether or not he will actually turn out to vote. 
Notice that while a total of only five parameters define an individual, the values these 
characteristics take among the population of a given tract are typically not directly 
observable by the registration drive manager. In general he will find it necessary to 
3. No particular assumptions will be formally adopted concerning the type of district 
or its size. However, the reader may wish to keep in mind a California Assembly 
district as an appropriate example; the total population of these districts is 
approximately 295,000 and there are on average 295,000 I 5000 = 59 census tracts per 
district. Empirical anlaysis based on the model will employ data from Assembly 
districts in Los Angeles County . 
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estimate the parameters which describe population of a tract on the basis of census 
data, current registrations, and past elections returns. 
Several assumptions concerning individuals and the political environment are 
formally set forth below. The central theme running through this group of assumptions 
is that, with the exception of registration status, the defining properties of individuals 
and the demographic characteristics of the district do not change during the 
registration period-- or as a result of registration drive itself. In other words, the 
registration manager need not attempt to hit a moving target. 
Individuals' Parameters 
11) Qualified individuals' self-registration parameters remain constant during 
the registration period. Furthermore, turnout and partisanship partisanship 
parameters remain fixed at least until election day.4 
12) Registered partisans who turn out vote for their own parties' candidates.5 
13) All individuals who self-register do so on the second date. (See the timing 
assumptions below.) 
13a) The pool of individuals who will self-register decays linearly to zero over 
the course of the registration drive. 
4. Evidence will be presented that conversion during registration drives is a 
relatively rare phenonenon. 
5. This assumption can be relaxed, given estimates for the probabilty of cross over 
voting in the various tracts. 
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Political Characteristics of the District Population 
Pl) Partisanship proportions are the same among the registered and qualified 
groups in each tract. 6 (These proportions may vary across tracts, 
however.) 
P2) The expected turnout proportions among the ex ante (before the registra -
tion drive) and ex post (after the registration drive) groups of registered 
partisans in each tract are identical. (These proportions may also vary 
across tracts, however.) 
Migration Across Boundaries 
Bl) Each individual resides in exactly one tract, and can register at most once 
in this single tract. 
B2) No individual is contacted or registered by mobile registrars outside his 
home tract. 
B3) There is neither in or out migration, nor change in other demographic 
characteristics in any tract during the registration period. 
Notice that assumption 11), the fixed individual parameter assumption, entails 
several important consequences. By assuming that individuals' participation 
parameters remain fixed, it follows that: 
• There is no self registration sensitization of group-only registerable 
partisans of one party resulting from contact with registrars representing 
another party. 
• There is no change in turnout rates resulting from multiple contacts with 
mobile registrars. 
• Cross-registered individuals would have eventually registered themselves 
had they not been group-registered first. 
6. This assumption is supported by Wolfinger's [1980] analysis of ANES survey 
results. Professor McKelvey has observed that Pl) entails that there are equal 
percentages (among qualified partisans) of unregistered Democrats and Republicans 
in each tract. 
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There are three organizations conducting group registration efforts in the 
district: two political parties, Party A and Party B; and a single non-partisan 
organization, N. Let Q'\ and EAi denote respectively the number of qualified and 
eligible A-partisans residing in tract i. Denote by 7t'\ the proportion of A-partisans 
among Ei, by cr'\ the proportion of EAi expected to self register in the absence of any 
registration drive, and by 't'\ the proportion of A-partisans expected to turn out and 
vote among all eligible group-only registerable A-partisans. 
Significant technical simplification results if it is assumed that both parties can 
perfectly predict the registration efforts of the non-partisan organization N, 7 and that 
this group generates all of its registrations instantaneously on the first date (see the 
timing assumptions below)8. The following assumptions describe these organizations 
and their objectives: 
Registration Groups 
Gl) There are three registration groups: two political parties, A and B, and a 
non-partisan organization N. 
7. It seems plausible that both parties should be able to make good decisions 
concerning non-partisan registration efforts; indeed, a truly non-partisan organization 
might well announce its registration intentions. Furthermore, since both parties are 
concerned with maximizing their expected plurality, they need only estimate the 
expected non-partisan registration yield. 
8. Actually, non-partisan groups most likely conduct their drives concurrently with 
those of the political parties, but formally introducing a concurrent non-partisan drive 
into the model significantly complicates the parties' objective functions and the 
associated systems of first order conditions. Since the non-partisan registration yield 
is relatively small compared to that of the parties, the instantaneous yield 
approximation would seem to be of no great consequence. 
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G2) Once having set a registration budget, each political parties' registration 
drive objective is to maximize the contribution--attributable exclusively to 
its registration drive-- to its own expected election-day plurality. 
G3) Both parties can perfectly predict the registration yield of group N; 
furthermore this non-partisan production occurs instantaneously at time 0. 
G4) The non-partisan organization registers members of various sub-popula -
tions in proportion to these groups' relative frequencies among the eligible 
populations of each tract. 
GS) Both parties have access to the same demographic and past elections data 
for the district; and both possess the same analytic skill. 
III.A.2 Timing Scenarios 
Timing assumptions often play a crucial role in social science models, 
particularly if conflicts of interest are the focus of the analysis. To a large extent, a 
model's timing scenario determines the participants' ability to update their information 
and to dynamically revise their stategic decisions. 
The model employs a straightforward two-date, one-period timing scenario. 
The first date represents the beginning of the period in which registrations can be 
generated, and the second is the last day to register for the next election.9 At first 
glance, this scenario may appear somewhat artificial since voter registration does take 
9. While no particular dates or registration period have been assumed, the 59.tb. day 
before election day is one natural date to regard as the middle of the group registration 
season in Los Angeles County. Shortly after this date the registrar of voters 
publishes the so-called 59-day close, the official registration roll for the county as of 
the 59th day before election day. Publication of the 29-day close marks the end of the 
registration season; registrants filing later cannot vote in the upcoming election. 
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place throughout the year. However, group-registration drives are strongly seasonal, 
with the greatest intensity of effort occurring shortly before the last day to register.lO 
Each registration drive manager, partisan and non-partisan, must take 
decisions and irrevocably allocate his force of mobile registrars on the first date. In 
the case of more than one organization conducting registration drives within the 
district, it will be assumed that they all move simultaneously on the first date. 
The distinguishing simplifying feature of these assumptions is that the 
managers are unable to dynamically update their deployment strategies as reports 
come back from the field. Once a manager selects his registration drive strategy, it 
cannot be revised or updated. Whether or not managers would want to update their 
strategies is a separate issue which will be taken up later.ll 
Timing Assumptions 
T1) There are two dates: 0 and 1, and a single period which will be termed the 
registration period. 
T2) All political groups mobilize their registration forces simultaneously and 
irrevocably on the first date. 
10. Several factors contribute to this seasonality. One such factor is geographic 
mobility and the concomitant need to re-register a fraction of those registered early in 
the campaign cycle. Another factor is that the act of registration itself seems to 
increase the salience of politics for registrants. Since this effect decays across time, 
early registration drives generate a relatively smaller turnout, other considerations 
being equal. 
11. Notice that it was not necessary to specify the available registration production 
method(s) in order for these timing assumptions to be well-defined. Furthermore, no 
assumptions made so far restrict drive managers to a single type of registration 
activity. 
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III.A.3 The Registration Drive Objective 
Each partisan organization will be assumed to conduct its registration efforts 
so as to maximize the exclusively attributable or marginal contribution to its own 
expected plurality.l2 Notice that choice of this objective presupposes that the party 
explicitly recognizes the possiblity of redundantly registering self-registrants. The 
non-partisan organization's allocation problem is not the focus of this analysis; 
therefore, the non-partisan objective will not be defined here; only the non-partisan 
registration yield-- but not the objective function-- formally appears in the modei.13 
a. The Manager's Problem: Maximize Expected Plurality Given a Fixed Budget 
Since each partisan organization has a well defined registration drive objective, 
it is convenient to imagine that each registration effort is conducted by a single 
individual, or manager. A registration drive manager will be modelled as maximizing 
the expected number of net own party registrations attributable solely to the drive, 
12 The assumptions that there is only one district, and that partisans of a given 
party vote for all the party's candidates are relevant when asserting the existence of a 
well defined party registration objective. Suppose that party A instructs its manager 
to conduct a registration drive to benefit two of its candidates running in two different 
districts; how should the manager split the budget between the districts? If there is a 
possibility of significant cross-over voting, two candidates from the same party 
running for different offices with overlapping district boundaries may even disagree 
concerning whether or not to launch registration efforts. A related class of problems 
arises in the case of simultaneous races for different offices with overlapping district 
boundaries: candidates from a given party may select sub-optimal levels of 
registration investment due to the free rider problem. 
13. Indeed, it is not transparent that given a plausible definition of "non-partisan" 
that an objective consistent with the definition can be defined. 
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given an exogenously specified budget constraint. Observe that both the manager's 
objective and the budget constraint must be expressed in expected terms, since the 
number of registrations generated and hence the costs of a registration drive are a 
random variable. It will be assumed that the manager pursues the goal of expected 
plurality maximization assiduously, without shirking; a manager does not pose an 
incentive compatability problem for the party which employs him. 
b. Expected Plurality and the Probability of Winning 
Presumably political candidates have only an indirect interest in expected 
plurality; the probability of winning office would appear to be candidates' prime 
consideration when making campaign decisions. However, as Kramer [1966] points 
out: 
Just as there are many ways of running a compaign, so also there is a variety of 
possible goals which a candidate may be pursuing .... [I]f a general analysis is 
to proceed we must concentrate upon the major and most tangible of the goals. 
For most candidates in most contests this goal is clearly to win. . .. With the 
usual electoral arrangements, winning is normally closely related to the size of 
the candidate's plurality. 
Kramer goes on to point out that maximizing the probability of winning and 
maximizing expected plurality will tend to yield different decisions when a candidate 
considers strategies which are both very risky and very productive--an unlikely 
scenario in the case of registration drives. On balance he finds that the analytic 
simplicity afforded by the expected plurality formulation justifies its adoption over the 
probability of winning: 
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[The probability of winning] formulation is computationally quite difficult to 
work with; in practical applications one would have to resort to simulation 
techniques which are expensive and often cumbersome. The expected plurality 
criterion is much simpler in this respect, and possesses the convenient 
property that if we can evaluate the candidate's expected plurality in each of 
several subunits (e.g., precincts) in his constituency, then his overall plurality 
can be obtained by simple summation. Clearly this is not true of the probalistic 
criterion. Moreover, the expected plurality criterion is more easily 
comprehended and communicated, since campaigners traditionally think in 
terms of so many votes gained or lost, and the criterion translates directly into 
these terms. Either formulation provides us with a reasonable, quantitative 
value criterion; however, in subsequent discussion we shall employ the 
expected plurality criterion. 
III.B. THE REGISTRATION PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY 
Voter registrations are generated by goal-seeking partisan organizations, 
analagous to the production of other goods and services by profit-maximizing firms. 
Like economic enterprises, political parties face two kinds of constraints in deter -
mining their optimal registration policies: technological constraints, and market 
constraints. Technological constraints reflect the sheer physical and informational 
feasibility of a registration production plan. On the other hand, market constraints 
concern the effects of the actions of other agents; for example, the suppliers of 
registration services may only accept certain prices for their inputs, or voters may 
resist changing their political affiliation. 
When the registration drive manager determines his optimal actions, he must 
take into account both sorts of constraints. The market constraints faced by the 
manager are straightforward; it will be assumed that he acts as a price taker in both 
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the labor and political markets.14 Thus the primary focus in this section will be on the 
technological constraints present in a registration effort. In order to analyze the 
efficient management of registration drives, it is necessary to develop a convenient 
formal description of a partisan organization's registration production possibilites--
that is, which combinations of inputs and outputs are feasible. 
Before deriving such a detailed specification of the most commonly employed 
registration production technology, the taxonomic problem of classifying different 
registration techniques will be considered briefly in the next section. 
III.B.l Classification of Registration Techniques 
Registration techniques vary with respect to the methods by which individuals 
are contacted, filtered, and registered. The particular method by which voters are 
contacted, the possibility of focusing registration efforts on individuals of a desired 
type--either before or after they are contacted, and the regulatory environment in 
which registration contacts occur are all prime strategic considerations for the 
registration dirve manager. This section will provide an overview of registration 
tactics by examining two schemes for the classification of registration efforts: the 
active I passive criterion advanced by Cain and McCue [1985], and classification 
according to filtering capability. 
14. Presumably the registration manager is not charged with the responsibilty of 
shaping the party's appeal so as to attract the maximum number of voters. He will be 
assumed to take the party's posistions and the partisanship of the electorate as 
givens. Recall that it has been previously assumed that individuals' partisanship, 
self-registration, and turnout parameters are fixed. These assumptions areall the more 
reasonable in light of the fact that registration dirves are typically conducted relatively 
late in the campaign cycle. 
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L Active and Passive Registration Efforts 
Political parties can contact individuals and encourage them to register in a 
variety of different ways, for example by: blind door-to-door canvassing, selective15 
door-to-door canvassing, work place visits by registration teams, media campaigns of 
every sort, mailings, and by other methods to be found in the campaign manuals of 
various political parties.16 
Cain and McCue [1985] have classified various registration production 
techniques along a so-called active I passive dimension. An active registration effort 
reduces the cost of registration 17 to registrants by actively locating potential voters, 
providing them with registration forms, assisting them in preparing the forms, and 
returning the completed forms to the registrar of voters. 
For example, a door-to-door registration drive in which the canvassers 
returned registrants' affidavits would be classified as very active along the active I 
passive dimension. On the other hand, a program which simply made affidavits 
available at public locations would be considered passive-- as registrants would bear 
all the transactions costs of completing and mailing their registration forms. A 
15. A variety of different selection criteria might be employed to select the most 
promising households for registration workers to contact. For example, one possible 
strategy would be to visit only those households which have fewer than some ceiling 
number of registered voters. 
16. See, for example, The Democratic Campaign Manual. Democratic National 
Committee: Washington, D.C., 1964. 
17. The costs of registration include: the opportunity cost of time lost from other 
activities, search costs entailed in locating registration forms, the costs of travel to 
pick up the forms, the psychic costs of filling them out, and the cost of mailing the 
forms to the registrar of voters. 
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registration effort consisting solely of a media campaign exhorting citizens to register 
would be classified even further along the passive direction. 
h... Classification of Registration Techniques Qy, Filtering Capability 
The effectiveness of a partisan registration effort and the optimal strategy to be 
pursued by a registration drive manager both depend critically on the ability of the 
party's mobile registrars to select or filter contacts and differentially register them in 
the party's best interest. This filtering process carried out by registration workers can 
be further refined into two distinct activities, what will be called here contact 
filtering, and registration filtering. Contact filtering refers to the restriction of 
exposure of the registration effort to selected subgroups of the population. 
Registration filtering refers to the capability of mobile registrars to refuse to register 
members of selected subgroups-- presumably partisans of other parties-- after such 
individuals have been contacted. 
Different registration methods can be usefully classified according to the 
contact filtering and registration filtering opportunities each method admits with 
respect to the dimensions which define politically relevant subgroups of the 
population. Five such dimensions have been identified here as particularly important 
regarding the efficient conduct of registration drives: 
i) Qualified /Unqualified, 
ii) Eligible /Registered, 
iii) Partisanship, and 
iv) Self-Registrant /Group-Registrant. 
v) Will Turnout /Won't Turnout. 
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The registration benefits of contact filtering and registration filtering along each of 
these dimensions will be discsussed in the next four sections. 
i.. Qualified I Unqualified Filtering 
Recall that an individual is said to be qualified if he is registered or eligible to 
register, that is: he satisfies the citizenship, age and residency requirements for 
registration. Since no unqualified individuals can be legally registered, every 
registration effort must conduct registration filtering with respect to this dimension. 
Indeed, the registrar of voters verifies registration filtering of unqualified individuals. 
Certain registration methods may operate more efficiently when accompanied 
by Qualified /Unqualified contact filtering. Such filtering should be particularly 
important in case the registration organization bears some direct cost per contact. For 
example, if registrations are being generated by sending teams of registrars to 
workplaces, the cost effectiveness of sending such teams to firms in industries known 
to employ undocumented workers would have to be carefully weighed against the 
registration benefits. Similarly, it would not make sense to place advertisements 
exhorting citizens to vote in childrens' media. 
ii... Registered I Eligible Filtering 
Presumably, individuals who are already registered do not seek to re-register 
unless they have moved, are changing their party status or have been purged from the 
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registration rolls for non-participation 18. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that 
individuals self select along this dimension insofar as registration filtration is 
concerned. In practice, registration filtering along this dimension presents a problem 
to parties which pay registration workers on the basis of own party registrations 
generated. There is no benefit to the party from re-registering an already registered 
partisan. 
If an organization bears a direct cost per contact in conjunction with the 
registration tactic being employed, it may well make sense to filter out contact with 
already registered individuals-- especially if conversion is unlikely, or if opposistion 
partisans may be sensitized by such contact. For example, a door-to-door registration 
effort could employ current registration rolls to select target addresses which do not 
show any (or some threshold number of) registered residents. Direct-mail campaigns 
urging registration might also exploit similar contact selection techniques along the 
Registered /Eligible dimension. 
iii. Partisan Filtering 
Partisan contact filtering is the restriction of exposure of a registration effort to 
partisans of a given party. Partisan registration filtering is the practice of 
discriminating in the supply of registration services among the contacted population on 
the basis of partisanship. The presence or absence of partisan filtering is a crucial 
distinguishing attribute of any registration effort. The inability to conduct partisan 
18. Los Angeles County practices a relatively generous purge policy. As long as an 
individual can still receive mail at his registered address he will remain registered, 
regardless of past voting history. 
. 132 
filtering significantly complicates a partisan registration manager's problem by raising 
the spectre of registering members of opposistion parties. 
In Los Angeles County, prior to 1977, all registration workers were agents of 
the registrar of voters, and were specifically charged not to practice partisan filtering. 
Presumably these government employees did not seek to differentially contact various 
parisan sub-populations concerning registration matters. Furthermore, as pre-1977 
registration affidavits could not be self-completed, mobile registrars could not decline 
to assist individuals in preparing their registration forms on the basis of partisan 
considerations. 
With the advent of the mail-in registration form, the registrars of voters in 
California counties cashiered their registration workers. Registration forms, which 
could now be self-prepared by registrants, were distributed at various government 
offices, including post offices. Civic and partisan organizations were also permitted to 
distribute, prepare, and return registration forms. The transfer of the voter registration 
function out of the registrar's office made registration drives an instrument of party 
competition, and also made effective partisan filtering a high relief feature of 
California's political landscape. 
Of course, before 1977 parties could conduct passive campaigns encouraging 
registration, and these appeals could be targeted to differentially contact the 
appropriate partisans. After 1977 active registration techniques also became 
available to parties. Registration managers could now practice contact filtering in 
active drives by, for example, selecting the neighborhoods to be visited by mobile 
registrars. Funhermore, registration filtering could now be practiced in the context of 
active, panisan registration efforts. While registration workers were charged to 
provide forms to anyone who requesting them-- regardless of partisanship, mobile 
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registrars were not required to assist opposition partisans in preparing or returning 
the forms. 
iL Self-Registrant I Group-Registrant Filtering 
Clearly no advantage is gained by directing scarce registration resources to 
individuals ultimately expected to register themselves. To the extent that the 
propensity to self-register is correlated with demographic variables, registration 
efforts can be tailored-- depending on the particular registration technique employed--
to reduce the costs of contacting sub-populations likely to self-register. It would not 
appear that any active method of generating registrations is likely to be sucessful at 
culling out self-registrants from the contacted population ex post, so as to avoid the 
deadweight loss of registering would be self-registrants. 
III.B.2 The ATIS Registration Technique 
Perhaps the most frequently employed active registration technique is what 
will be referred to here as the Aggregately Targeted, Individually Selective 
(ATIS) method.19 Drives of this type are sometimes referred to as "site" registration 
drives. This is certainly the most commonly employed registration drive tactic in Los 
Angeles county, and the focus of this paper will be restricted to analyzing registration 
drives employing the ATIS strategy. 
19. I am not aware of any formal research concerning the frequency with which 
parties employ different registration techniques. However, several seasoned 
California campaign professionals have agreed that the A TIS technique is by far the 
most frequently employed registration production method in Los Angeles county. 
134 
L A TIS Contacts 
In the A TIS method of registration production a partisan organization assigns 
its mobile registrars to station themselves in specifically targeted public places, such 
as shopping malls or convenience stores, and to inquire of passing citizens whether or 
not they are registered to vote. Individuals who respond negatively (and match the 
registrar's partisanship in the partisan filtering case) are then encouraged to register. 
Presumably they agree to do so since registration is essentially costless to 
registrants. a> 
The ability of the registration drive manager to choose the intensity of 
registration effort within each tract is reflected in the phrase "aggregately targeted," 
while the phrase "individually selective" refers to the ability of partisan mobile 
registrars to discriminate among potential registrants on the basis of partisanship. 
The selection capabilities of mobile registrars will be discussed in detail in the next 
section. 
Contacting citizens is the first step of an active registration effort, and 
formulating a precise definition of an A TIS contact is the first step in determining 
optimal A TIS registration strategies. An A TIS contact between a registration worker 
posted at his station and a passing inidvidual is defined to be the pyhsical arrival of 
the individual within "conversational distance" of the registrar's station. Notice 
that actual conversation need not have taken place for the contact or exposure to have 
occurred. "Conversational distance" is a primitive concept which will not be formally 
defined here. 
20. Indeed, it will be assumed here that all unregistered individuals encouraged to 
register by mobile regisitrars will in fact do so. 
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lL. The A TIS Arrival Process 
The hallmark feature of the A TIS registration method is the arrival of 
individuals at mobile registrars' stations. In order to specify a functional form relating 
the method's inputs, registrar-hours, to the outputs, contacts and registrations, the 
nature of this arrival process must be specified. A set of plausible regularity 
assumptions greatly simplifies the analysis, without seeming to represent a 
significant departure from the workings of real-world ATIS registration drives. In 
particular, the arrival of individuals will be modelled as a Poisson process. Arrivees 
may be thought of as having been culled at random from the entire qualified population 
of a tract. Having once arrived at a station, the arrivee is returned to qualified 
population from which he may be selected to arrive again. 
A stochastic process is an indexed family of random variables. An elementary 
example of a stochastic process known as a Poisson process arises naturally in many 
models of queueing phenomena. Karlin and Taylor [1975] present an informal 
definition of a Poisson process, which has been paraphrased below to cover the 
context at hand. 
Let X(t) denote the number of A TIS contacts (hereafter, simply 
contacts)at at mobile registrar's station in the time interval [O,t] . 
Suppose that the number of potential contacts is very large, or that 
being contacted once does not affect the chance of a a given individual 
being contacted again. Suppose that as many contacts are likely to 
occur during one interval of time as another. And finally, suppose that 
the probability of two contacts occurring simultaneously is vanishingly 
small. Under these ideal conditions, the process {X(t) I t ~ 0} is a 
Poisson process. 
This example serves to point up the Markov property (the chance of a 
contact does not depend upon the number which have already occurred) 
and the "no premium for waiting" property, which is the most distinctive 
property possessed by the Poisson process. 
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The arrival of clients for service is a classical application of the Poisson 
process formalism. and so the interested reader is referred to Karlin and Taylor for a 
detailed discussion of the properties of Poisson processes. The following well known 
proposition is the most important consequence of the Poisson assumptions for 
understanding the results of this paper: 
• If Jl. is the probability of at least one contact occurring in a unit of time. Jl.*t 
is the expected number of contacts in a time interval of length t. 
Three regularity assumptions concerning the arrival of A TIS contacts are listed 
below: 
A TIS Arrival Assumptions 
Al) The arrival of qualified individuals at each partisan mobile registrar's 
station within a given tract is a Poisson process. characterized by a mean 
arrival rate of rate Jl. individuals per hour per station. randomly selected with 
replacement from the qualified population of the tract as a whole. 21 
A2) The arrival rate Jl. is constant across tracts. 
A3) Service times at mobile registrars' stations are zero; there is no queueing 
or crowding. 22 
21. The random selection assumption in the context of the arrival process is related to a 
notion of perfect mixing of individuals within each tract. Individuals might be said to be 
perfectly mixed if at any given moment the likelihood some one individual occupies a 
specified location in the tract does not depend on his previous locational history. 
22. The reader is invited to speculate rearding the following question: If there are no 
conversion. self-selection. or crowding phenomena. and if perfect partisan filtering is 
possible. why do mobile registrars bother to post partisan signals at their stations? 
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Notice that the random arrival assumption Al) entails the following consequences: 
• The same registration results can be expected from posting n registrars for 
1 hour in a given tract as froin posting 1 registrar for n hours. 
• Arrivees' demographic, political, and registration characteristics reflect 
relative frequencies in the qualified population. 
• In particular, the self-registration propensity among individuals contacted 
by mobile registrars is the same as that among those not contacted. 
• Registered or previously contacted individuals do not self-select to avoid 
contact with mobile registrars. 
• Registrars cannot a priori filter arrivals by any crterion. 
£..:. Filtering Capabilities ofthe ATIS Technique 
The filtering capabilites of the ATIS registration method are presented in the 
table below. The ATIS method is an active method of registration; it reduces the 
costs of registration to the opportunity cost of a sixty-second conversation with a 
mobile registrar. The A TIS method allows effective partisan registration (post 
contact) filtering by essentially making the method a relatively passive one from the 
perspective of opposition partisans. 
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FILTERING CAPABILITY OF THE ATIS REGISTRATION METHOD 
FILTER DIMENSION \ Contact Filtering Registration Filtering 
Qualified /Unqualified N/ A; all contacts N/A; all contacts 
assumed qualified. assumed qualified. 
Eligible /Registered Tract targeting. Perfect; verified by mobile 
registrar after contact. 
Partisanship Tract targeting. Assistance refusal; perfect 
for group-only reg's. Inef-
fective for self-registrants. 
Self-Reg /Group-Reg Tract targeting. None. 
Turnout Tract targeting. None. 
Table 1. 
III.B.3 A Prototypical ATIS Service Cycle with Partisan Filtering 
This section presents a prototypical arrivee service cycle at a mobile 
registrar's station. While not every feature of this scenario is a formal assumption of 
the model, the example is consistent with the general assumptions that have been 
made. The flowchart in Figure 1 depicts the interaction between an arrivee and an 
A TIS registration worker. 
Imagine an individual arriving at-- or contacting-- the registrar's station, that 
is he has approached within "conversational distance" of the registrar. The 
individual has two choices at this point: he can pause at the station, or continue 
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walking past. If the individual appears likely to leave the vicinity of the station, the 
registrar also has two choices: he can opt to do nothing while the arrivee departs, or 
he can initiate a conversation with him. 
Now, if the individual is already registered, presumably he has no reason to 
communicate with the registrar and will therefore proceed past without stopping. The 
registrar may choose to inquire after him, but before discussing this branch of the 
diagram, consider the other possibility at the f'rrst decision juncture-- namely that the 
individual is not registered. The unregistered individual will observe the partisan 
literature posted at the station. If the the registrar is a representative of the arrivee's 
party, it is more likely that the individual may decide to pause at the station, 
depending on of his degree of interest in politics. On the other hand, if the registrar is 
not a representative of the arrivee's party, it is plausible that only a strongly 
enthusiastic partisan--indeed, a self registrant--would pause at the station. 
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If an individual appears about to pass by the station, the registrar must decide 
whether or not to initiate a conversation with him. Presumably the registrar estimates 
the arrivee's partisanship based on some spectrum of observable characteristics, and 
decides to address him only if he conjectures their partisanship matches. Otherwise, 
the registrar will simply do nothing while the individual departs.23 
Progressing down the diagram, suppose the juncture has been reached at 
which an individual has stopped at the registration station, either on his own accord or 
because the registrar has asked him to.24 The registrar's rrrst question in either case 
is to inquire whether the individual is registered or not.25 Obviously, if the individual 
is registered, no further interaction will occur; and the arrivee departs while the 
23. It is unlikely the registrar will let very many arrivees simply walk past. While he 
clearly does not want to waste any effort serving cross-partisans, the extent of his 
obligation to such individuals is the provision of registration affidavits. He can decline 
to assist processing the forms. On the other hand, if the registrar mistakenly lets his 
party's partisans bypass his station, he will loose potential registration commissions. 
Furthermore, if the model is to be consistent with this scenario, the registrar must 
make accurate partisanship guesses. Otherwise, eligible individuals with a low level 
of interest in politics will fail to be registered at their first contact with a registrar of 
their party-- as the model predicts. 
24. Of course an individual is free to ignore the registrar's summons. However, 
under assumptions Rl)- R3) which will be formally presented in the next section, an 
individual will refuse to pause when requested only if: i) he is already registered, or ii) 
he is a group-only registerable partisan who believes the registrar represents an 
opposition party. An arrivee might form such a belief after inspecting partisan 
literature posted at the registrar's station. In the absence of such partisan signals, 
Rl)- R3) require that an unregistered individual stop at the station. 
25. Individuals who stop of their own accord presumably are not already registered, 
but it seems reasonable to suppose the registrar will ask about their registration 
status just to ascertain there has been no mis-understanding. Among those arrivees 
stopped by the registrar himself, some will be already registered, and some not; in 
these cases the determination of registration status is a necessity. 
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registrar prepares for the next arrival. On the other hand, if the individual is not 
registered the registrar's next move will be to determine the arrivee's partisanship. · 
If the individual asks to register for a party other than the registrar's, the 
registrar must, as prescribed by the California elections code, provide the arrivee with 
an affidavit before dispatching him.26 However, the registrar is not obligated to assist 
the individual in filling out the form or returning it. On the other hand, if the arrivee's 
declared party affiliation matches the registrar's, the registrar will aid in the 
completion and processing of the form. 
The ATIS arrival service cycle has now been completed, and the registrar 
resets and awaits the next arrival. Presumably the length of time required to serve an 
arrival is relatively short compared to the mean length of time between arrivals. 
Indeed, in the interests of analytic simplicity it will be assumed that the service cycle 
is length zero, that is the processing of an arrivee is instantaneous. This will obviate 
the need to formally introduce the possibility of queueing in the model, which would be 
mathematically complex but would not seem to be an important feature of the A TIS 
registration process. 
III.B.4 The ATIS Production Function 
The purpose of this section is to express the expected number of marginal 
registrations produced by a partisan A TIS registration drive as a function of the 
26. Recall it has been assumed that self-registrants postpone self registration until 
the second date. Thus an A-party self-registrant, even though he had just received an 
affidavit from a B-party registrar would not return the form until the second date. Such 
an individual could still be contacted by A-party mobile registrars during the 
registration period and group registered. 
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drive's contact intensities A.i across tracts. A marginal registration is defined to be 
that of an individual who would not have registered in the absence of the drive. Zl The 
contact intensity of a registration drive in tract i is defined by: A.i = Y/Qi, the number of 
contacts 'Yi generated by the drive as percentage of the qualified tract population Qi. 
These contact intensities should be regarded as the inputs to the A TIS production 
process; the production function developed in this section describes the feasible 
combinations of contact intensities and expected marginal registrations. 
Two cases will be considered: first that mobile registrars can practice partisan 
filtering defined by assumptions Rl)- R3) below, and secondly that they cannot. The 
filtering case is applicable to the current politcal environment in California--while the 
no-filtering case, analyzed in the appendix, is mainly of historical interest. Prior to 
1977 mobile registrars were non-partisan deputies of the registrar of voter~ and were 
prohibited from engaging in partisan filtering.28 
Three assumptions have been made below regarding A TIS registration pro -
duction. Notice particulary that these assumptions determine the partisan registra -
tion (post-contact) filtering capability of A TIS mobile registrars. 
Rl) Eligible self-registrants will obtain and return registration affidavits at f"rrst 
contact with any registration group. 
R2) Eligible group-only registrants will become registered if and only if con -
tacted by an own-party or non-partisan group. These individuals will be 
registered at the first such contact, but never cross-register. 
27. Notice that all marginal registrations must be generated from the pool of eligible 
group-only registerable individuals not registered by the non-partisan organization. 
28. Presumably the no-filtering case is also more appropriate for describing 
registration drives conducted by non-partisan organizations. 
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R3) Partisan mobile registrars must provide affidavits on demand to cross-
registrants, but need not assist in preparing or returning the forms. 
These assumptions determine the registration filtering capability of mobile 
registrars as follows: (WOLOG, consider the case of an A-party registrar repre-
senting party A.) By previous assumptions, each individual is either a self-registrant 
or a group-only registrant, and either an A-partisan or not. After contacting an eligible 
individual, an A-party mobile registrar will immediately verify the contact's 
partisanship. Although the registrar cannot refuse to distribute an affidavit to a non-
A-partisan, he can decline to assist such an individual in preparing and returning the 
form. The registrar will, however, provide preparation assistance to an A-partisan. 
This is an effective filtering strategy. For consider that self-registrants, 
regardless of partisanship, will obtain and return registration forms one way or 
another-- nothing is lost by providing an affidavit to a self-registrant. On the other 
hand, group only registrants will return their forms only if assisted--restricting 
registration assistance solely to A-partisans prevents the registration of opposistion 
partisans.29 Notice also that Rl) - R3) imply that individuals cross-registered by 
party A would have self-registered anyway; therefore, cross-registrations should not be 
subtracted from own-party registrations when computing party A 's marginal plurality 
29. Registration filtering losses may occur in the case of group-only registerable 
individuals who decline to state a party preference (GORDS). Under Rl)-R3), A-
party registrars would not assist such individuals. Some would vote for party A if 
registered, and so represent a filtering loss. However, the fewer GORDS individuals, 
the smaller the losses. The weaker GORDS individuals' political interest and the 
lower their turnout probability, the less important the registration loss. Finally, while 
some GORDS registrants would turn out for party A, some would also turn out for the 
opposistion. 
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yield. In the partisan filtering case, expected marginal registration plurality is equal to 
expected (own-party) marginal registrations. 
The first step in computing the expected number of marginal registrations due 
to an A-party registration effort is to determine the expected number of eligible A-
partisans in each tract of the district. This is the pool of individuals from which the 
marginal registrations will be generated. It has been previously assumed in G3) that 
both parties can perfectly predict the registration yield of group N, and that this non-
partisan production occurs instantaneously at time 0. In particular, suppose that 
group N registers rNi individuals in tract i leaving a remaining eligible population of 
Ei- rNi at time 0.30 Recall that 1t~ denotes the proportion of A-party partisans among 
Ei. According to assumption G4), the non-partisan group-registers sub-populations of 
a tract in proportion to their relative frequencies; therefore, the expected number of A-
partisans remaining after the initial non-partisan effort can be expressed as: 
(eq 1) 
It remains to determine a) the percentage of this sub-population expected to be 
30. Assumption G3), that the non-partisan registration yield rNi is obtained 
instantaneously on the first date, has been made for technical convenience. Of course 
if the non partisan group conducts its eforts concurrently with the parties over the 
course of the registration period, it is not strictly correct to assume that there are 
Ei- rNi eligible individuals remaining at time 0. 
The expected number of A-party registrations produced by party A under the 
concurrent scenario can be calculated; however, the resulting first order system is 
quite complex and appears unlikely to afford desired closed form solutions for the 
optimal contact intensities. Since the expected number of A-party registrations 
obtained under G3) approximates that obtained under the concurrent scenario, and 
since the non-partisan effort is relatively minor, there is no advantage in analyzing the 
more complex case. 
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contacted and registered by an effort of a given intensity, and b) the percentage of 
registrations which are attributable soley to the registration effort. 
a. An Occupancy Problem : Numbers of Individuals Contacted at Least Once 
This purpose of this section is to determine the percentage of eligible A-
partisans contacted at least once-- and hence registered-- during an A-party registra-
tion effort of a given intensity. Since ATIS mobile registrars are unable to distinguish 
a priori between registered and eligible individuals, it is likely that during a 
registration drive some individuals will be contacted several times by registration 
worker(s)31. This phenonenon gives rise to an interesting combinatorial problem: 
Suppose a registration effort in tract i results in 'Yi contacts from a qualified population 
of Qi. What is the expected number of individuals contacted at least once during this 
drive of intensity A.i? 
This problem can be interpreted as an instance of a well-known schema in 
probability theory--the occupancy paradigm--based on the notion of balls falling into 
compartmentalized boxes.32 Let 'Yi balls be dropped randomly into a box containing Q i 
identically sized compartments, Di of which have been distinguished or specified in 
31. Recall self-registration or turnout sensitization effects due to multiple contacts 
have been assumed away in Il),and will not be analyzed further here. 
32. Occupancy problems occur frequently in the quantam mechanics and thermo -
dynamics literature. Perusal of a journal such as Biometrika will reveal considerable 
research interest in similar problems, particularly on the part of epidemiologists. 
However, in the epidemiological literature, immunization workers-- who play a role 
analagous to that of registration workers here-- are not typically modelled as being 
unable to distinguish a priori between immunized and unimmunized members of the 
population. 
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advance. A compartment is said to be occupied (after the drop) if it contains one or 
more balls. How many of the Di distinguished compartments can be expected to be 
occupied after 'Yi balls have been dropped? 
Dropping one of the Yi balls into a compartment corresponds to the registration 
worker contacting a member of the qualified population Qi, and the first drop into each 
of the Di distinguished boxes represents a successful registration in the distinguished 
sub-population. The possibility for a compartment to contain more than one ball 
reflects the possibility that a given individual may be contacted redundantly several 
times during the registration drive. 
By means of a suprisingly tedious argument, David & Barton [1962] demon-
strate that the expected number of occupied compartments among the Di is given by: 
DiEt - (1-1/Q0'Yi], 
where ~ = yJQi,is the contact intensity33. This expectation can be quite closely ap -
proximated by the simpler expression: 
The interested reader may verify that this approximation affords non-trivial 
33. The reason this approximation works is that ln(1 +x) = x, for x small-- as can be 
verified by direct application of Taylor's theorem. Given this result, notice that 
ln(l-1/Qi )'Yi] = Yiln(1-1/Qi) = Yi(-1/Qi) = -r/Qi = -A.i, the approximation improving as 
Qi increases. Now as ln(1-1/Qi )Yi = -A.i, taking exp of both sides gives (1-1/Qi )'Yi = e-
A.i. Finally, substituting e-A.i for (1-1/Qi )'Yi gives DJl-(1-1/QJ'Yi] = Di(l-e-A.i), as 
desired. 
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computational advantages when manipulating first-order equation systems. The 
excellent quality of the approximation, particularly for values of 'Yi and Qi likely to be 
encountered in real-world registration drives, can be appreciated by inspecting the 
table which appears in the appendix. 
In conclusion, the expected number of marginal registrations produced by an 
A TIS registration drive conducted at a contact intensity A.i among a qualified 
population Q,of whom (Ei-rNi) are eligible to be registered and a fraction 1t~ are a-
partisans, can be closely approximated by choosing Di = 7t~(Ei-rNJ to obtain: 
(eq 2) 
b. Factoring Out the Self-Registrants 
It would not be correct to regard the expectation (eq 2) as the marginal 
registration impact of the A-party effort in tract i; some of these registrations almost 
certainly correspond to individuals who would have self-registered anyway. This 
section will analyze the problem of eliminating the self-registrants from the marginal 
expected registration count. 
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+ SELF + 
Ex Post Unregistered A-Parti.s ans in Tract i 
New A-Registrations Solely from Drive 
Figure 2. 
Let the entire region depicted in the figure above represent all the eligible A-
partisans remaining in tract i immediately after the non-partisan effort has been 
completed. Again, as there are a total of Ei eligible individuals from both parties, and 
a fraction 1t~ of these are A-partisans, the total number of unregistered A-partisans 
remaining after the non-partisan drive is 7tAi(Ei-rNj}. 
Recalling the earlier discussion of the occupancy problem, the expected number 
of group-registrations produced by an A-party registration drive conducted in the tract 
at intensity ~ is given by: 
These group-registered individuals are represented by the "GROUP" band running 
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along the southern edge of figure 2. Notice that, in accordance with Rl) - R3) , no 
non-A-partisans can have been group-registered in the A-party effort. 
The registration drive manager should not assume, however, that all of these 
group-registrations can be attributed to the drive. Indeed, some of the individuals 
who were group-registered would have self-registered anyway. Suppose it is expected 
that a fraction cr'\ ~ 0 of the unregistered A-partisans in tract i would self-register, 
unless contacted first by a registration worker. Then the number of unregistered A-
partisans who could be expected to self-register in the absence of any A-party 
registration effort is: 
crA1tA(E·-rN·)(l-e-"-i) 1 1 1 1 • 
This group of individuals is represented by the "SELF" band whi~h appears along the 
west edge of figure 2. 
Assumption Al) guarantees the propensity to self-register is the same among 
those contacted by registration workers in tract i as among those not contacted. 
Therefore, a fraction cr'\ of the gross group-registrations reported by the drive should 
be discounted by the manager when evaluating performance. The expected number of 
potential self-registrants who were group-registered instead is given by: 
crA1tA(E.-rN ·)(1-e-/.;) 
1 1 1 1 • 
And this group is represented in figure 2 by the double crosshatched region where the 
"GROUP" and "SELF" bands intersect in the southwest corner of the diagram. 
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Finally, how many of the group registrations can be exclusively attributed to 
the registration drive? The expected number of such group-only registrations is 
obtained by simply subtracting the expected number of group registrants who would 
have self-registered from the ranks of all group-registrations-- thus netting out the 
redundant group-registrations, as below: 
1t'\(Ei-rN 0(1-e-A.i) - cr'\1tAi(Ei-rN 0(1-e-Aj) 
= (1- crAi)1tAi(Ei-rN 0(1-e-Aj)_ (eq 3) 
The set of group-only registerable A-partisans is represented by the diagonally 
shaded region in the southeast corner of figure 2. 
c. Expected ATIS Marginal Registrations 
Summing the expectation (eq 3) across the I tracts which comprise the district 
gives the district wide total expected number of group-only registerable A-partisans 
registered by A-party mobile registrars 
(eq 4) 
In the absence of any A-party registration drive, these individuals would not 
otherwise have been registered, and thus represent the marginal increase in A-party 
registrations attributable to the effort in tract i . As per Rl) - R3), no group-only 
registerable A-partisans were registered by any opposition party, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, the self-registrant opposition partisans registered by party A have not 
been charged to party A's marginal yield in tract i. Notice also that the expression 
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above (eq 4) does not depend upon assumption 13), namely that self-registrants delay 
registration until the final date, or upon the alternate assumption I3a) of linear decay. 
III.B.S Strategy Revision During Fixed-Budget ATIS Drives 
This section is concerned with the import of assumption T2), that all groups 
mobilize their registration forces simultaneously and irrevocably on the first date. 
Given that the parties' managers' budgets are fixed, and supposing the managers 
make. good estimates of both the non-partisan registration yield and the political and 
demographic charactersistics of the tracts, would either manager want to revise his 
registration strategy after observing the other party's efforts? If not. then assumption 
T2) could be regarded as relatively innocuous in the context of the model's other 
assumptions. Furthermore, such results would simplify the analysis of party 
competition during registration drives, since neither party would choose to dynamically 
update its strategy in response to the other party's efforts. 
The problem reduces naturally to two cases: partisan filtering, and no partisan 
filtering. The second case is analyzed in the appendix, and yields the interesting 
conclusions that with no partisan filtering, neither manager would want to revise his 
strategy, and that the two parties will never conduct concurrent registration efforts in 
the same tracts. The results in the partisan filtering case are presented in the 
following proposition. 
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PROPOSITION (Redundancy of Assumption T2 with Partisan Filtering) 
Given the other assumptions of the model, assumption T2) is redundant; that is 
neither partisan manager would want to revise his strategy during the course of the 
registration drive.34 
Observe that from a partisan manager's point of view, the marginal productivity of a 
given tract depends only on the concentration of group-only registerable own-party 
eligibles. Since these individuals will never be registered by the opposition party, 
neither manager can benefit from the other party's efforts.35 Additionally, as there are 
no conversion effects, a registration drive by the other party does not decrease the 
34. Professor McKelvey has pointed out that the import of this proposition is that 
registration drive managers, as modelled here, are involved in a trivial game 
situation-since each player's payoff depends only on his strategy, but not his 
opponent's. The parties play a non-trivial game when choosing registration effort 
levels, but this competition is not the focus of the current analysis. 
35. Notice assumption 13), that all self-registration takes place on the second 
date, prevents a rather complex interaction between concurrent registration drives 
conducted by parties A and B in the same census tract. Consider that group 
registration efforts by party B will inevitably result in the contact of some eligible A-
party self registrants. If these individuals, having obtained affidavits from B-party 
registrars, were to immediately self register, they would of course no longer be eligible 
if contacted subsequently by A-party mobile registrars. This would represent a 
benefit to party A due to the actions of party B; since the group registration of an own-
party self-registrant is a deadweight loss to party A-- because a payment is entailed 
for registering an individual who would have eventually registered himself. However, 
with 13) in force, an A-party self registrant-- even though he has been previously 
contacted by B-party registrars-- will remain eligible during the registration period, 
and therefore can be group-registered at first contact with A-party registrars. See 
section III.C. l.c for additional discussion of this topic. 
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number of own-party eligibles. Given that each faces a fixed budget, the opposition 
party's efforts are therefore irrelevant to both managers. But this means knowledge 
of such efforts would similarly be of no tangible benefit. Thus both managers will find 
their date 0 optimal strategies, computed in the absence of information about the other 
party's strategy, will appear just as effective after the other party's strategy has been 
observed. QED. 
III.B.6 Compensation Schemes for Mobile Registrars 
Political parties typically compensate registration workers under the terms of 
incentive contracts which specify that the worker be paid a constant dollar amount for 
each own-party registration produced. ?6 Notice that even though registration workers 
are not paid directly on the basis of contact intensity, managers cannot set arbitrarily 
high contact intensities. Mobile registrars confront a problem of decreasing returns; 
as more own-party eligibles are registered, the next such individual becomes more 
difficult to find. Presumably, parties must pay registration workers their opportunity 
costs of foregoing other employment, at least on an average across the whole 
registration force. It must be possible for registrars to generate a sufficient number of 
successes to recoup their opportunity costs-- otherwise they will simply decline to 
continue employment with the party. 
Thus managers may find it useful to regard registrars' payments as the cost of 
contacting own-party eligibles-- even though these payments appear to be the cost of 
generating registrations. That registrars are commonly paid according to own-party 
registrations might well be an artifact of the difficulty of supervising a geographically 
36. I am not aware of any formal research concerning the incidence of parties' choice 
among various contract types for the compensation of registration forces. 
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dispersed labor force producing a product from inputs, registrar effort and the random 
arrival of eligibles, which are costly for managers to observe. If more efficient--
indeed, any-- supervision technologies were available to managers, it would not be 
suprising to observe parties employing different compensation schemes for their 
registration forces. 
The design of compensation schemes for mobile registrars represents an area 
for potential improvements in registration efficiency, particularly as regards the turnout 
and loyalty qualities of the registrations produced. This topic will be considered 
further in section V. 
11.L.C. THE MANAGER'S OPTIMAL STRATEGY 
The registration drive manager has been modelled as a rational, that is goal-
seeking, individual intent upon solving a well-defined optimization problem.37 Given a 
fixed budget, his problem is to allocate A TIS mobile registrars across the census 
tracts comprising a contested district so as to maximize his party's expected plurality. 
In this section the registration drive manager's problem will be foramalized and 
sufficient conditions for its unique solution will be derived. 
It will be demonstrated that the manager can determine his optimal strategy by 
first ranking the tracts according to a measure of their expected return to registration 
effort. In practice, several arguments of this return index must be estimated, for 
example: the numbers of unregistered partisans per tract, the propensity of such 
37. The problem of providing incentives to the registration drive manager will be 
omitted from consideration here. He will be assumed to take his assigned objective 
function as a given, and will diligently search for the optimal solution. 
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individuals to self-register, and the likelihood that group-registered individuals will 
turn out. Finally, the desired ATIS contact intensities for each tract are obtained as 
the natural log of each tract's productivity index plus a constant term. The interested 
may consult the appendix for a parallel treatment of the no partisan filtering case. 
III.C.l The Manager's Maximization Problem 
The statement of a formal optimization problem is comprised of three parts: the 
set of choice variables or strategy space, the objective function, and the constraints. 
It is suprising that a construct of this simplicitcy should exhibit such profound 
explanatory power in the social sciences. In any event, the three components of the 
registration manager's problem will now be discussed in turn. 
An A TIS registration drive manager can control the contact intensity of the 
effort in each of the census tracts which make up the district. That is he can direct an 
exact number of mobile registrar-hours to each tract during the course of the drive. In 
particular, his force of mobile registrars is assumed to take direction, to attend 
specified locations for the assigned number of hours, and not to stray to other tracts--
as set forth below: 
The Registration Manager 
Ml) The registration drive manager is able to control expected contact inten -
sities across tracts by posting mobile registrars at targeted locations for 
specified time intervals. 
Notice that the migration assumptions are also ultimately assumptions which 
bear upon the nature of the manager's control variables. Assumption B2), that 
individuals stay within their tracts entails that when a manager allocates some 
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number of mobile registrar-hours to a given tract, the targeted population will in fact 
be present. And the random arrival within tracts assumption Al) admits the 
conclusion that mobile registrars' hours are additive in the following sense: The 
expected number of individuals in a given tract contacted at least once by two mobile 
registrars, each stationed one hour in the tract, is the same as the expected number 
generated by one mobile registrar working two hours.38 
-----------I~J;-technical-convenience the manager's choice variables have been expressed 
in terms of contact intensities "-i = yJQi, that is, the expected number of contacts in a 
tract 'Yi divided by the total qualified population in the tract Qi. However, the final 
re~;ults would be no different if the manager had been modelled as selecting the 
expected contacts per tract, or the number of mobile registrar-hours per tract. 
As discussed previously, the registration drive manager's goal is to maximize 
the contribution to his party's39 election day plurality attributable to the drive, given a 
fixed budget constraint and the ATIS registration technology. 
The Registration Manager. Additional Assumptions 
M2) Partisan registration managers' objectives match those of their respective 
parties; managers pose no incentive compatability problems to the parties. 
M3) The ATIS registration drive is the sole registration production method. 
M4) The manager assumes his registration budget is exogenously fixed. 
MS) Registration managers act as price takers in labor markets. 
38. An example of how this assumption could fail is two registrars who have set up 
their stations right next to each other. 
39. In an election with several different races, all voters presumably vote the straight 
party ticket. 
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The expected number of registrations produced in a tract by an A TIS drive of a 
given intensity has been derived in section III.B.S. It remains to consider the role of 
the turnout factor in order to finish the construction of his objective function. 
Presumably, the manager's ultimate purpose is not simply to deliver new net 
registrations for his party, but rather new net votes on election day. Recall that 't~ 
denotes the proportion of A-partisans expected to actually vote if registered among all 
eligible A-partisans not expected to self-register; 't~ is the expected turnout 
percentage for group only registered A-partisans. 
Recalling expression (eq 4) developed previously for the expected number of 
marginal registrations, the desired expression for the expected marginal increase in 
party-A election day plurality as a result of the drive at contact intensity "-i in tract i 
can now be obtained. The expected number of individuals group-registered for party A 
who would not have registered otherwise--and who will also turn out for party A is 
given by: 
And so the manager's objective function is simply the sum, across all the 
tracts, of the expected marginal plurality in each tract: 
(eq 5) 
As discussed at the beginning of section III.B, a partisan registration drive 
manager (affiliated, say, with Party A) faces not only technological limitations, but 
159 
also resource and market constraints. Formally, these additional constraints are 
threefold: 
i) Non-Negativity Constraints. 
ii) The Budget Constraint. 
iii) Opportunity Cost Constraints. 
The non-negativity constraints are additional technological conditions; it is 
simply not possible for the registration drive manager to select negative values for the 
~· Doing so would correspond to de-registering individuals in the district«>. 
The budget constaint reflects the reality that registration is not costless, and 
the assumption the manager has an exogenously determined finite budget with which 
to finance the drive. It will be assumed that the expected number of registrations 
chargeable by the A-Party registration force times the cost per registration must not 
exceed the manager's budget constraint. 
In order to determine the expected number of registrations for which the party 
must pay, consider that the registration force generates registrations corresponding to 
two types of individuals: A-party group-only registrants, and A-party self-registrants. 
Given perfect partisan filtering, so that no A-party group-only registrants will be 
registered by opposition parties, the expected number of group-only A-party 
registrations generated by a drive conducted at contact intensity A.i has already been 
shown to be (1-cr~7tAi(Ei-rNi)(l-e-"-i) . Under, assumption 13) all self registrants--
40. It might be possible to include some notion of de-registration in a model of voter 
registration drives which allowed for the possibiltiy of conversion effects during 
registration. However, such effects have been disallowed here, and in any event 
conversion phenomena are generally thought to be insignificant during registration 
drives; see Cain and McCue [1985]. 
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and in particular A-party self registrants- postpone self registration until the second 
date. Therefore all A-party self registrants contacted at least once by an own-party 
registrar will be group registered. After subtracting the initial non-partisan group 
registrations, the expected number of eligible A-party self-registrants on date 0 is 
<1~1t~(Ei-rN0; therefore, the expected number of such individuals contacted at least 
once-- and hence group registered by Party A--must be : 
(eq 6) 
And so the desired expected number of registrations in tract i for which the party must 
pay its registration force is obtained as the sum below: 
(1-a~1t~(Ei-rNi)(l-e-Ai) + <1~1t~(Ei-rN j}(l-e-Ai) 
= 1t~(Ei-rN0(1-e-A:i). (eq 7) 
Summing the expression above across tracts and multiplying by the unit registration 
cost c, the A Party manager's budget constraint can be expressed as: 
(eq 8) 
The third constraint, the opportunity cost constraint, reflects the market reality 
that mobile registrars will not provide their services unless registration commissions 
cover their opportunity costs. In practice this constraint turns out to bound the model; 
without it managers would have an incentive to select arbitrarily high contact 
intensities. Since the manager pays the registration force on a per registration basis, 
if he does not take the opportunity cost constraint into account, he will continue to 
assign registrars to exhausted tracts where expected waiting times between 
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sucessful registrations are long--and commission charges per hour quite low. Of 
course such tactics simply aren't feasible, and this consideration must be built into the 
modei.41 
Mobile Registrar Compensation 
M6) Mobile registrars are compensated by a constant dollar payment for each 
own-party registration generated. These payments represent the only cost 
of an A TIS registration effon. 
M7) The expected total payments to mobile registrars must at least equal the 
registrars' total opportunity cost. 
Summing expression (eq 7), the tract i expected number of chargeable registra-
tions, across tracts and multiplying the result by the unit registration commission c 
gives the expected total compensation paid to mobile registrars. Comparing this 
expresion to the opportunity cost borne by the registration force yields the 
opportunity cost constaint below: 
(eq 9) 
where M denotes a mobile registrar's hourly opportunity cost, and ti is the total 
number of hours worked by A-pany mobile registrars in tract i. 
41. Another way to look at the opportunity cost constraint is that the pany is really 
paying the mobile registrars for contact hours; however, given the geographic 
dispersion of the registration force and the technological uncertainty inherent in the 
registration production process, it is very difficult for the party to monitor mobile 
registrar performance. The constant payment per registration compensation package 
is an incentive scheme designed to encourage the registration force to police itself. 
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DEFINITION (Productivity Index pi) 
For notational and conceptual convenience, let 13i be defined as below: 
(eq 10) 
Pi can be interpreted as a tract's registration productivity index from the A-party 
registration drive manager's point of view. l3i• where 0 :s; l3i :s; 1, is the percentage of 
group-only registerable A-eligibles (net of those registered by the non-partisan group) 
who will tum out if registered, among all qualified individuals in tract i. 42 Re-writing 
the manager's objective function (eq 5) in terms of l3i• one obtains: 
Finally, having discussed its three components, the desired formal statement of the 
A-Party manager's ATIS registration problem can now be presented: 
(eq 11) 
S.T. 1) A.i ~ 0, fori= 1, ... , I. (Non-Negativity Constraint) 
2) c>~<Ll1t'\(Ei - rN0( 1-e-A.i)) :S; C. (Budget Constraint) 
42. Notice that l3i is an index of concentration, and thus measures a tract's 
productivity per unit of registration effort, rather than in absolute terms. 
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III.C.2 Solving the Manager's Optimization Problem 
The optimization problem (eq 11) can be manipulated to yield an analytically 
more tractable form. The resulting problem is equivalent to the original in the sense 
that both problems admit exactly the same set of solution(s). The desired 
simplification will be accomplished by eliminating and combining the constraints of the 
original problem. Next, the associated first-order system will be solved. Finally, it 
will be demonstrated that this solution represents the unique constrained optimum for 
the manager's problem . 
.a.a. A Simplified Equivalent Problem 
In order to eliminate constraint 1); it will be assumed that at an optimum, none 
of the choice variables ~ is negative. Intuitively this should be the case, since a 
negative choice for ~ makes the ith summand of the objective function negative, a 
situation which hardly seems likely to be optimal.43 
43. Of course, it is formally possible--although it makes no practical sense--that a 
negative choice for some A.i given a relatively small Pi (and a correspondingly small 
registration penalty associated with a negative choice of A.v might feed back through 
the budget constraint 2) and "create" resources thereby permitting the choice of an 
artificially large positve A.j given a relatively large Pj· 
Should one of the non-negativity constraints in fact be binding, first-order conditions 
derived under the assumption that all such constraints were not binding would not 
correctly express the optimality conditon that the gradient of the objective function is a 
linear combination of the gradients of the binding constraints. However, this possi -
bility appears remote in the present instance. 
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Constraint 2), the budget constraint, requires that the registration drive 
manager choose the Ai so that the expected payments to mobile registrars do not 
exceed his budget C.44 In fact this constraint must hold with equality at an optimum, 
since--assuming perfect partisan filtering--the manager can always increase the 
expected number group-only registrations for his party by conducting a more intensive 
drive. Thus any allocation which leaves a positive expected budget residue must 
perforce be suboptimal; therefore, the manager will continue spending until the budget 
is exhausted. 
Finally, constraint 3) stipulates that the total expected payments to mobile 
registrars must at least equal their opportunity costs. It will be assumed that in labor 
market equilibrium, the price c paid per A-party registration will adjust so that the 
third constraint will also hold with equality. Presumably the registration force will not 
agree to work for less than its opportunity cost, while the party need not pay more. 
Notice that the left-hand sides of constraints 2) and 3) appearing in (eq 11) are 
identical. Since, as argued above, both of these constraints must hold with equality, 
the right hand sides can be set equal to yield a single equality constraint: 
(eq 12) 
Recall that the contact intensity Ai is defined as Yi/ Q , where 'Yi is the total number of 
contacts made in tract i. If the expected number of arrivals at each mobile registrar's 
44. The number of A party registrations which will be actualy produced by the mobile 
registrars is, of course, a random variable. Thus the manager cannot make a perfect 
prediction concerning the cost of his registration activities. If the realized cost of the 
registration drive exceeds the budget, presumably the difference can be made up 
budget surpluses realized from other campaign activities, or from additional fund 
raising conducted after the campaign. 
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station in tract i is Jl per hour, the expected total number of registrars' hours in tract i 
required to generate 'Yi contacts is J...l*ti. Thus 1j_ and A; are related according to: 
'Yi = J!ti ¢::> (yJQJ*Qi = J.lti ¢::> A.iQi = J.Lti 
¢=> 1j_ = A.iQJ J.l, for Jl ;t 0. 
And so, substituting for ti in (eq 12), the manager's maximization problem can be 
reformulated as: 
MAXA, L1 l3iQi(1-e-~) (eq13) 
S.T. la) M*Lr A.iQ)J...l =C. 
Rearranging constraint 1a) above and attaching it to the objective function with a 
Lagrange multiplier45 ~yields the equivalent unconstrained problem: 
(eq 14) 
h.. First-Order Conditions 
Differentiating (eq 14) with respect to A. and ~ yields the following system of 
I+ 1 first-order conditions: 
l3iQ~-"'i- ~Qi = 0; fori= 1, ... , I, and 
LI AjQj- CJ.L/M = 0. 
(eq 15) 
(eq 16) 
45. Recall that a Lagrange multiplier can be interpreted as the percentage increase in 
the value of the objective function (at an optimum) if the associated constraint were 
relaxed by 1%. See Varian [1984]. 
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First consider the I equations of type (eq 15). Rearranging gives: 
e-l..i = ~;t3i <=> ln(e-l..i) = ln(~i) 
<=> /vi= ln(~i) -In(~); fori= 1, ... , I. (eq 17) 
It remains to express In(~) in terms of the parameters of the model. To this end, 
multiply each equation immediately above by Qi and so obtain: 
And summing these equations across I gives: 
Rearranging the first-order condition (eq 16) and setting its right-hand side equal to 
that above yields: 
C~/M = L1 QJin(~i) -In(~)) = L1 Qln(~J -ln(~)*Q 
<=> In(~)= ( :LI Qiln(~j)- C~/M) I Q. (eq 18) 




It is interesting to note that the expressions (eq 17, 18, 19) above can also be 
manipulated to yield: 
In(~) = ( L 1 Qiln(J3J - L 1 "-iQi) I Q, and 
A.i = ln(J3J- ( L 1 Qiln(J3J- L 1 "-iQi) I Q; for i = 1, ... , I. 
Thus it can be further concluded that C~/M = L 1A.iQi. 
Again, recall that J3i, the productivity index for tract i, is the percentage among all 
qualified individuals in tract i of group-only registerable A-partisans who will turn out 
if registered. Recall also that and ~ denotes the arrival rate46, C and M are the budget 
and registrars' opportunity cost respectively47 , and Q denotes the entire qualified 
population of the district. 
46. Notice assumption A2) , that the arrival rate is constant across, facilitates the 
the derivation of these pointblank first order conditions. If arrival rates ~i '# 0 are 
different across tracts, the interested reader can verify the manager's optimization 
problem takes the form: 
MAX A. L1 J3iQi(l-e-A.i) - ~*(LI (A.iQ/~J-C/M) . 
The corresponding first order conditions are A.i = ln(~J + ln(J3i) - In(~), where the 
expression for ln(~) is somewhat more complex than that which appears in (eq #). In 
particular: 
ln(~) = (L,I (Q/~i)[ln(~i) + ln(J3J ]-(C/M)) /'J:.I (Q/Jli) 
Notice the occurence of ~i in the equation for A.i. 
47. Observe that the parameters C and M appearing in the constant term are 
estimable. Presumably M is just the minimum wage, while C is the party's 
registration drive budget. Since the total number of registrations produced and the 
cost per registration are known, C can be estimated if it is assumed that payments to 
mobile registrars are the only costs of the registration drive. 
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~ Sufficiency and Uniqueness 
First of all, notice that each expression (1-e-).;_) is both strictly concave and 
strictly monotonically increasing in A.i.48 Referring to the definition of j3i above, since 
0'~, 1t~, and 't~ are strictly bounded in the interval (0,1), then l3i must be strictly 
positive--so that each of the functions j3i(1-e-Aj_) must also be strictly concave and 
increasing in A.i. Since the sum of such functions shares these properties, the objective 
function L 1 l3iQi(1-e-'-i) is also strictly concave increasing in A.. Observe that the 
constraint 1a) appearing in (eq 13) is a linear, and hence convex, function of the choice 
variables ~· It is well known (see Varian [1984]) that any solution to the associated 
first-order system of such a nicely behaved problem must be an optimum. And indeed, 
inspection of the first-order system (eq 19) of the manager's problem will reveal that it 
admits a single, unique solution . 
.d.. Benefits of Additional Registration Spending · 
This section answers the question: What is the expected registration increase 
if an optimally conducted registration effort is allocated an additional dollar? 
The value of the Lagrange multiplier ~ at the optimum determined by the 
first-order system (eq 19) gives the percentage increase in the value of the objective 
function as the budget constraint in (eq 13) is relaxed. ~ is functionally related to the 
optimal values of the contact intensities ~ acording to: 
A.i = ln(j3i) - In(~); for i = 1, ... , I, (eq 20) 
48. The function (1-e-).;_) takes the value 0 when A.i = 0, and increases aymptotically 
toward 1 as the values of ~ increase. 
169 
and also to the equation: 
(eq 21) 
Either of · these relationships should premit estimation of the registration benefit of 
relaxing the budget constraint. The second equation above is especially interesting 
becuase it does not contain direct instances of optimal values of the choice variables 
~. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This section examines the extent to which the A TIS model explains the 
allocation of effort in registration drives conducted across several Southern California 
Assembly districts. The analysis focuses on registration activity during the 
nine-week period of intense effort preceeding the last day to register for the 1984 
general elections. I While some features of Los Angeles County Assembly races are 
obviously unique, it is reasonable to suppose these contests are representative of 
political campaigns in general--and so represent a convenient design for testing the 
A TIS model. Furthermore the demographic and political diversity of Los Angeles 
county afford an opportunity to gauge the parametric sensitivity of the model. 
Certain ancillary issues can also be illuminated by empirical analysis. For 
example, evidence has been marshalled to support the assumption that 
cross- registrants (partisans group-registered by the opposistion party) would have 
self-registered except for prior contact by registration workers. The degree to which 
mobile registrtU:S can practice partisan filtering has also been investigated. 
Empirical results concerning the A TIS model also indicate directions for 
improving the efficiency of future registration drives. To the extent that i) the 
assumptions of the model reflect current registration practices, and ii) managers were 
able to make ex ante estimates of the required parameters, systematic deviations 
from the model's optimality conditions represent avenues for improved registration 
efforts. 
1. The 1984 general election presents an attractive opportunity for empirical 
analysis in part because Census data gathered in 1980 is still relatively current. 
1 71 
In conclusion, the empirical section of this paper consists of five major 
subsections: 
Part A) describes the data set and provides summary statistics concerning 
the Assembly districts chosen for detailed scrutiny. 
Part B) presents results concerning the effectiveness of parties' partisan 
filtering, and lends support for the perfect filtering assumptions Rl)-
R3). 
Part C) discusses methods employed to estimate both contact intensity and 
the model's parameters, and reports tests of the A TIS first-order 
conditions. 
Part D) advances and tests an alternative model of registration drive 
managers' decision making. 
Part E) analyzes potential improvements of registration drive efficiency. 
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IV.A. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SET 
The data analyzed in this study consist of observations of voter registrations 
from several different Los Angeles County Assembly districts during the nine-week 
period from 1Sl August 1984 until the twenty-ninth day prior2 to the November 1984 
general election. Hereafter this time interval will be referred to as the registration 
period. Cain and McCue [1985a,b] originally assembled the data utilized here, and 
have commented in detail concerning its unique attributes: 
The data for our analysis comes from Los Angeles County. In addition to being 
one of the cental areas of voter registration in the state, Los Angeles is 
uniquely suited for an empirical study of this sort. Voter registration records 
are detailed and in readily accessible compute~ized form. The creation of the 
data set employed here required three pieces of information: the registration 
number assigned to the application form of each newly registered voter, the 
registered voter file, and the purge file. 3 
A group undertaking registration drives in LA County is issued registration 
forms with affidavit numbers that fall within a given range. The affidavit 
number on the completed registration form identifies how the individual was 
registered and by whom. By matching this number with the registered voter 
file, it is possible to know the voter's age, marital status, sex, time of 
registration, surname and party registration. A comparison of the newly 
registered list with the purge list of nonvoters then generates the names of 
those who were newly registered but did not vote. Since the data set includes 
information about whether an individual was registered by a group or self-
registered, we can compare the characteristics of the two kinds of registrants 
as well as their voting rates. 
2. This is the last day to register in order to vote in the November election. Group 
registration activity declines precipitously after this date. 
3. Cain and McCue [1985b] report that in Los Angeles County each voter failing to 
vote in a general election is sent a postcard to be returned to the registrar of voters, 
thus confirming the validity of the voter's registered address. Voters who neglect to 
return the card are finally purged from the registration rolls. 
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[Even though] the registration tapes do not include such crucial information as 
the income, education, or race of the registrant, by matching addresses on the 
registration tapes to those on the Census Dime files, it is possible to merge 
census data with them. [Thus it is possible to create] a combined data set of 
registration information for each newly registered voter, census variables that 
describe the demographic characteristics of the bloc the individual lives in, a 
record of whether the person voted in the 1984 election, the political behavior of 
the precinct the individual lives in, and the group that registered him. 
The data just described are characterized by two distinct degrees of resolution: 
the registration and voting data are available at the individual level, while census data 
is only available at the census bloc or tract level. Approximately 5000 individuals 
reside in a typical Los Angeles county census tract. Since a merged data set can only 
be as fine as its coarsest component, when merging the registration and census data it 
was necessary to aggregate the individual level observations of registration and 
voting variables to obtain tract totals. This procedure yields the census tract as the 
basic unit of analysis or case. A representative Assembly district is comprised of 
approximately 60 census tracts. 4 
Notice that although the registration affidavit for a group-registered individual 
indicates the registration group and the registrant's address (and hence his census 
tract), the location of the registration contact is not specified. This aspect of the data 
4. Not suprisingly, the geographic boundaries of Assembly districts and census 
tracts do not coincide exactly. An Assembly district is typically ringed by split tracts 
which straddle the boundary. This phenomenon was taken account of here by 
restricting attention only to those tracts of a given district containing at least 1000 
qualified district residents. 
Counting all split tracts, AD63 contains 66 tracts, AD41 has 73, while AD39 is 
comprised of 82 tracts. Removal of split tracts reduces these totals approximately 
15%~ however the associated population loss is only a few thousand individuals out of 
an average qualified population of 295,000. 
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set highlights the importance of assumption B2), that registrants are contacted in their 
home tracts.5 
Several different registration groups, including political parties, committees 
formed by individual candidates, and a variety of civic organizations, conducted regis -
tration drives in Los Angeles County Assembly districts during 1984. In order to test 
the A TIS model, these various organizations were classified as partisan or non-
partisan, and if partisan, as Republican, Democrat, or other.6 To the degree that 
organizations classified as representing the same party coordinate their registration 
efforts, it is reasonable to model their efforts as being orchestrated by a single 
manager. The involvement of the Speaker's office in financing and coordinating 
registration efforts in recent Democratic campaigns for the Assembly lends further 
plausibility to the single manager scenario. 
It would be unwieldy to try to analyze all new registrations in Los Angeles 
County during the peak registration season prior to the 1984 election. Creation of the 
requisite merged data sets for both parties in each of dozens of Assembly districs 
would simply represent too great a computational burden. Following Cain and McCue 
[1985a] the sample has been narrowed to three selected Assembly districts: 
• the 63r.d, near Downey, a marginal district which changed hands between 
the 1982 and 1984 elections, 
5. Potentially very interesting research concerning registration drives might be 
conducted by arranging to have mobile registrars log the locations of their registration 
successes. These locations could then be compared with registrants' home addresses 
to develop a chart of population circulation within the district. 
6. The classification scheme adopted by Cain and McCue [1985a,b] was employed 
here. 
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• the 4 1 s....t, which includes parts of Pasdena, Altadena and Glendale, a safely 
Republican district, and 
• the 39th, just north of downtown Los Angeles, excluding Hollywood, which 
is safely Democratic. 
The numbers of individuals registered in these three districts during the 
nine-week registration period are reported in the table below. The total new 
registration column shows new registrations by party generated from all sources. The 
discrepancy between the sum of the Democratic and Republican totals and the figure 
reported in the TOTAL row is accounted for by third party and decline-to-state (DCL) 
registrations. Own party group-registrations are reported separately; this column 
shows Democratic registrations produced by Democratic groups, and Republican 
registrations produced by Republican groups. The third column reports self-
registrations by party. Notice that for a given party, the difference between the party 
new registration total and the sum of own party group-registrations plus self-
registrations for the party is due to the efforts of non-partisan registration 
organizations and cross-registrations by other parties. 7 
7. The totals reported were computed directly from individual level registration data. 
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NEW REGISTRATIONS SUMMARY 
Total New Reg Own Group-reg Self-reg 
AD63 
Dem 7419 5531 1136 
Rep 4412 1126 1757 
TafAL 12,815 
AD41 
Dem 5838 2761 1805 
Rep 7264 2756 2564 
TafAL 14,825 
AD 32 
Dem 7005 4519 1299 
Rep 7200 4332 1029 
TafAL 15,440 
Table 2. 
It is interesting to note the strong group-registration success achieved by the 
Democrats in the marginal 63n1 district. In the other two districts, both parties were 
about equally successful in terms of absolute numbers of group-registrations 
produced. 
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IV.B. TESTS OF PARTISAN FILTERING 
The ability to conduct successful partisan registrant filtering is a critical 
determinant of parties' optimal registration strategy. (The theoretical importance of 
such filtering can be appreciated by comparing the predictions of the A TIS model with 
the no-filtering model first-order conditions presented in the Appendix.) The available 
data permit at least two tests of the extent to which partisan A TIS mobile registrars 
can successfully conduct partisan filtering. One test is based on the incidence of 
cross-registration, while the other examines the correlation of the parties' filtering 
success with filtering difficulty. 
B.l Incidence of Cross-registration 
Recall that an individual is said to have been cross-registered if he has been 
group-registered by a registrar representing an opposition party. If parties could not 
practice partisan filtering, the partisanship ratios among group-registrations generated 
by opposing partisan organizations should tend to be the same in a given district. 
Further, these partisanship ratios should tend to resemble those among the 
unregistered population as a whole. 8 
In fact, the partisanship ratios of registrations generated by different parties 
are dramatically different. The numbers of Democratic registrations produced by 
Republican groups, and vice versa are shown in the table below. The figures in square 
brackets are the ratio of cross-registrations to own-party group-registrations plus 
cross-registrations. These percentages point out the very low incidence of cross-
8. The reader is referred again to Wolfinger [1980] for support of this somewhat 
suprising claim. 
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registration; the filtering errror would be even smaller if group-produced DCL and 
third-party registrations were included in the denominator. Finally, it is interesting to 
note that the Republicans appear to exhibit a somewhat better filtering performance 
than do the Democrats. 
INCIDENCE OF CROSS-REGISTRATION 
Rep by Dem Demby Rep 
AD 63 904 174 
[14%] [13%] 
AD41 704 268 
[11%] [9%] 
AD32 580 279 
[11%] [6%] 
Table 3. 
B.2 Filtering Efficiency and Filtering Difficulty 
It might be argued that aggregate measures of filtering efficiency do not 
necessarily lend strong support to the claim that parties possess powerful filtering 
capability. Indeed, seeming filtering ability might simply be an artifact of astute tract 
targeting. One possible reply to this contention is that if a party can filter perfectly 
then its filtering errors across tracts should be unrelated to the difficulty of the filtering 
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task. This relationship was analyzed for AD63. Unfortunately, the existing data do 
not permit testing this relationship for AD39 and AD41. 
Suppose, in the case of the Democrats, that the ratio of Republicans registered 
by Democrats to all Democratic-produced group-registrations is adopted as a 
measure of tract filtering error; denote this variable by: 
DFLTERR =REP BY OEM/OEM-PRODUCED 
And let the difficulty of the Democrats' filtering task be measured by: 
the ex ante concentration of eligible Republicans among all qualified tract residents. 
Define analagous measures RFLTERR and REPCON for the Republicans. The relationship 
between these error and difficulty variables can be better understood by examining the 
following scattergrams and regression results. 
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REGRESSION OF DFLTERR ON REPCON, AD63 
CO.EF => REPCON CONST F n 
.476** .030 .138 8.195 53 
.166 .022 
p(DFLTERR,REPCON) = .372 J..l.(DFLTERR) = .089 J..l.(REPCON) = .12A. 
REGRESSION OF RFLTERR ON DEMCON, AD63 
COBF => DEMCON CONST F n 
-.033 .050** .007 .381 53 
.059 .014 
p(RFLTERR,DEMCON) = -.086 J..l.(RFLTERR) = .042 J..l.(DEMCON) = 250. 
"**" indicates significance measured by at test at the .01 level; standard errors appear below 
the regression coefficients. n = number of cases. 
Table 4. 
These results suggest that it is reasonable to assume that partisan regis -
tration organizations can conduct effective partisan filtering. There appears to be no 
significant relationship between filtering error and difficulty in the case of the 
Republicans, and the relationship is quite tenuous for the Democrats. 
Some additional evidence which supports the perfect filtering assumption can 
be found in the discussion of the no-filtering model the Appendix. In particular, if 
parties cannot filter, a tract separation theorem obtains. Ignoring self-registration and 
turnout effects, under no-filtering conditions no party will conduct a registration drive 
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in a tract in which opposition eligibles outnumber own-party eligibles. Thus at most 
one party will launch registration efforts in a given tract. However, in the three 
Assembly districts under consideration, both parties registered individuals from nearly 
every tract . 
.ILl Cross-Registrant Self-Registration Propensity 
Having examined the marked extent to which parties are able to avoid 
registering opposition partisans, it is natural to inquire how this phenomenon comes 
about. The ATIS model presumes parties accomplish filtering by declining to provide 
registration assistance to opposition partisans. Although, some individuals are cross -
registered9, it has been suggested here they do not represent a plurality cost to the 
cross-registering organization--the sense of the claim being that such individuals 
would have self-registered had they not first encountered a mobile registrar . 
Confidence in this proposition should be strengthened if it can be demonstrated 
that cross-registrants tend to resemble self-registrants more closely than group-
registrants insofar as the salience of politics is concerned. One important measure of 
individual political initiative is electoral participation. The following table shows that 
cross-registrants voted nearly as often as self-registrants, and considerably more 
often than did group-registrants. These results are consistent with the A TIS 
assumption that cross-registrants would have otherwise self-registered. 
9. The A TIS model assumes such individuals complete and return their affidavits 
without registrar assistance. 
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NEW REGISTRANT PARTICIPATION PERCENTAGE BY REGISTRATION 
STATUS, 1984 GENERAL ELECTION 
Self ~ OwnPty 
AD63 
Dem 81% 81% 67% 
Rep 88% 81% 81% 
AD 41 
Dem 86% 83% 75% 
Rep 89% 84% 79% 
AD39 
Dem 81% 84% 70% 
Rep 85% 80% 79% 
Table 5. 
The available data will support other tests of the similarity between cross -
registrants and selfregistrants, based on census variables such as age, ethnicity, and 
income proxies. However, further analysis of this nature belongs in a study specifi-
cally devoted to the crossregistration phenonemon. 
It is interesting to compare the results for the 1984 general election presented 
in Table 5 above with similar participation percentages computed by Cain and McCue 
[1985a] for the November 1982 election. Their analysis was based on all the 108,653 
new registrations filed in Los Angeles County after the 1980 general election up until 
54 days before the 1982 election. 
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NEW REGISTRANT PARTICIPATION PERCENTAGE BY REGISTRATION 
STATUS, 1982 GENERAL ELECTION 
Self All GrQu~~ 
Party 
Dem 58% 38% 
Rep 63% 53% 
DCL 41% 34% 
Table 6. 
As in 1984, there were sharp differences between the participation rates of 
selfregistered and group-registered individuals. The generally lower levels of 
participation in 1982 are not atypical for a non-Presidential election. 
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lY.C.. TESTS OF OPTIMAL ATIS CONTACT ALLOCATION 
This section examines the A TIS model's ability to predict parties' allocation of 
registration effort across tracts. The model's fundamental behavioral premise is that 
registation managers choose contact intensities which maximize expected group only 
registerable (GOR) plurality. If this is the case, observed registration efforts should 
satisfy the A TIS first-order conditions derived previously. 
One possible initial test of the model involves examining the correlation 
between the observed contact intensities ~. and logs of the tract productivity indices 
ln(f3J. An additional test entails regression of A. on ln( (3), or alternately on the logs of 
the multiplicative components of (3. 
Before such analysis can be undertaken, however, estimates of several 
intermediate expressions appearing in A.i and f3i must be developed. These estimation 
tasks have been grouped into two classes: 1) the estimation of demographic and 
political parameters which are more or less directly observable given the available 
data, and 2) the estimation of several variables which must be inferred on the basis of 
specialized assumptions . 
.c...1 Estimating Demographic and Political Parameters 
The implicit tract contact intensities A.i must be computed from observed 
registrations, by invoking the inverse of the registration production function. This 
production relationship depends directly on both: 
• the numbers of qualified and eligible individuals in each tract, and 
• the tract productivity indices f3i· 
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In tum the productivity indices further depend on: 
• tum out probability among new tract registrants, and 
• partisanship of unregistered tract residents. 
This section describes the estimation of tract qualified and eligible populations, 
numbers of self and group-registrants, and turnout and partisanship parameters from 
the available census and past elections data. 
a. Qualified and Eligible Tract Populations, Qi and Ei 
The number of qualified individuals per tract has been estimated here as the 
number of tract residents over the age of 18, based on 1980 Federal Census data. The 
number of aliens counted as members of tract populations is an important proviso in 
Latino tracts. Unfortunately, available census data do not provide sufficient infor -
mation to control for the alien population. However, an adjustment to the nominal 
tract populations has been made here by assuming that .3 of tract Latino populations 
over 18 are not qualified to register. 
Recall that so-called eligible individuals satisfy the legal requirements for 
registration, but remain unregistered at the start of the registration period. The· 
number of eligibles in a given tract has been estimated as the number of qualifed 
individuals net of those registered, as reported by the registrar of voters 29 days 
before the elections, and corrected for the number of individuals newly registered 
during the registration period itself. That is: 
Ei = (EX ANTE) EUGIDLES = QUAUFIEDS-Tar AL (EX POST) REGISTERED +NEW REGISTRANTS 
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b. Self-registrants and Group-registrants 
One of the singular advantages of the data set being employed here is that 
registrants can be classified as group-registered or self-registered according to the 
registration group codes appearing on each affidavit.IO 
All individuals who obtained and returned registration forms, in the absence of 
any interaction with a registrar, have been counted as self-registrants.ll On the other 
hand, all individuals whose registration codes indicate contact with a mobile registrar 
have been classified as group-registered--except for cross-registrants, for reasons 
previously discussed. Group-registrants have been further distinguished as having 
been registered by partisan or non-partisan groups. For technical convenience it has 
been assumed in G3) that non-partisan group-registrations occur at the start · of the 
registration period. Notice that according to the taxonomy proposed here, it is not 
possible for non-partisan group-registrants to be classified as cross-registrants. 
c. Tract Turnout Probability 'ti 
It is interesting that there is not as much variation in turnout across tracts as 
one might initially expect. Indeed, turnout considered as a percentage of the entire 
10. This part describes the method by which a simple count of tract group-registrants 
and self-registrants was obtained. The more complex task of estimating tract 
residents' propensity to self register will discussed in a following section. 
11. It may well be the case that, as a group, individuals who chance to obtain 
affidavits at convenient locations such as shopping malls or banks have not 
demonstrated the same degree of self-registration propensity as others who, for 
example, have visited the registrar of voters for the express purpose of registering. 
Nevertheless, the self-registrant category has not been refined on the basis of such 
considerations. 
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population of tracts varies a great deal, whereas turnout among the registered 
population does not show nearly as much variation. 
Two types of estimates for tract turnout probability 'ti suggest themselves: 
turnout of the previously registered individuals in the tract, and ex post turnout of the 
new registrants. The first type of estimate implicitly supposes that the registration 
manager estimates turnout based on previous elections data. The second presumes 
that on the basis of past experience, the manager estimates turnout probabilities 
correctly. Estimates of the second type will be employed here, under what amounts to 
a perfect foresight assumption on the part of registration managers. Turnout esti -
mates have been computed as: 
'tAi = (#NEWLy REG'D. N. WHO VOTE) I (#GROUP-REG'D. ~BY PARTY A) 
A table of turnout percentages among new registrants by district, party, and 
registration category has already been presented. 
d. Tract Partisanship Percentages 1ti 
A useful basic premise for developing estimates of partisanship percentages is 
that a tract's partisanship is not related to the geographical location of the tract per 
se, but rather to some more fundamental set of charactersistics which tend to be 
shared by tract residents. Estimates of partisanship percentages can therefore be 
based on the percentages corresponding to the registered population of a tract, 
corrected for systematic differences in backround variables between the registered and 
eligible populations in a tract. 
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However, to simplify the analysis, tract patisanship percentages have been 
estimated by the partisan proportions among the registered individuals in each tract at 
the start of the registration period. That is: 
1tAi =(#EX POST REG'D ~-NEW REG'D N-) I(# ALL EX POST REG'D - ALL NEW REG'D). 
It is not unreasonable to suppose that registration managers can estimate these 
parameters in a similar fashion. 
,C.l. Estimating Unobserved Vafiables 
The empirical analysis also entails estimating three variables which are not 
directly obsevable from the available data: 
a) the propensity to self-register, 
b) the tract contact intensities, and 
c) the constant term appearing in the first-order conditions. 
Furthermore, the expression for this constant term contains instances of three other 
unobservable parameters: the registration budget C, the arrival rate IJ., and the typical 
mobile registrar's opportunity cost M. To avoid circularity, the estimates of all the 
unobservable parameters should not be based on the assumption that the parties are 
behaving optimally, since these estimates will be employed to test this condition. 
a. Self-registration Propensity cr'\ 
Explicit recognition of the significance of the self-registration propensity for 
efficient registration drives is a hallmark feature of the A TIS model. Presumably 
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registrars should seek to avoid the costly redundant registration of self-registrants, 
and focus their efforts on the group only registerable population. Recall that cr'\ 
denotes the proportion of eligible A-partisans expected to self-register in the absence 
of any registration efforts. Although, this important parameter of the model is not 
directly observablel2; however, it can be estimated from observable self-registration 
variables. Consider the following figure: 
-" SELF -" 
2 
Figure 5. 
Suppose the entire rectangular region depicted in the figure, that is, quadrants 
1 through 4, represents all eligible A-partisans in tract i, including those who will be 
registered by non-partisan groups. The task at hand is to estimate the area of the 
12. Not only is the self registration propensity not directly observable from the data 
under consideration here, but only an expen~ive controlled study of group registration 
across demographically and politically similar tracts would seem capable of providing 
direct observations of this parameter. 
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"SELF" band, consisting of quadrants 2 and 3 along the west edge of the figure, 
relative to the area of the entire figure. Three pieces of information can be brought to 
bear on this problem: 
• Reliable estimates can be made of the size of the entire eligible poulation Ei 
from census and registration data. 
• The total number of group-registrations for party A can be observed. This 
number corresponds to the "GROUP" band consisting of quadrants 3 and 4 
along the south edge of the figure .. 
• The total number of self-registrations for party A can also be observed. 
This number corresponds to quadrant 2. 
The key datum which would solve the problem--if it were directly observable--is the 
number of individuals represented by quadrant 3 alone, that is the number of self-
registrants redundantly group-registered. If this were known, the area of the "SELF" 
band could be determined, and the desired estimate of crAi could be obtained as the 
ratio of the"SELF" band to the entire diagram. 
Since the entire qualified population Ei can be estimated, and quadrants 2 and 
(3 + 4) can be observed, the remainder-- quadrant 1 can be estimated by simply 
subtracting 2 and (3 + 4) from Ei. Having done this, the area of quadrant 3 can be 
estimated-- if it is assumed that the ratio of quadrant 3 to 4 equals that of quadrant 2 
to 1, as specified below .13 
13. One way to think about this assumption runs as follows: Consider the ex ante A-
eligible population as having been divided into two groups: those contacted (and hence 
registered) by mobile registrars, and those not contacted. There would appear to be 
no a priori reason to suppose the self registration propensity among these two groups 
is different. In the absence of any reason to think otherwise, its reasonable to assume 
the two groups' self registration propensities are identical. 
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• The percentage of eligible A-partisans who would self-register is the same 
among A-party group-registrants, as among the remaining A-eligible 
population. 
This assumption together with the following two auxiliary technical assump -
tions suffice to yield the desired estimate of cr~. 
• Party-A group-registrants who were cross-registered would have self-
registered otherwise. 
• The percentage of individuals who would have self-registered among 
eligible A-partisans group-registered by A-party registrars is the same as 
that among those registered by non-partisan organizations. 
Hence cr~ can be estimated according to the equation: 
cr~ = {A SELF-REG+ [(A SELF-REG I (A ELG- A BY A))* A BY A]} /A ELG, 
where: 
• A SELF-REG 
denotes the number of individuals who self-registered for Party A in tract i, 
plus the number in tract i who were group-registered for party A by 
Party B. 
• AELG 
is the number of ex ante eligible A-partisans in tract i, net of those 
individuals group-registered for party A by non-partisan organizations. 
That is A ELG = 1t~*(Ei- A by NONPART). (The estimation of the tract i ex 
ante A-party partisan percentage 7t'\ and the eligible population Ei have 
been previously discussed.) 
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• AbyA 
is the number of own-party registrations produced by Party A in tract i. 
Examination of this definition, together with the three assumptions set forth earlier, 
will show that cr'\ so estimated is indeed the ratio of quadrants (2 + 3) to quadrants 
(1 + 4), as depicted in Figure 5. 
b. Tract Contact Intensity A.i 
Although the contact intensities A.i 14 are not directly observable, they can be 
inferred from the numbers of registrations observed in each tract by applying the 
inverse of the registration production function . Recall from the earlier discussion of 
the A TIS registration production function that the expected total (not just group-only) 
number of A-Party registrations generated by a registration drive conducted in tract i 
at contact intensity ~ is given by the expression: 
Thus the unobservable variable A.i can be estimated according to the relationship 
below, where r~ is A BY A, the observed total number of tract i A-Party group regis-
trations produced by party A: 
14. A.i will be written for A.Ai whenever there is no possibility for confusion. 
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rAi = 1tAi(Ei-rNi)(l-e-Aj_) 
<=> e-Aj_ = (1tAj(Ei-rNi)-rAJ/((Ei-rN0) 
<=> "-i = ln(1tAi(Ei-rNJ )-ln(1tt\(Ei-rNi)-rAJ 
= ln(AELG)- ln(AELG-A byA) (eq 22) 
Estimates of this form for "-i possess several desirable properties, which are 
especially fortunate given the key role played by contact intensities in the model. 
• Notice that this estimate of "-i does not depend on the assumption that parties 
are behaving optimally. 
• Given the perfect mixing assumption, A; can be estimated on the basis of own-
party group-registrations, rt\. DCL-registrants, cross-registrants, and regis -
tration efforts by other parties will not bias the estimate. 
• The quality of the estimate does not depend on the equal arrival rate 
assumption.l5 
• Since A; is inferred from own-party vote production, the estimate does not 
depend on the validity of the perfect filtering assumption. 
Finally, notice that A.i is an expression of the form ln(x)- ln(x-h), and so can be 
approximated as h/x. For the three Assembly districts under consideration, 
15. Suppose two tracts, identical except for different arrival rates, have yielded the 
same number of A-party registrations, then the contact intensity estimates for the two 
tracts will also coincide. However, the low arrival rate tract will require relatively 
more registrar hours to generate this intensity. 
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provides an excellent approximation to A.i as specified in (eq 22). Adopt the notationl6 
••A = rA.f1tA.(E·-rN·) r- 1 1 1 1 1 • 
In each of the three Assembly districts and for each party, the correlation coefficient 
p(J.LAi, A.~) is always greater than .989, and the slope of this linear relationship is very 
nearly unity. J.L~, and therefore A.~, can be interpreted as the percentage of A-party 
eligibles group-registered by party A. While the definition of A.~ might seem rather 
obscure, the notion of the percentage of own-party group-registration success is quite 
intuitive. A scattergram has been included to illustrate this relationship for the case of 
the Democratic party in the 63rd AD. 
16. The symbol J.L has been employed earlier to denote the mean arrival rate of 
qualified individuals at a mobile registrar's station. The intended meaning should be 
clear from the context. 
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c. The Linear Decay of Self-Registrants 
The above estimate of A.i is based on the earlier assumption that all self-
registrants, even those who obtain forms from oppositio·n registrars during the 
registration period, postpone registration until the final date unless contacted by an 
own-party registrar. An alternative assumption is that the number of self-registrants 
remaining unregistered decays linearly from the begining of the registration period. 
Each self-registrant can be thought of as being indexed by a point in time 
during the registration period at which he will self-register unless he has been 
previously contacted by an own-party registrar. In the interests of mathematical 
tractability, it should also be assumed that contact by an opposition registrar will not 
result in a self-registrant registering prior to his indexed decay time.17 Under this 
scenario, one finds: 
(eq 23) 
Since this expression is monotonic in ~, a unique estimate can be computed given an 
observation of r'\. In more practical terms, for values of ~ between 0 and 1, the 
expression 1-(1-e~)~ is roughly (1-e--"i)/2, as can be verified by direct 
computation.l8 Thus the expression above can be written as: 
17. Analagous to the earlier scenario, the contacted individual will obtain an affidavit 
from the opposition registrar, but no other registration assistance. The individual will 
delay returning the form until his scheduled decay time, or until he encounters an own-
party registrar. 
18. For example, 1-(1-e-.2)/.2 = .094, and (1-e-.2) = .181; .094/.181 = .519. Similarly, 
1- (1-e-.6)/.6 = .248, and (1-e-.6) = .451; .248/.251 = .550. 
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r'\ = crAi1tAi(E1 rNi)(l-e -A.i)/2+ (l-crAi)1t'\(E1 rNj)(l-e-A;) 
= (l-crAf2)1t\(E1 rNi)(l-e-A;) 
<=>A; "" ln((l-crAp)1tAi(E1 rNi) )-ln((l-crAf2)7t'\(E1 rNi)-r'\). (eq 24) 
Initial results will be reported using the rrrst method ( eq 22) of estimating A;. 
Further analysis based on the linear decay method of estimating A.i will be undertaken 
if the possibility for significant explanatory improvement is apparent. 
d. Estimating the Constant Term 
Finally, recall that the expression (L1 Qiln(~j)- C~/M) I Q appears in the first-
order conditions for the optimal contact intensities. This expression has been 
estimated in the following manner. · First of all, to estimate the unobserved arrival rate 
~ recall that: 
ti hours = (A.i contacts/person*Qipersons) I fl contacts/hour, for~ '# 0. 
Trivially then A.iQi = lj~. and summing this expression across the I tracts gives: 
where TOTAL HOURS denotes the expected number of total hours spent by the A-party 
registration force across the district. Suppose that i) payments to the registration 
force represent the only costs of Party A~ registration effort, and ii) that the entire 
budget will be spent. Then TOTALHOURS equals C/M, the total budget divided by the 
average hourly opportunity cost. Therefore: 
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Notice that the estimate above for the arrival rate J.1 does not depend on the 
observed A.i being optimal. Substituting this expression for J.1 into the constant term 
gives the estimate: 
.!:.l Summary Measures and Correlations of Tract Parameters 
This section first reports the means and standard deviations for the contact 
instensity A., and the components 0', 't, 1t, and CON of the productivity index p, where 
the unit of analysis is the census tract. The discussion then turns to the correlation of 
registration effort with eligibility concentration, and of contact intensity with tract 
productivity. 
a. Contact Intensity and Registration Productivity Variables 
Consider the following table of means for tract contact intensity and 
productivity variables. Notice that the entries in the Democratic (resp. Republican) 
rows of the table correspond to the values associated with the Democratic (resp. 
Republican) registration efforts. Thus, for example, the entry .607 in the Democratic 
row for the 63rd Assembly District under the E('t) column indicates that on average 
60.7% of the eligible individuals in each tract of the district at the beginning of the 
registration period were Democratic partisans. The E(CON) column shows tract means 
for the (non-partisan) concentration of eligible individuals, where: 
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The number of observations reflects the omission of split tracts from the sample. 
SUMMARY MEASURES OF CONTACT INTENSITY AND REGISTRATION 
PRODUCTIVITY 
E(A.) E({3) E(cr) E('t) E(1t) E(CON) #OBS 
AD 63 .413 
Ikm .117 .164 .045 .680 .607 53 
~ .047 .082 .183 .800 .293 52 
AD 41 .353 
Ikm .083 .105 .105 .793 .390 56 
~ .078 .120 .136 .795 .474 56 
AD 39 .429 
Ikm .094 .174 .055 .719 .588 66 
~ .0182 .084 .140 .784 .271 66 
Table 7 . 
b. Negative Correlation Between Registration Effort and Eligibility Concentration 
One of the most interesting aspects of this data set is a pervasive negative 
correlation between measures of partisan registration effort such as A. or 1-L and 
measures of eligibility concentration such as CON or its partisan analogs DEMCON = 
1toEM*CON and REPCON = 1tREP*CON. This negative relationship is somewhat 
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paradoxical; intuitively, tracts exhibiting heavy concentrations of eligibles should 
attract relatively high contact intensities and yield sizeable numbers of successful 
registrations. However, as the tables below indicate, intuition does not always accord 
well with empiry. 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REGISTRATION EFFORT AND ELIGIBILITY 
CONCENTRATION 
p(Jl,CON) p(Jl,PTYCON) p{A,CON) p(A.,PTYCON) 
AD 63 
Ikm -.497** -.231 * -.494** -.227 
~ -.449** -.503** -.443** -.504** 
AD 41 
lli.m -.471 ** -.135 -.449** -.114 
1ku -.589** -.618** -.576** -.614** 
AD 39 
Iilln -.401 ** -.314** -.394** -.395** 
1ku -.662** -.137 -.608** -.142 
"**" and"*" indicate significance measured by a one tailed test at the .01 and .05 levels 
respectively. 
Table 8. 
Scattergrams of JlDEM and JlREP (resp.) with CON and DEMCON and REPCON (resp.) for 
AD63 have been included to further illustrate this pattern of negative correlation . An 
explanation will be suggested for this "Paradox of Registration" after the A TIS 
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c. Correlations of~ with l.nf.1ll and 1tPTY 
As an initial step in the evaluation of the ATIS model, the correlation 
coefficient between Ai and ln(J3i) was estimated. Since the model predicts the affine 
relationship: 
Ai and ln(J3j) should be highly correlated as they are linearly related by the equation 
above, except for an additive term which is constant across tracts. The correlations 
are reported for the three districts by party in the following table. In light of these 
rather disappointing results,and in order to gain some perspective, the correlation 
coefficient of A with the own-party ex ante registration percentage, 7tPTY, has also 
been reported. Recall that this registration percentage has been estimated according 
to: 
1tAj = (#EX POST REG'D ~- NEW REG'D AS.) I(# ALL EX POST REG'D- ALL NEW REG'D). 
The relatively high correlations observed between A and 1tPTY highlight the importance 
of partisanship percentage in tract targeting decisions. 
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CORRELATIONS OF CONTACT INTENSITY WITH TRACT PRODUCTIVITY 
AND PARTISANSHIP PARAMETERS 
p(A., In~) p (A, 1tPTY) 
ADf!J 
Dem -.294 .429 
Rep -.048 -.271 
AD41 
Dem -.118 .478 
Rep -.304 .028 
AD39 
Dem -.396 -.098 
Rep .113 .282 
Table 9. 
One possible explanation for the relatively strong positive correlation between 
the variables A. and 1tPTY REG in the heavily Republican 41.s.l district is the geographic 
concentration of black voters in this district, and the relative ease of locating them. 
Furthermore, the correlation coefficient between the percentage of black residents and 
the percentage of Democratic registrants across the tracts in the 41.s.l is .649. Thus it 
would seem that the parties' registration efforts A. could be precisely targeted toward 
productive tracts, yielding the high observed correlation. 
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.c.J Regression Analysis of the A TIS Model 
The form of the A TIS first-order conditions suggest the model can be tested by 
by hypothesizing an additive error term and regressing A.i on ln(~0.19 If the model is 
not to be rejected, the coefficient of ln(~J should not be significantly different from 
unity, and the constant term not different from L1 Qi(ln(~i)-AJ / Q. Notice that even 
though the system of equations: 
determines A.i based in part on all the remaining A.j, this simultaneity is confined to the 
the second summand on the right-hand side of each equation. Since this term is 
constant across all the equations, the model can be estimated by standard OLS 
techniques. The regression results are reported in the following table: 
19. The reader may be concerned that the split tract selection process may have 
eliminated some tracts in which partisan registration effort was zero, or that some 
tracts remaining in the sample may be characterized by zero effort by one or both 
parties. In any such a case the non-negativity constraints would be binding. 
However, it can be verified that the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions imply that the 
suggested regression equation should hold among the tracts for which the non-
negativity constraints are not binding. In any event, after selecting out the split tracts 
there is only a single tract in the Republican 63n1 in which no own group registrations 
were recorded. 
210 
REGRESSION OF A. ON ln(p) 
COBF => InCP> CONST r2 F n 
AD63 
Dem -.294* .165** .103 5.871 53 
.121 .021 
Rep -.379** .079** .158 9.357 52 
.124 .011 
AD 41 
Dem -.325 .117** .058 3.336 56 
.178 .021 
Rep -.429** .129** .376 32.547 56 
.075 .0097 
AD 39 
Dem -.334** .152** .131 9.678 66 
.107 .0197 
Rep -.543 .228** .046 3.091 66 
309 .028 
"**" and "*" indicate significance measured by a two tailed t test at the .01 and .05 levels respectively. 
Standard errors are reported below the regression coefficients. 
Table 10. 
In light of these rather disappointing results, one possible avenue for further 
analysis is the regression of A. on the decomposed form of ln(p).Z> Recall that p is a 
multiplicative expression comprised of terms corresponding to: self-registration 
propensity, partisanship percentage, turnout probability, and the concentration of 
20. Professor McKelvey suggested this approach. 
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eligible individuals among the qualified population. Thus ln(j3) can be expressed as 
the sum of the logs of the multiplicands of j3. When A. is regressed on this set of 
explanatory variables, it is possible their individual effects can be better understood. 
REGRESSION OF A. ON THE COMPONENTS OF ln(j3) 
COBJF ~ ln(1-cr) ln('t) ln(1t) ln(CON) CONST I r2 F n 
AD63 
Dem .384 -.055 .140** -.149** .047 .575 16.222 53 
347 .043 .032 .026 .034 
Rep -.116* -.0089 -.0102 -.037 -.026 .462 10.075 52 
.047 .019 .016 .022 .028 
AD41 
Dem -.597** -.095* .157** -.090** .039 .742 36.590 56 
.138 .036 .019 .019 .022 
Rep -.319** -.0067 -7.76E-04 -.012 .0148 .576 17.289 56 
.078 .039 .012 .014 .015 
AD32 
Dem -1.173** -.0039 .078* -.019 .049 .534 17.509 66 
.185 .039 .036 .029 .032 
Rep -.513** -.115 .0028 -.125** -.031 .561 19.483 66 
.123 .076 .017 .043 .047 
"**" and"*" indicate significance measured by a two tailed t test at the .01 and .05 levels respectively. 
Standard errors are reported below the regression coefficients. 
Table 11. 
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These results suggest that registration managers may be ignoring turnout 
effects and self-registration propensity when selecting contact intensities. Indeed, 
suppose that managers are rewarded simply on the basis of the number of own-party 
registrations produced. In this case the manager's problem assumes the following 
form where 1t A* CON = 1t A* (E·-rN. )/Q· · ' 1 1 1 1 1' 
It can be easily verified that this problem yields first-order conditions analagous to 
those already developed for the A TIS problem, except that every instance of J3i in the 
equations is replaced by 1t Ai*CON i· Thus this model can be tested by regressing A. on 
ln(7tA) and ln(CON). Notice the regression coefficients are again predicted to be unity. 
This model may well better reflect the incentives faced by registration managers. 
Nevertheless, preliminary investigation indicates that while ln(7tA) and ln(coN) 
explain nearly as much of the variance in A. as did the variables in the previous 
regressions, the coefficients do not exhibit the desired qualitative properties. 
As an exercise in empirical investigation, A. was also regressed on 7tA alone. It 
is not implausible that a registration manager might employ this variable as an index 
of tract registration productivity, rather than the more complex measure ln(j3). 
Registration drive managers may not take into account turnout effects, self-
registration propensity, or the efforts of non-partisan registration groups. Furthermore 
they may discount the diminishing marginal returns to registration effort. In this case 
the simpler productivity index 7tA would be an appropriate return measure. 
While no claim has been made concerning the sign or magnitude of the 
coefficient of 7tA in the following regression, it is interesting to note the percentage of 
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the variance in A explained by this variable alone. These regression results are 
reported in the next table. 
REGRESSION OF A ON 1tPTY 
COBJFI => %PTYREG CONST r2 F 
AD63 
Dem .218** -.017 .184 11.50 
.064 .040 
Rep -.086* .073** .073 4.04 
.043 .014 
AD39 
Dem -.050 .124 .009 .621 
Rep .213 .117 .079 5.52 
AD 41 
Dem .261 ** -.024 .228 16.01 
.065 .028 
Rep .007 .074** .001 .044 
.033 .018 
"**" and"*" indicate significance measured by a two tailed t test at the .01 and .05 levels res~tively. 
Standard errors are reported below the regression coefficients. 
Table 12. · 
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.c..! Systematic Deviations from the ATIS Model 
Since the A TIS model predicts I..,Pf'f = ln(PJ + CONSTANT, if the deviations of 
the observed contact intensities from those predicted, 1..pas - ln(j3i) ignoring the 
constant term, are regressed on an appropriate set backround variables, it might be 
possible to discover some distinguishing characteristics of the sub-optimally targeted 
tracts. 
A potential problem with this method of analysis is an embarassment of riches 
afforded by the large number of possible explanatory variables contained in census, 
past elections, and registration data. Literally hundreds of different demographic and 
political variables are available to describe each census tract. Some method of data 
reduction was required to help determine which variables could best illuminate the 
deviations between the predicted A.~ and the observed registration contact intensities. 
One such method is factor analysis. 21 In the present instance factor analysis 
tended to indicate three factors were particularly important in explaining these 
deviations. Inspection of the components of the factors suggested that the first factor 
was related to an individual's degree of social atomization or the strength of his 
relationships with other members of his community, as measured by variables such as 
age, marital status, and household size. The second factor clearly was associated 
with economic well-being, measured by variables such as median rent, and the number 
of persons living per room. Finally, the third factor could clearly be seen to be related 
to an individual's posistion on the liberal-conservative spectrum, measured by 
21. Factor analysis, for well known reasons, is employed relatively infrequently by 
economists. However, the method has achieved a noteworthy degree of acceptance in 
both theoretical and empirical work concerning securities prices. The Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory of Ross and Roll, and Rosenberg's contributions to the prediction of stock price 
volatility come to mind. 
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variables such as partisanship and voting performance with respect to various 
indicator initiative measures. The factor analysis for the Democratic registration effort 
in the 63rd Assembly District can be found in the Appendix. 
In light of these observations. it was deemed appropriate to regress the 
deviations between the predicted and observed A~ on the following set of variables: 
• VARIABLE 1 = %party reg= the ex ante % of registered tract residents 
registered for <party>. 
• VARIABLE 2 = % single = the % of tract residents who are single, separated, 
or divorced. 
• vARIABLE 3 = census variable x279 = median tract dwelling price, hereafter 
called HOUSING. 
The results of this empirical exploration are reported in the following table. Notice 
that the relatively small magnitude of the coefficients for census variable x279 is due 
to a scale factor; the other two variables are percentages. while x279 measures home 
prices in dollars. 
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REGRESSION OF DEVIATIONS ON BACKROUND VARIABLES 
COE!F => % REG % SINGLE HOUSING INTRCPT I ADJ r2 F 
AD63 
Dem -1.533* -.018* -1.353E-06 1.530* .330 9.552 
Rep -6.904* .020 -9 .185E-06* 6.707* .701 40.881 
AD41 
Dem -.981 -.034* 5.302E-06* 1.357* .587 27.079 
Rep -12.164* -.051 * 1.243E-05* 8.217* .668 37.878 
AD ~2 
Dem -1.61* -.009 5.743E-~ .640 .547 27.154 
Rep -12.008* -.005 1.061E-05* 5.748* .828 105.449 
"*" indicates significance measured by a t test at the.05 level. 
Table 13. 
Since the dependent variable in these regressions is of the form J..OBS - J..OPT, (ignoring 
the constant term from the first-order conditions) a positive coefficient for one of the 
explanatory variables indicates that as the magnitude of that variable increases, the 
deviation between J..OBS and J..OPT increases--indicating sub-optimal over-registration. 
Of course, negative coefficients suggest the opposite relationship. 
Lastly, given the relative success of the explanation of the deviations from the 
model predictions, the observed contact intensities A. were also regressed on this 
same set of variables. These results are reported in the next table. 
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REGRESSION OF 'A ON BACKROUND VARIABLES 
COJEF::::) %REG % SINGLE HOUSING INTRCPT I ADJ r2 F 
AD 63 
Dem .155* -.001 -3.375E-07 -1.901 * .216 5.781 
Rep -.131 -7.441E-04 1.835E-07 .090 .105 3.003 
AD41 
Dem .437* -.001 6.984E-07* -2.132* .337 10.337 
Rep -.082 -.002* 2.473E-07 .143* .143 4.049 
AD 39 
Dem -.025 -.002 3.401E-07 -1.993* .019 1.429 
Rep -.044 .002 1.427E-06* -.003 .210 6.781 
"*" indicates significance measured by a t test at the .05 level. 
Table 14. 
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IV.D. DIFFERENTIAL REGISTRATION COSTS; A MODIFIED ATIS MODEL 
One possible explanation for the modest performance of the A TIS model lies 
with the assumptions that all individuals within a given tract are equally likely to 
encounter a mobile registrar, and that unregistered individuals will register upon first 
contact with an own-party registrar. This conjecture is reinforced by the observation 
that both contact intensity and registration success tend to be negatively correlated 
with the concentration of eligibles and also with the concentration of group-only 
registerable eligibles. Why should parties tend to avoid neighborhoods with high 
concentrations of group-only registerable partisans? This so-called paradox of 
registration may be due to the fact that such individuals pose an onerous burden to 
the registration force. 
Suppose that an individual's likelihood of registering when contacted by an 
own-party registrar increases monotonically with his degree of political interest. At one 
extreme, for example, political participation is sufficiently important to a self-registrant 
that only 0 contacts are required to register him. An individual for whom politics is 
less salient might not self-register, but would agree to register when first contacted. 
However, those individuals even less interested in the political process might require 
several contacts by registrars before finally becoming sufficiently sensitized to agree 
to register. 
The tract partisan self-registration propensity cr'\ would appear to provide a 
reasonable index of the general level of political interest among tract residents. 
Furthermore, this variable is unquestionably related to the ease of registration 
operations; if the tract group-registration propensity is unity, a trivial registration 
effort will register all eligible partisans. Similarly, it is not unreasonable to suppose 
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that low levels of tract self-registration propensity might be associated with 
individuals' relative unwillingness to register. 
The most rigorous way to investigate the relationship between self-registra -
tion propensity and registration production would be to derive and estimate a 
relationship between tract self-registration propensity and the distribution of the 
number of contacts required to register tract residents. Having done this, further 
study of the occupancy paradigm could presumably yield the expected number of 
registrations for a given contact intensity. 
However, this method would entail solving for the expected number of boxes 
which contain at least k balls when m are dropped fork = 1, 2, 3, . . . Next these 
results would have to be combined with the tract population distribution for the 
number of contacts required for registration, in order to finally obtain a registration 
production function which takes contact intensity as its argument. This is a seemingly 
hopeless computational task, since the expected number of boxes containing at least k 
balls is a very complex expression except in the special case k = 1; see David and 
Barton [1962]. Even if the desired production function could be obtained, deriving and 
solving the associated first-order system for the manager's problem would likely be 
even more difficult. Clearly a more heuristic approach is called for. 
The strategy which will developed here is the use of the tract self-registration 
propensity as a deflator for contact intensity, the idea being that nominal contact 
intensity will not yield the numbers of registrations predicted by the A TIS production 
function. The underlying justification for deflating the nominal contact intensity is .to 
take account of the fact that not all contacts of own-party eligibles result in 
registration success. 
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Consider the division of the tract i A-party elegible population into two 
components, the self-registrants crAi1t\(E1 rNi), and the group-only registrants 
(1-cr\)1t\(E1 rNJ. Since the self-registrants will presumably register on first contact, 
the previously derived production relationship will apply to them, that is if party-A 
conducts a drive with contact intenstiy ~ it can expect to register 
crAi1tAi(E1 rNi)(l-e-Ai) self-registrants. On the other hand, the drive will not be so 
effective as regards the group-only registerable population--since not all these 
indiviudals will register at first contact. 
Suppose the "true" contact intensity among the group-only registerables is 
only crAi*Ai. In this case the party can only expect to register 
(1-cr'\)7t\(E1rNJ(l-exp(-O'~~)) self-registrants. Thus· the total expected registra-
tions r~ which can be expected from the drive is given by the following sum, where 
E~ denotes 1tAi(E1 rN J: 
rAi = crAi7t~(E1rNJ(l-exp(-A.v) + (1-cr'\)7t'\(E1rNi)(l-exp(-cr~~)) 
= crAjE~(l-exp(-A.v) + (1-0'AJacr\(1-exp(-crA)..v) 
= EL<r\ * (aAi(l-exp(- Aj)) + (1-aAJ(l-exp(-a~A.v)]. 
As before, such a production relationship can be inverted to give an estimate of 
contact intensity based on the number of observed group registrations. In order to 
avoid notational confusion with contact intensities estimated by the A TIS production 
function, estimates based on the equation above will be denoted by LMBD2. Again 
letting 1tAi(E1 rNJ = ELGAj, straightforward manipulation gives the following 
expression for LMBD2: 
LMBD2\ = ln((l-aAJ*ELGAJ + ln(a\*ELGAJ- ln(ELGA1 rAJ 
/ (l+crAJ. 
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Suppose that, given the production relationship above, the registration man-
ager simply attempts to maximize the number of own-party registrations produced--
without taking into consideration registrants' self-registration propensity or their 
turnout probability. His problem is then to: 
MAX A. Lr [crAi1tAlE1 rNi)(l-exp(-AJ) + (1-cr-\)1tAi(E1 rNi)(l-exp(-cr-\A.J)] 
- ~*(Lr A.iQi- CJ.!/M). 
Consider that the earlier arguments concerning the budget constraint are still valid in 
this new context. After manipulation, Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for the 
tracts in which the non-negativity constraints are not binding can be obtained as: 
for tracts i such that A.Ai > 0. 
This equation can be tested by regression analysis, restricting the sample to those 
tracts with non-zero registration effort if necessary. To simplify notation let: 
SELF2i = a\[1+(1-aAi)exp(a\)], 
and denote (E1 rNi)/Qi by CONi. SELF2, considered as an explanatory variable for 
registration effort in the context of a regression analysis, may be thought of as the 
tract self-registration propensity cr-\ grossed-up or inflated by the term (1-cr-\)exp(cr'\) 
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which takes account of the relative ease of registering individuals in tracts 
characterized by a high self-registration propensity.22 
Recalling that contact intenstiy must now be estimated as LMBD2i, the following 
regression equation is obtained: 
Once again, the coefficients are all predicted to be unity.23 The regression results are 
reported in the following table: 
22. This interpretation of SELF2 can be further reinforced by noting that, for small 
values of cr~, exp(cr~) can be closely approximated by l+a~. Substituting this 
approximation into ( **) gives SELF2i = 2cr~- ( cr~3 = 2cr~, since the cubed term can be 
ignored for real-world values of crAi· Comparing the first-order conditons (*) with 
those of the original ATIS model indicates the relative benefits of targeting tracts with 
high self-registration propensity. 
23. The constant term in the regresssion results corresponds to the expression In(~) 
appearing in the first-order conditions (*)· 
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REGRESSION OF LMBD2 ON PRODUCTIVITY VARIABLES 
COJalF => ln(SELF2) ln(1t) ln(CON) CONST r2 F n 
AD6J 
Dem 1.037tt 1.069tt .436t 7.016** .628 27.545 53 
.136 305 .261 561 
Rep .450 1.286tt .471t 5.983** .551 20.003 53 
.159 .181 .251 548 
AD41 
Dem .707t 1.027tt 1.058tt 6.752** .748 51.409 56 
.127 .149 .167 356 
Rep .58 It .922tt 1.147tt 6.491 ** .586 24.508 56 
.164 .122 .194 .489 
AD 39 
Dem .86211 .77711 1.355tt 6.919** .488 19.699 66 
.134 322 .239 .487 
Rep .226 .93 1 tt .854tt 5.504** .668 41.593 66 
.142 .087 .242 .438 
"tt" indicates that the coefficient is not significantly different from 1 at either the .05 or .01 
confidence levels, while "~'" indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 1 at the .05 
level but not at the .01 level, as measured by a two tailed t test~ "**" and "*" indicate 
significant difference from 0 measured by a two tailed t test at the .01 and .05 levels respectively. 
Standard errors are reported below the corresponding regression terms. 
Table 15. 
24. The t test results measure whether or not the regression coefficients are 
significantly different from 1; the constant terms are tested for difference from zero. To 
test whether or not a coefficient is different from 1, form the statistic: 
(COEF- 1) / STD ERROR- t(n-k); where n is the number of observations, and k is the 
number of regressors. 
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These results are considerably more satisfying than those obtained from the 
original ATIS model. In particular the signs of the regression coefficients accord with 
the modified model's predictions, tend to be highly significant, and several are quite 
close to unity--as predicted. 
In order to further characterize the modified contact intensities LMBD2, a table 
of correlations with own-party group registration success J..I.PTY is presented below. 













"**" and"*" indicate significance measured by a one tailed test at the .01 and .05 levels 
respectively. 
Table 16. 
Suppose now that the registration manager faces the same so-called deflated 
production relationship defined above but that his optimand is the same as that 
developed in the original A TIS model--namely to maximize registrations of group-only 
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registerable individuals who will turn out on election day. Recall that under the 
"deflated" scenario a registration effort of intensity ~ can be expected to produce 
(1-crAj}1tAi(ErrNi)(1-exp(-crAiA.i)) = (1-crAj}aGAi(l-exp(-crAiA.J) group-only register -
able successes. Thus taking turnout into account. the manager's problem can be 
expressed as: 
This problem yields Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for those tracts i satisfying the 
non-negativity constaints for contact intensity. as below: 
A.'\*0''\ = ln[crAi(1-crAj}] + ln('tAi) + ln(1t'\) + ln(COND -ln(~). 
<=> A.'\= ln[cr'\(1--oAj}]/cr'\ + ln('t'\)JcrAi + ln(1t'\)/cr'\ + ln(CONJ/cr'\ -ln(~)/cr'\. 
To simplify notation let crAi(1-cr'\) be denoted by SELF3i• (E1 rNJ/Qi by CONi and notice 
that in this s~tuation A.'\ should again be estimated by LMBD2i. Thus. hypothesizing an 
additive error term q. the following regression equation is obtained: 
LMBD2'\ = ln(SELF3'\)JcrAi + ln('tAJJcrAi + ln(1tADfcr'\ + ln(CONJ/crAi + COEF* 1/cr'\ + q. 
for tracts i such that LMBD2'\ > 0. 
Observe the model predicts that coefficients for all the regressors except 1/ cr'\ should 
necessarily be unity. Actual regression results for this variant of the A TIS model 
have been left as a topic for future research. 
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IV.E. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENT OF SUBOPTIMAL DRIVES 
To the extent that the assumptions of the A TIS model are deemed appropriate, 
deviations from the first-order conditions represent opportunities to improve the 
efficiency of registration efforts. Kramer [1966] has remarked: 
In the past two decades, the use of quantitative methods as aids for decision-
making has become common in many fields, particularly those involving military 
and industrial operations. More recently, efforts have been made to apply 
these efforts to other govenmental activities. By and large, however, these 
efforts have not been made by political scientists, nor have the methods 
employed, despite their increasing sophistication and power, had great impact 
upon the discipline. 
The potential improvements in registration yield for registration drives in Los 
Angeles County during the 1984 campaign season can be computed by estimating the 
registration budget for the district in question, estimating the parameter values 
required by the model, computing the optimal contact intensities predicted by the 
model, computing the expected registration yields associated with these intensities, 
and comparing the optimal yields with the yields which were in fact obtained. 
Recall the optimal contact intensities ~ specified by the A TIS model are specified by 
the Kuhn-Tucker first-order system: 
A.i = ln(!3i) - ln(t); for some t ;::: 0, whenever A.i > 0, 
!3jQj = tQj- tj; for some tj;::: 0, whenever Aj = 0, and 
L1 A.iQi = CJ..L/M (budget constraint). 
In attempting to solve this system, notice that since 0 < l3i < 1 then ln(l3i) < 0; hence 
A.i > 0 iffO < t < !3i < 1. And observe that the condition A.j = 0 unless t < !3j guarantees 
the existence of K-T multipliers !3j associated with the binding non-negativity 
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constraints. Thus the system can be solved by the following iterative method: i) 
choose some 
t e [O,MAX { Pil ]; ii) if t < Pi then choose A.i = ln(j3i,) - ln(t), otherwise set A.i = 0; and 
iii) if L I A.iQi is sufficiently close to CJ.l/M, then stop. Otherwise, if L I A.iQi > CJ.l/M 
then choose t larger; else if LI A.iQi < CJ.l/M choose t smaller. This process converges 
since LI"-iQi increases monotonically as t decreases. 
As mentioned above, once the optimal contact intensities have been computed, 
the registration production function can be employed to determine the difference 
between potential and observed registration yields. Of course, any policy recommen-
dations based on this technique must be qualified by the analyst's degree of 
confidence in the A TIS model. 
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V. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
& Better Estimates of the Registration Production Function 
The model developed here has the potential for application in real-world 
registration drives. Recently, in fact, a serious effort was undertaken to incorporate 
several aspects of the A TIS model in a registration drive conducted during March and 
April 1987 in the 63rd Assembly District, . The most important application of the 
model in this drive was to point out to both the registration drive manager, and to the 
manager's manager, that the objective of a registration drive ought to be the 
maximization of the expected number of net votes attributable to the drive--not simply 
the maximization of the number of new registrations. 
It is hoped that the A TIS model can be sufficiently refmed to generate actual 
tract targeting schedules for the registration force. To accomplish this goal it will be 
necessary to verify the production assumptions adopted here. There is much to be 
learned about eligible individuals' inter-district flows, the apparent tenedency for 
people to register in their home tracts, the number of contacts required to register an 
individual, the propensity to self-register, and the sensitization of opposition partisans 
by registration drives. 
Such empirical questions have not yet been well-studied, and probably can only 
be investigated by field research in conjunction with actual registration drives. A 
substantial quantity of registration production information was gathered during the 
recent drive in AD63, and this data will form the raw material for future research. 
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.lL. Optimizing Across Several Campaign Activities 
The so-called general campaign problem concerns the optimal allocation of 
resources across aO campaign activities from canvassing and mailings to registration 
efforts and fundraising--while the opposition party is simultaneously solving the same 
problem. It appears that this problem is simply too complex to analyze given the cur-
rent capabilities of quantitative social science. 
The multi-activity problem is intractable for several reasons: it is very difficult 
to specify a party's objective function, except in the broadest terms. In particular 
great uncertainty attaches to assessments of the contribution to expected plurality (or 
to the expected probability of winning) made by intangible campaign activities. 
Furthermore, the possibility of raising additional campaign funds violates the 
specification of a classical constrained optimization problem. Finally, adding the 
dimension of party competition further complicates a difficult problem. 
An important rrrst step towards better understanding the campaign problem 
would be to solve the relatively simple problem of setting the magnitude of the 
registration budget in competition with a second party, assuming that both registration 
efforts will be conducted optimally . 
.C.. Unravelling the Paradox of Registration 
The phenomenon of new registrations being disproportionately produced from 
areas in which registration is already high has been discussed in some detail. This 
puzzling situation represents an interesting area for further research. 
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One possible approach is to refine and test the model of managerial decision 
making. It has been suggested that the so-called deflated production relationship, 
which represents an attempt to model differential registration costs, discussed in 
section IV .D be tested under the assumption that the manager is atempting to 
maximize registrations of group-only registerable individuals who will also turn out. 
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APPENDIX .L. 
NOTATION and DEFINITIONS SUMMARY 
I I= { 1, ... ,I}, the index set of Census tracts which comprise the district. 
Pi the population of tract i. 
Q the number of qualified individuals in the district; a qualifed individual is either 
registered or eligible to register. 
Qi total number of qualifed individuals in tract i. 
E total number of eligible individuals in the district; an eligible individual is 
qualified, but unregistered. 
Ei total number of eligible individuals residing in tract i. 
E/Qi the proportion of eligible voters among all qualified voters in tract i. 
A one political party. 
B the second political party. 
N a non-partisan organization 
Q~ the number of qualifed A-partisans in tract i. 
E~ the number of eligible (qualified but unregistered) A-partisans in tract i. 
1t~ proportion of A-partisans among Ei. The symbol "1t" is mnemonic for 
"partisan." 
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cr'\ proportion of eligible A-partisans in tract i expected to self register in the 
absence of any registration drive.l The symbol"cr" is mnemonic for "self." 
't~ the proportion of A-partisans expected to actually vote if registered among all 
eligible group-only registerable A-partisans.2 The symbol"'t" is mnemonic for 
"turnout." 
13i = [(1- cr'\)7t'\'t'\] * (Er rN i)/Qi; the percentage, among all qualified individuals 
in tract i, of individuals who are eligible (net of those previously registered by 
non-partisan groups) and who are also expected: i) not to self register, ii) to be 
A-partisans, and iii) to turn out if registered . 
'Yi· total number of all exposures to or contacts by A-party registrars among 
qualified individuals in tract i.3 
~ = yJQi, the A-party registration contact intensity in tract i. Note the absence 
of a superscript "A" in the interests of notational simplicity. 
J..Bi the B-party contact intensity in tract i. 
ti the total number of hours worked by A-party mobile registrars in tract i. 
t the total number of hours worked by A-party mobile registrars district wide. 
M a mobile registrar's hourly opportunity cost. 
J.1 mean hourly arrival rate of qualified individuals at a mobile registrar's station. 
1. Note that crAi need not equal the proportion of self-registrants among the already 
registered A-partisans in tract i. 
2. Note that 'to\ need not equal the proportion of A-partisans among the already 
registered individuals tract i. 
3. Notice that a given individual may be contacted more than once during the course 
of a registration drive. The symbol ""('is mnemonic for "contatct." 
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a random variable; the number of arrivals district wide in the time interval [0, t]. 
constant unit cost per A-party registration paid by party A to mobile registrars. 
exogenously specified registration drive budget constraint for party A. 
total number of registrations produced by A-partisan organizations in tract i. 
total number of registrations produced by B-partisan organizations in tract i. 
total number of registrations produced by non-partisan organizations in tract i. 
total number of registrations produced by all groups in tract i. 
total number of registrations produced by all groups districtwide. 
= exp(x). 
multiplication. 
dot product . 
exponentiation. 
transpose of matrix X. 
MDAS order of arithmetic operations: multiplication, division, addition, subtraction. 
Group-register An individual is said to have been group-registered if he obtains his 
registration affidavit from a mobile registrar affiliated with a political 
or civic organization, and the group returns the completed affadavit to 
the registrar of voters. Group registration, as defined here, does not 
allow for the possibility that a registrant may return his affidavit 
himself. 
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Self-register An individual is said to have been self-registered if he obtains his 
registration affidavit from the registrar of voters, the post office, or 
other government agency, and the completed affadavit is accepted by 
the registrar of voters. 
Cross-register An individual is said to have been cross-registered if he obtains his 
registration affidavit from a mobile registrar affiliated with one 
political party, but registers for a different party. 
GOR An acronym for Group OnlyRegisterable. Such an individual is 
eligible to register, but will do so only if group-registered. 
Qualified An individual is said to be qualified if he is already registered or 






An individual is called eligible if he is qualified but not yet registered. 
A contact of a qualified individual by a mobile registrar, or 
equivalently an exposure to the registrar, is defined to be the 
physical arrival of the individual within "conversational distance" of 
the registrar's station.4 
A marginal registration produced by a registration drive 
corresponds to a group only registerable individual who would not 
have registered in the absence of the drive. 
An acronym for Aggregately Targeted, Individually Selective. An 
A TIS registration drive deploys mobile registrars stationed in 
selected heavily trafficed public places to search for unregistered 
partisans. 
4. As defined here, actual conversation need not take place for the contact to be said 






Tl) There are two dates: 0 and 1, and a single period which will be termed the 
registration period. 
T2) All political groups mobilize their registration forces simultaneously and 
irrevocably on first date. 
INDIVIDUALS' PARAMETERS 
11) Qualified individuals'self-registration parameters remain constant during 
the registration period. Furthermore, their turnout and partisanship 
partisanship parameters remain fixed at least until election day. 
12) Registered partisans who tum out vote for their own parties' candidates. 
13) All individuals who self-register do so on the second date. 
13a) The pool of individuals who will self-register decays linearly to zero over 
the course of the registration drive. 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
Political Characteristics of the District Population 
Pl) Partisanship proportions are the same among the registered and qualified 
groups in each tract. (However these proportions may vary across tracts.) 
P2) The expected turnout proportions among the ex ante and ex post groups of 
registered partisans in each tract are identical. (However these propor-
tions may also vary across tracts.) 
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Migration Across Boundaries 
81) Each individual resides in exactly one tract, and can register at most once 
in this single tract. 
82) No individual is contacted or registered by mobile registrars outside his 
home tract. 
83) There is neither in or out migration, nor change in other demographic 
characteristics in any tract during the registration period. 
REGISTRATION GROUPS 
Gl) There are three registration groups: two political parties A and B, and a 
non-partisan organization N. 
G2) Once having set a registration budget, each political parties' registration 
drive objective is to maximize the contribution--attributable exclusively to 
its registration drive-- to its own expected election day plurality. 
G3) Both parties can perfectly predict the registration yield of group N; 
furthermore this non-partisan production occurs instantaneously at time 0. 
G4) The non-partisan organization registers members of various sub-popula -
tions in proportion to these groups' relative frequencies among the eligible 
populations of each tract. 
GS) Both parties have access to the same demographic and past elections data 
for the district; and both possess the same analytic skill. 
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REGISTRATION TECHNOLOGY 
A TIS Registration Production 
Rl) Eligible self-registrants will obtain and return registration affidavits at first 
contact with any registration group. 
R2) Eligible group only registrants will become registered if and only if con -
tacted by an own-party or non-partisan group. These individuals will be 
registered at the first such contact, but never cross-register. 
R3) Partisan mobile registrars must provide affidavits on demand to cross-
registrants, but need not assist in preparing or returning the forms. 
The A TIS Arrival Process 
Al) The arrival of qualified individuals at each partisan mobile registrar's 
station within a given tract is a Poisson process, characterized by a mean 
arrival rate of rate J.1 individuals per hour per station, randomly selected with 
replacement from the qualified population of the tract as a whole. 
A2) The arrival rate J.1 isconstant across tracts. 
A3) Service times at mobile registrars' stations are zero; there is no queueing 
or crowding. 
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The Manager's Optimization Problem 
Ml) The registration drive manager is able to control expected contact inten -
sities across tracts by posting mobile registrars at targeted locations for 
specified time intervals. 
M2) Partisan registration managers' objectives match those of their respective 
parties; managers pose no incentive compatability problems to the parties. 
M3) The A TIS registration drive is the sole registration production method. 
M4) The manager assumes his registration budget is exogenously fixed. 
MS) Mobile registrars are compensated by a constant dollar payment for each 
own-party registration generated. These payments represent the only cost 
of an A TIS registration effort. 
M6) The expected total payments to mobile registrars must at least equal the 
registrars' total opportunity cost. 
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APPENDIX~ 
THE APPROXIMATION OF (1-1/Q)'YiBY e-(yJQj) 
true = ( 1-1/QJr~, approximation = e-<r-JQJ 
Q, \ 'Yi lJl l.Q.!l ~ l.JlJl.Q illJl 10.000 
10 I t .3487 t .00003 t 13220-23 t 1.7478-46 tO tO 
I a .3679 a .00005 a 1.9287-22 a 3.7200-44 aO aO 
1oo I. t .9044 t .3660 t .0066 t .00004 tO tO 
I a .9048 a .3679 a .0067 a .00005 a 1.9287-22 a 3.7200-44 
10001 t .9900 t .9048 t .6064 t .3677 t .0067 t .00005 
I a .9900 a .9048 a .6065 a 3679 a .0067 a .00005 
soool t .9980 t .9802 t .9048 t .8187 t .3678 t .1353 
I a .9980 a .9802 a .9048 a .8187 a .3679 a .1353 
1o,ooo I t .9990 t .990 t.9512 t .9048 t .6065 t .3679 
I t .9990 t .990 t .9512 t .9048 t .6065 t 3679 
2s,ooo I t .9996 t .9960 t .9802 t .9608 t .8187 t .6703 




ATIS Registration Drives Without Partisan Filtering 
ATIS registration drives have been analyzed in the perfect partisan filtering 
case under the assumption that only self registrants would ever be cross-registered. 
It was assumed that partisan mobile registrars would decline to assist cross-
registrants in the preparation of registration affidavits, and that only self-registrants 
would be possessed of sufficient initiative to return the forms without assistance. In 
this appendix the polar case will be considered, namely that mobile registrars cannot 
choose to supply or withold their assistance on the basis of a registrant's 
partisanship. 
The partisan registration drive manager's problem will be analyzed in the no 
filtering case. This analysis will highlight the importance of mobile registrars' ability 
to filter registrants. Furthermore, the no filtering scenario is better suited for the 
analysis registration efforts in jurisdictions which require the same level of service be 
provided to all contacts, and may also be more appropriate in the case of non-partisan 
drives. 
The assumptions adopted previously will be retained, with a few modifications. 
For simplicity,it will be assumed that there are two parties but no non-partisan 
registration group, and that every individual is a partisan of one of the parties. 
Assumptions G3) and G4), and R2) and R3) pertain to the actions of the non-partisan 
group, and to the filtering process and so will no longer be required. Modified versions 
of three of the earlier assumptions appear below: 
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11') Qualified individuals'self-registration, turnout, and partisanship parameters 
remain constant during the registration period. Every individual is a 
partisan of either party A or party B. 
Gl') There are two registration groups, political parties A and B. 
Rl ') Eligible individuals will register at first contact with any registration group. 
In the no-filtering case, ATIS registration workers encountering individuals at 
random in public places such as shopping malls and convenience stores cannot 
determine a priori the partisanship of the contacts, and cannot discriminate on the 
basis of partisanship in providing registration services. In such an environment 
registration workers for party A will inevitably contact and register some B-partisans 
during the course of the registration drive. 
Suppose that party A conducts a registration drive at contact intensity A.i ~ 0 in 
each tract i of the district. Notice that 1tBi• the fraction of Ei composed of B-partisans, 
is equal to l-7t'\. Let crBi denote the fraction of unregistered, qualified B-partisans in 
tract i who are expected to self-register. Thus, arguing by methods employed in the 
body of the text, the expected number of B-partisans cross-registered as a 
consequence of party A's registration drive is given by the expression: 
Hence the expected number of individuals group-registered for party A who would not 
have registered otherwise, net of the number of individuals group-registered for party 
B who would not have registered otherwise is given by: 
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Suppose that the registration drive manager's goal is to maximize the 
contribution to his party's election day plurality attributable to the drive, given an 
inflexible budget constraint and a single registration technology. It remains to 
consider the role of the turnout factor in order to finish the construction of the 
manager's objective function. Let 1:Ai and 1:Bi denote repectively the expected turnout 
percentage for group-only registered A and B-partisans. The expected number of 
individuals group-registered in tract i for party A who would not have registered 
otherwise-- and who will also tum out for party A, net of the number of individuals 
group-registered for party B who would not have registered otherwise-- and who will 
also tum out for party B is given by: 
And so the manager's objective function is simply the sum, across all the tracts, of the 
expected marginal plurality in each tract: 
As before, the control variables which can be manipulated by the registration 
drive manager are the contact intensities A.i for each tract i of the district. Thus, 
assuming the non-negativity constraints A.i ~ 0 are redundant and equating the right 
hand sides of the budget and opportunity cost constraints as in the perfect filtering 
case, the manager's voter registration drive resource allocation problem can be 
formulated as: 
MAXA. [I:1 [(1- cr~)1tAi1:Ai- (1- cr80(1-7t~)'t8i]El1-e-A.i)] 
S.T. la) M*~ A.iQi I~= C. 
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Notice that at an optimum the manager will set A.i = 0 in tracts which for (1- cr'\)7tAi't'\ 
< (1---aBD(l-7t'\)'tBdEi(1-e·Aj); in these tracts, positive contact intensity will produce 
more opposition than own-party group-only registerable votes.5.6 
Renumber the productive tracts as 1*, ... , I* and let ai be def'med as: 
ai = [(1- cr'\)7tAi't'\- (1- crBi)(1-7t'\)'tBi] * E/Qi. 
a i can be interpreted as the net percentage of group-only registerable eligible 
individuals who would turn out, among all the qualified individuals in tract i. Then 
employing ~ as a Lagrange multiplier for the budget I opportunity cost constraint, the 
maximization problem above can formulated equivalently as: 
After manipulation parallel to that in the perfect filtering case, the following system of 
flrst-order conditions is obtained: 
~ = ln(aJ- [ ( LI Qln(aJ-CJ.L/M) I (l:l* (Qu) ]; 'ViE { 1*, . .. '1*}, and 
A.j= O, 'Vje {1*, .. . ,1*}. 
5. This result simplifies the problem of modelling party competition in registration 
drives: Two parties will not both choose to conduct registration drives in the same 
census tracts. Furthermore, given a fixed budget and having once selected the optimal 
pattern of registration efforts, a given party will not revise its strategy in response to 
opposistion efforts. 
6. Obviously this "tract separation" prediction of the no-filtering model can be 
tested quite easily. In the three Assembly districts for which data was available, 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23: 32: 04 
~nal~S• ~ uf t~ ~Ct data 
ENV:~ONMENTAL QUALITY LAB DEC M1 croVAX-I VMS V4. 3 
FILE: AGGREGATE]J FILE 
F A C T 0 R A N A L Y S I 
ANALYSIS NUMBER 1 L!STWISE DELETION OF CASES WITH MISSINQ VAL1JES 
EXTRACTION 1 FOR ANALYSIS 1· PRINCIPAL-CO~ONENTS ANALYSIS CPC> 
INITIAL STATISTICS. 
VARIABLE COI":!":!..'NALJ. TV * FACTOR EIGENVALUE PCT OF VAA CUM PCT • 
LAMBDA 1 . ~00<1C ~ 1 10. 16033 31 . 8 31 . a 
ERROR 1 . 00000 * 2 e . 71717 27.2 ~9 . 0 
XA!~II l. 00000 * 3 ~. 41113 16.9 7:5. 9 X279 1 00000 .. 4 1 70199 ~ - 3 81 . 2 
PQUAL.IFV 1 . oooov :5 1 . 2:5321 3. 9 8:5 . 1 
PQOVDEI'f 1 coooo • 6 1 . 06009 3 . 3 88. 4 
PDEMREQ 1 . vCCOO * 7 . 97663 3 . 1 91 . :5 
PPROOf'l l . 00000 • 8 . :59849 1. 9 93 . 4 
PRENTERS 1 . 00000 * 9 . :54192 1.7 9~. 1 PX126 1. 00000 « 10 . 31032 1. 0 96 . 0 
PX127 ! 00000 • 11 196:57 . 6 96 . 6 
PX12S ~ . :-oonn • 12 1~2:56 . :5 97 . 1 
PX129 1 . (10000 * 13 14376 . 4 97 . 6 
PX130 l ooco~ * 14 1138:5 . 4 97. 9 PX131 1 . 00000 * 1:5 11A!14 . 4 98 . 3 PX132 1. 00000 * 16 . 09089 .3 98. 6 PX133 1 . OOOOCJ ... 17 08119 . 3 98 . 8 
PX134 1 . 00000 * 18 . 07629 . 2 99 . 1 PX135 1. 00000 . 19 . 06447 .2 99. 3 
PBLACK 1.00000 ._. 20 . 0:5724 . 2 99 . 4 
PHISP 1 00000 • 21 . 04210 . 1 99 . 6 
PPR11VE 1. 00000 * 2.Z . 03:538 . 1 99 . 7 PPR12VIE 1. 000!.10 i:· 23 . 02.34 . 1 9 • . 8 
PPR13VIE 1 . 00000 w 24 . 01853 . 1 9 • . 8 
PPR14VIE 1 . 00000 * 25 . 01~29 . 0 99 . 9 PPR15YE 1 . 0000() * 26 . 01241 . 0 ••. 9 PAQIE1824 1 . 00000 • ;!7 . 01044 .0 99.9 
PAQIE2534 1. 00000 • 28 . 00712 . 0 100. 0 
PAQIE3~44 1.00000 * 2. . 00555 . 0 100.0 PAQIE4554 1 . 00000 * 30 . 00240 . 0 100.0 PAQIE55 ... 1. 00000 • 31 . 000115 . 0 100. 0 
PAQIE64PL 1 . 00000 .. 32 . 0003. . 0 100. 0 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mn•l~~1~ ~~ :T.,t a•t• 
S:NV !RGNMS:Ni."~ QUA!.. ITV LAD OEC M1CT'O'JAX-I '.JMS 114. 3 
F A C T 0 R 
FINAL.. STAT!STICS· 
liAR I ABU COM?"JUNA!.. :0 T'o' • FACTOR EIQENVAL.UE PCT OF liAR CUI'! PCT .. 
L.AI'I8DA . 73471 • 1 10. 160:33 31.8 31.8 
ERROR 87j77 • 2 a. 71717 27.2 :59 . 0 
X&:~ll . 89:58= 3 ~ - 41113 16. 9 7:5.9 
X279 . 86~4 .. • 4 1. 701H :5. 3 81 . 2 
POUAL..IFY 91!1.91 • :, 1. 2S3.21 3 . 9 8:5. 1 
PQOVD£1'1 . 9:5103 .. 6 1. 06009 3.3 88.4 
PDEI'tREGI . 90993 • 
PPROOI1 . 90~3, • 
PRENTER9 . ?3qt2 * PX1.26 . <;114378 * PX1.27 . 9 ... _. .. ;;. 
PX1.28 ';'003t • 
PX1.29 . 9078&' • 
~X130 91.:!-~ 
PX1:31 8010~ * PX13:Z 9~001 • 
PX133 . 8:59:56 * PX134 . SQ871 ... 
PX13:5 . 90879 * F'SL.ACK . 97~7!' ~ 
!'HISP . 1:1608? * !2PRllYE 84774 
PPR12YE ?:Jass .. 
PPR13YE 81416 • 
PPfU4YE ~l0.1;2 • 
PPR1:5YE . 9:51CO • 
PAGIE18.24 8:5449 • 
F'AQE2:534 . 710:50 .. 
F'AQE3:544 . 91080 ~ 
F'AQE4:5~ . ~7347 • 
PAQ£:5:5414 . 93aoq * F'AQE64PL . 89.36 .. 
VARI.,._X ROTATION l ~OR EXTRACTION 1 IN ANALYSIS 1 - KAISER 
IIARII'IAX CO~~CED IN 14 ITERATIONS. 
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APPENDIX .6. 
ATIS REGISTRATION MATERIALS 
NORWALK DEMOCRATIC 
VOTER REGISTRATION PROJECT -- 1987 
JOB: Register Democrats to vote at busy locations in the 
Norwalk area. 
PAY: $1.50 for each valid ' registered Democrat in the 63rd 
Assembly District. 
HOURS: Choose your own hours and _wQrk sites 
PAY PERIOD: Payday is every Friday for work done from Thursday 
thru Wednesday. 
The "Rap" on site: 
"Hi, have you registered to vote, yet? 
Have you moved recently? 
Great, we're registering Democrats, you're a Democrat 
aren't you?" (Assist the voter in filling out the form) ••• 
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QUASITRANSITIVE SOCIAL CHOICE WITHOUT 
THE PARETO PRINCIPLE 
Jack Williamson 
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 
California Institute of Technology 
Summer 1986 
This paper analyzes the structure of families of decisive coalitions, given an 
underlying quasitransitive valued social decision procedure which satisfies the 
universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives axio.ms. By 
identifying the collection of alternatives x• ~ X on which the Pareto principle fails, 
the extent of imposition in the social ranking can be characterized. In particular, 
every coalition is weakly decisive for x• over X-X•, and weakly antidecisive for x-x• 
over x•. Therefore alternatives in X-X• can never be socially ranked above those in 
x•. Further results can be obtained by repeatedly refining x• so as to remove 
alternatives on which the Pareto principle fails. 




Ever since Arrow's [1951] results first appeared, the central problem of the theory 
of social choice has been to classify the properties of families of decisive coalitions 
entailed by ethical and regularity restrictions on social welfare functions. This paper is 
an attempt to clarify some of these properties assuming only the principle of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives, universal domain and quasitransitive valuedness 
of the social welfare function. In particular, the analysis does not require the Pareto 
principle. 
If a social welfare function fails to satisfy the Pareto principle, the collection X of 
alternatives must contain at least one element x which is unbeatable-- regardless of the 
preferences of any coalition-- against at least one other y e X. That is there is no 
coalition which can enforce the strict preference of its members for x over y. 
Thus X can be partitioned into a set x* of alternatives each of which is unbeatable 
with respect to some member of X and the complement x-x* on which the Pareto 
axiom holds. It is then instructive to characterize the decisive and blocking coalitions 
for: 
• x-x* against x-x*. 
• x-x* against x*' 
• x* against x-x*. and 
• X* against x*. 
This line of reasoning may be pursued further: x* itself may contain elements 
which are unbeatable with respect to alternatives in X*-- this is to say that the Pareto 
axiom fails again, locally on X*. In this case X* may be partitioned into (X*)*= X2* 
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and x* - x2*, and the same analysis applied in the case of the partition (X* ,X-X*) 
can be employed again. This process can be iterated until X 0 * = <1> or xn* = xCn+l)*, 
for some n. 
The main result of this paper is that the elements of X-X* can never be socially 
ranked above any of the elements of X*. In a similar vein, it has been established that 
every coalition is weakly antidecisive with respect to members of X-X* over elements 
of X*. It is hoped that a characterization or classification scheme can be developed for 
sets of alternatives which are invariant under the *-operator; such sets are exactly those 
in which every element of the set is unbeatable against at least one other member of the 
set. 
In what follows, section II is a brief literature review, section III sets forth the 
social choice model employed here, and sections IV through VII present specialized 
results concerning the families of decisive coalitions for (X-X*, X-X*), (X*, X-X*), 
(X-X*, X*), and (X*, X*) respectively. Section VIII indicates some directions for 
future research. Finally, a notation and definitons summary can be found in the 
appendix. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper is related to two different areas of research in generalizing Arrow's 
Theorem: i) relaxing the requirement that the social ranking of alternatives must be 
transitive; and ii) relaxing the Pareto principle, the requirement that an unanimously 
preferred alternative be socially preferred. 
In his 1977 paper, Sen reviews impossibility results of the first variety. Each of the 
propositions discussed below depends upon some form of relaxation of the requirement 
that a social welfare function yield a transitive social preference relation. 
PROPOSITION (Acyclic and Quasitransitive Social Choice) 
i) (Sen) Let X be a finite set of alternatives. 3 an (acyclic I, complete, reflexive)-
valued social welfare function satisfying the UNIVERSAL DOMAIN, ITA, 
PARETO and NON-DICTATORSIDP conditions. 
ii) (Gibbard) A social welfare function is said to be oligarchic if there is "a 
unique group of persons in the community such that if any one of them strictly 
prefers any x to any y, society must regard x to be at least as good as y, and if 
all members of the group strictly prefer x to y, then society must strictly prefer x 
toy. Each person in the oligarchy has a veto." 
Any (complete, reflexive)-valued social welfare function which is also 
quasitransitive-valued and satisfies the UNIVERSAL DOMAIN, IIA, and 
PARETO conditions must be oligarchic. 
1. Recall that a relation R is said to be acyclic if x1Px2, x2Px3, ... , X 0 .1Px0 => 
-,x0 Px 1. Defmitions of other social choice terminology can be found in section ill. of this 
paper. 
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ill) (Brown) If the set of alternatives is infinite and individuals' preferences are 
acyclic, any social welfare function which generates acyclic preferences and 
satisfies Arrow's conditions will fail to produce an oligrachy only if there is a 
subset of individuals, the collegium , who must prefer x to y for social 
preference for x against y. Their unanimous assent is thus a necessay 
condition, though not sufficient. 
i) See Sen [1969, 1977]. The proof is by example; construct f such that given 
any profile R, xRrY unless y is Pareto preferred to x. The social welfare 
function thus obtained in fact satisfies the stated conditions. 
ii) Again, the interested reader is referred to Sen's 1977 paper and to Sen [1970]. 
He states this result was proved by Gibbard in an unpublished 1969 paper. The 
proposition is also a consequence of Hansson's result, which will be reviewed 
in the following pages, that the family of decisive coalitions under these 
assumptions forms a filter. The oligarchy claimed in ii) can be obtained by 
taking the intersection of all coalitions in this decisive filter. 
ill) See Brown [1973]. 
Wilson [1972] reports a generalization of Arrow's theorem along a different 
direction-- the relaxation of the Pareto principle. Let X denote the set of alternatives, 
and IR the collection of all complete, transitive binary preference profiles on X; if R e IR , 
let Rr denote the social order of X generated by f on R. Defme the relation Rr* on X, called 
weak imposition, according to xRr*Y iff 'V R e IR (xRry); and denote by Pr* and Ir* the 
strict and indifferent components of Rr* respectively. A social welfare function is said to 
be null on a collection of alternatives V c X just in case 'V Re IR , 'V x,y E V (xlry); that 
is a null social welfare function generates social indifference among the alternatives in V 
from every profile. Finally, a social welfare function is called two-way dictatorial on 
V c X in case there is some individual i e N for whom: 
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(V Re JR., V x,y e V (xRry => xRiy)) v (V Re JR., V x,y e V (xRrY => yRix)). 
The assent, either direct or inverse, of such an individual is necessary before any one 
alternative can be socially ranked over another. 
PROPOSITION (Relaxing the Pareto Principle) 
(Wilson) Suppose that a transitive valued social welfare function f satisfies the IIA and 
UNIVERSAL DOMAIN conditions. 
i) Rr* is an equivalence relation on the set X of alternatives. 
ii) Let Ir*[x] denote the Rr*-equivalence class to which x e X belongs. If xlr*Y 
then either Ir*[x] = {x,y}, or else fis null or two-way dictatorial on Ir*[x]. 
258 
III. THE MODEL 
Let X be the set of all possible social states or alternatives; X need not necessarily 
be !mite, but must contain at least three elements. The elements of X should be regarded as 
being mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive; only one social state can prevail. 
Society is composed of a finite set N = { 1, ... , i, ... , n} of individuals. Each 
individual i is characterized by a complete, transitive, reflexive preference realtion Ric 
X X X. Denote by Pi and Ii the asymmetric and symmetric parts of Ri. That is (x,y) 
belongs to the asymmetric part of Ri which implies xPiY· iff xRiY and -..,yRix; similarly 
(x,y) belongs to the symmetric part of Ri so that xliY iff both xRiY and yRix. Ann-tuple of 
preference relations, one corresponding to each individual, is called a profile; let R denote 
the set of all profiles which are complete, transitive, and reflexive over X. 
A social welfare function is a map 
f:R~ {COMPLETE BINARY RELATIONS ON X}. 
The f-image of a profile R will be denoted Rr. and let Pr and Ir denote the asymmetric and 
symmetric parts of Rr respectively. Any social welfare function defined over the entire 
domain R is said to satisfy the universal domain condition (UDOM); this paper will be 
exclusively concerned with such maps. 
A binary relation, say Ri, is said to be quasitransitive on X just in case its 
asymmetric component is transitive, that is 'Vx,y,z e X (xPiY 1\ yPiz => xPiz). Notice that 
indifference need not be transitive in the case of a quasitransitive relation. Let Q denote the 
set of all quasitransitive relations on X. The results of this paper require that social welfare 
functions take values in Q; such functions will be called quasitransitive (QUASI). Let F 
denote the set of all quasi transitive social welfare functions on R. 
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A social welfare function is said to satisfy the so-called principle of independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) just in case: 
VR,R' e R, Vx,y e X (R I {x,y} = R' I {x.y} => Rc I {x,y} = R'c I {x,y}). 
This principle stipulates that if two profiles R and R' coincide on some collection of 
alternatives V c X , then the social rankings R'r and Rc generated by f must agree on V. 
The IIA principle will be required of all social welfare functions considered here. 
The Pareto principle (PARETO) requires that a social welfare function f satisfy the 
condition: 
VR e R, Vx, y e X (xPNY => xPcY ); 
that is, if every individual strictly prefers x toy then x must be socially ranked above y. 
Unless otherwise specified, the results of this paper do not require the Pareto principle. 
There may be instances in which the Pareto principle holds only on a subset of the set of 
alternatives; if V c X, the Pareto principle is said to hold locally on V with respect to f, 
written PARETOr(V], just in case: 
PARETOc[V] ¢::> (VR e R., Vx, y e V(xPNY => xPcy)). 
If there is no possibility for confusion, the subscript "f' will be omitted. Observe that the 
defining conditions must obtain regardless of the particular preference profile characterizing 
the individuals in N. Notice also that condition (*) only requires that alternatives in V 
satisfy the Pareto principle with respect to other alternatives in V, not necessarily with 
respect to all the alternatives in X. 
A subset of individuals C c N is called a coalition. Let x,y e X , if every 
member of coalition Cat least weakly prefers x toy, that is: 
Vi e C (xRiy), 
then write xRcy. In this way a coalitional preference relation Rc is defined over X. 
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Similarly define the strict coalitional preference relation 1 P c according to: 
VC c N, Vx, y e X (xPcY {::) 'v'i e C (xPiy)). 
Let P c and Ic denote denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of Rc respectively. Let 
U,V c X be collections of alternatives, a coalition Cis said to be decisive for U over V 
with respect to a social welfare function f just in case: 
'v'R e R., Vue U, Vv e V (uPcv => uPrv). 
Notice that the power of a decisive coalition does not depend upon the preferences of its 
members. Let Dr (U,V) denote the family of all f-decisive coalitions for U over V. 
Coalition C is said to be weakly decisive for U over V with repsect to f iff: 
VR e R, Vue U, 'v'v e V (uPcv => --,-,vPru). 
And denote by WDr (U,V) the set of all weakly f-decisive coalitions for U over V. 
So-called anti-decisive coalitions turn out to play an important role in the 
theory of social choice without the Pareto principle. A coalition C is said to be anti-
decisive for U over V with respect to f if the members' strict preferences are exactly 
inverted in the social preference relation generated by f, that is: 
'v'R e R. , 'v'u e U, Vv e V (uPcv => vPru). 
Let Ar (U,V) denote the set of all f-anti-decisive coalitions for U over V. Mirroring the 
definitions of decisiveness, coalition C is said to be weakly anti-decisive for U over 
V with respect to f just in case: 
VR e R , 'v'u e U, Vv e V (uPcv => --,-,uPrv). 
1. I would like to thank my Committee for pointing out that P c• as defmed here, is not 
simply the asymmetric part of~· For example, consider a two member coalition 
C = { 1,2}, and suppose that xP 1y, while xl2Y. Referring to the definitions of P c and Rc 
above, notice that xRcY and --,yRcx which implies (x,y) is an element of the asymmetric 
part of Re--but it is not the case that xPcY· Note that, for a given non-empty coalition C and 
corresponding preference profile, P c is an asymmetric relation. This asymmetry property is 
used repeatedly; however, no results derived here depend upon P c being the asymmetric 
partofRc. 
261 
While the members of an anti-decisive coalition cannot hope to find their strict preferences 
for U over V embodied in the social preference relation generated by f, they will not 
necessarily have to endure the strict opposite of their wishes. The collection of all weakly 
f-anti-decisive coalitions for U over Vis denoted by WAf(U,V). 
Members of blocking coalitions--as defined here--lack sufficient power to enforce 
their strict preference in the social preference relation, but can secure exact social 
indifference between any pair of coalitionally strictly ordered altematives.2 More 
formally, coalition C is said to be a blocking coalition for U over V with respect to f iff: 
VR e R, Vue U, Vv e V (uPcv => ulrv). 
Denote the set of all f-blocking coalitions for U over V by Bf(U,V). Finally, the set 
SWDf(U,V) of strictly weakly decisive coalitions for U over V with respect to f is 
defined by: 
SWDr(U,V) = WDr(U,V)- Dr(U,V)- Br(U,V). 
The members of such a coalition find they can enforce their strict coalitional preference as 
strict social preference for some pair(s) of alternatives (u,v), but that for some other pair(s) 
of alternatives (u',v') their strict preference results only in social indifference. Similarly, 
the set of strictly weakly anti-decisive coalitions for U over V with respect to f is 
defined by: 
SWAr(U,V) = WAr(U,V)- Ar(U,V)- Br(U,V). 
2. This construction is somewhat non-standard, but has been adopted here to permit 
greater precision. More typically in social choice literature, a blocking coalition can prevent 
the strict social ordering of any two states contrary to the members' unanimous strict 
preference. Decisive, weakly decisive, and blocking coalitions--as defined here--are all 
"blocking" in this sense. 
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PROPOSITION 1. (Elementary Consequences of the Definitions) 
Let f e F be quasitransitive and U,V,W c X. 
i) V'R e R, V'x,y e X (xPq,y). 
Given any preference profile, every member of the empty coalition strictly 
prefers x to y. 
ii) Vx e X(<!> e Df(x,x)). 
The empty coalition is not f-decisive for any alternative x over x itself. 
iii) V'x e X (Df(x,x) = 2N- <j>). 
Every non-empty coalition is decisive for an alternative x over x itself. 
iv) PARETOr[<j>]. 
f satisfies the Pareto principle trivially over an empty collection of alternatives. 
v) V'x e X (PARETOc[x]). 
f satisfies the Pareto principle trivially over every singleton collection of 
alternatives. 
vi) Df(<j>,<j>) = Dc(<j>,V) = Df(V,<j>) = 2N, for all V c X. 
Every coalition is f-decisive for one collection of alternatives over another, if 
one of the collections is empty. 
vii) Let U :;e <j>; then <1> e Dt{U,U).3 
The empty coalition is never f-decisive for a non-empty set of alternatives. 
3. Note, however, that if U,V c X such that U n V = <j>, then it is possible that <I> e 
Df(U,V). In this case Df(U,V) = (<j>}, and every element of U is strictly imposed over 
every element of V. 
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Every f-decisive coalition for U over Vis decisive for each element u of U over 
V, and for U over each element v of V. 
ix) Let U c V; then Df(V,W) c Df(U,W), and Dc(W,V) c Dc(W,U). 
Every coalition f-decisive for V over W is decisive for every subset of V over 
W; furthermore, every coalition decisive for W over Vis decisive for W over 
every subset of V. 
x) Df(U,V) (\ Df(V,W) c Df(U,W). 
Decisiveness of a coalition is a transitive property over the family of all subsets 
of alternatives, in the following sense: If a coalition is decisive for U over V and 
for V over W, then the coalitiqn is also decisive for U over W. 
xi) Df(U,V) and Bf(U,V) are closed under superset inN. 
Adding members to a decisive or blocking coalition does not dilute the 
coalition's decisive or blocking power. 
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IV. ALTERNATIVES IN X-X* vs. ALTERNATIVES IN X-X* 
Given a social welfare function f which is not known a priori to satisfy the Pareto 
principle over the set X of alternatives, one may reason that either f satisfies the Pareto 
principle-- PARETOf[X]-- or else that f does not. If not there must be at least one 
alternative x e X at which the principle fails. That is for some distinct alternative y all 
individuals strictly prefer y to x, that is yPNx, but xis strictly ranked above yin the social 
ordering generated by f, xPrY· 
Suppose that all the alternatives at which the Pareto principle fails are culled into a 
distinguished collection X*. Then f satisfies the Pareto principle at each of the alternatives 
in the remainder X-X*, and the local behavior off on this set can be analyzed under the 
assumption that the Pareto principle holds. 
DEFINITION (The Pareto Failure Set X*) 
Let f e F be a social welfare function, and V c X. An alternative x e X is said to be 
!-unbeatable in V just in case there is at least one profile R e lff. and at least one distinct 
alternative y e V (which may depend on the profile R) such that yPNx but xPrY· Define the 
Pareto failure set X* to be the set of all alternatives which are f-unbeatable in X. 
The next four claims are direct consequences of the definition of X*. The fifth is 
Hansson's [1972] elegant social choice result, and is included here for completeness. 
Notice that for the same reasons D.c(X-X*,X-X*) is a filter, A.c(X-X*,X-X*) =<I>· 
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PROPOSITION 2. (Consequences of the Definition of X*, Hansson's Arrow Result) 
i) P ARETOr[X] iff X* = <j>. 
f satisfies the Pareto principle on X just in case the Pareto failure set X* is 
empty. 
ii) PARETOr[X-X*]. 
f satisfies the Pareto principle on the portion of X remaining after the failure set 
X* has been excised. 
iii) X-X* E MAX{Y~X} {Y I PARETOr[Y]}. 
X-X* is a maximal element of the family of subsets of X on which f satisfies 
the Pareto principle. 
iv) If X= X*, then "i/n E N (X= xn*). 
If the Pareto principle fails at every alternative in X, then repeated attempts to 
isolate those alternatives at which f satifies the principle will prove fruitless. 
v) (Hansson) If #{X-X*} ~ 3, then Df(X-X*, X-X*) is a filter--and so contains 
an oligarchy obtained by intersecting all elements of the filter, even though the 
social ordering is only required to be quasitransitive. 
Iff also generates transitive social orderings, then Dr(X-X*, X-X*) is an 
ultrafilterL- and so contains a singleton decisive coalition or dictator. 
1. A filter F on a set S is a non-empty family of non-empty subsets of S such that: i) the 
family is closed under intersection, if f1 ,f2 e F then f1 fl f2 e F, and ii) the family is 
closed under taking supersets inS, iff e F and f!;;; fs= S then f e F. An ultrafilter U 
on S is a filter which is not strictly contained in any other filter on S, that is U is maximally 
fine. It can be easily shown that U is an ultrafilter iff for every T ~ S either T e F or S-T 
e F. Every ultrafilter on a finite set contains a singleton element. See Willard [1970]. 
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REMARKS (Semigroups and Dr(X-X*, X-X*)) 
As a topic for funher research, consider the following problem. Let u,v,w,y be 
distinct elements of X-X*; is it the case that Dr(u,v) = D.r(w,y)? In case Dr (X-X*, X-X*) 
is an ultrafilter one can cenainly answer affirmatively. However, if only quasitransitive 
range is assumed, Dr (X-X*, X-X*) is merely a filter, and the problem is more complex. 
One might consider the functions Dr (•,x): X-X* --7 21V\(2N) such that: 
y--7 D.r(y,x), and defrne the relation= on X-X* according to: x = y iff: 
Dr (•,x) I (X-X*)-{x,y} = Dr(•,y) I (X-X*)-{x,y}· 
Notice the relation= would partition X-X* into a finite number of equivalence classes, 
each of the form [x] where x e X. Define an associative, binary operation* on [X-X*]= 
according to [x] * [y] = [z] iff: 
Dr(•,{x,y}) I (X-X*)-{x,y,z} =Dr(•,z) I (X-X*)-{x,y,z}· 
A potential problem arises in that [X-X*] = may fail to be *-complete; there simply 
may not be an alternative z which is equal with respect to unbeatability at the set of 
alternatives {x,y}. However, X-X* could be augmented so as to make [X-X*l= 
*-complete. Then ([X-X*la ,*) would form a semigroup. Insofar as 
D.r(X-X* ,X-X*) could be said to have been encoded into its associated semigroup, the 
sizeable body of theorems concerning the taxonomy, characterization, and complexity 
of finite semigroups could be brought to bear on the nature of Dr(X-X*, X-X*). 
Notice, for example, that if Dr(X-X*, X-X*) is an ultrafilter, then [X-X*]= is just a 
single equivalence class. As another example, in a context more general than X-X*, if 
there is an alternative x e X which is always strictly imposed so that Dr(x,X) = 2N, 




iv) Ar (X*,X-X*) =Be (X*,X-X*) = <j>. In fact, Vx e X*, Vy e X-X* (Ar(x,y) 
= Br(x,y) = <j>). 
No coalition is either antidecisive or blocking for the failure set X* over X-X*. 
Verification of i), ii), and iv) are left for the interested reader. In the case of iii), suppose 
not. Then for some x e X*, andy e X-X*, Dr(x,y) = <j>; but this gives y e X*, a 
contradiction. The local claim comprising the second half of iii) is now obvious. QED. 
The next proposition is directed to the question: How large is the family 
Dr(X* ,X-X*) off-decisive coalitions for X* over X-X*? The three parts of the proposi -
tion each assert that Dr(X* ,X-X*) must contain coalitions of a certain kind and therefore 
must be at least as large as these families. 
PROPOSITION 4. (Lower Bounds for Dr(X*,X-X*)) 
Suppose that X*~ <1> and #{X-X*}~ 2. 
i) Let c e Dr (X* ,X-X*) and de Dr(X* ,X-X*), then c r. de Dr (X* ,X-X*). 
The family of coalitions f-decisive for X* over X-X* is closed under 
intersection. 
ii) Dr (X-X*,X-X*) cDr (X*,X-X*). 
Every coalition which is decisive for X-X*-- in particular the oligarchy 
nDr(X-X* ,X-X*)-- is also decisive for X* over X-X*. 
iii) In fact, a sharper but perhaps more obscure local result can be obtained. 
Suppose v e X* and distinct y, z e X-X*. Then Dr(z,y) c Dr(v,z). 
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Figure 1 and 2 
Let R e R be given s.t. vPcndY; it is required to show that vPfY obtains. Construct R' 
such that R I (v,y} = R' I (v,y}• according to table 1 below: 
R R' 
c-d £rld 2::£ Q::d ~ d:::£ 
[v,y] v [v,y] [v,y]R v z 
y z z [v,y]R 
y 
Table 1 
The notation [ v ,y] means the relation between v and y under R among the members of the 
coalition c ~ d is arbitrary. Notice also that the subscript R indicates that the relation 
between v and y under the profile R' among the members of the coalition shown at the 
column heading agrees with R. 
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Now vPc'z so that vP'rz since c e Dr (X*,X-X*) and zP'ctY since de Dr(X-X*,X-X*). 
Thus quasitransitivity gives vP'ry, and vPrY obtains by IIA. Hence c n d e 
Dr(X-X*,X-X*), as desired. 
In the case of ii), referring to the proof of i) above ... choose C = N (recall N e 
Dr(X*,X-X*)) and let d range over the members of Dr (X-X*,X-X*). 
Finally, in the case of iii), refer to figure 2 and simply apply the technique employed to 
prove ii) immediately above. QED. 
A stronger condition than was employed in the previous claim gives Dr (X* ,X*) as 
another lower bound for Dr (X* ,X-X*). 
PROPOSITION 5. (Dr (X*,X*) Bounds Df(X*,X-X*) from Below) 
Let #{X*} :2: 2 and X-X*# <j). Suppose that there is at least one alternative we X* such 
that Dr (X*,w) # <j>. 
i) Ifce Dr(X*,X*)andde Df(X*,X-X*),thencnde Dr(X*,X-X*). 
The intersection of an f-decisive coalition for X* with a coalition decisive for 
X* over X-X* is itself decisive for X* over X-X*. 
ii) Dr (X* ,X*) c Df(X* ,X-X*). 
Every coalition which is f-decisive for X* is also decisive for X* over X-X*. 
iii) Unless every member of Dr (X*,X*) has non-empty intersection with every 
member ofDr(X*,X-X*), then Df(X*,X-X*) = 2N. 
Note the condition 3 we X* (Dr(X*,w) # <P) obtains ifPARETOf[X*], or if X*# (X*)*. 
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X* x,....,x ... 
Figure 3 
Suppose R e R is given such that vPcndx. Construct R' e 1R such that R I {v,y) = 
R' I {v,y)• and so that the requirements of table 2 below are also satisfied. 
R R' 
c-d £.fl d d::£ ~ ~ ~ 
[v,x] v [v,x] [v,x]R v w 
X w [v,x]R 
w X 
Table 2 
Thus vP'cw so vP'rw since assumed c e Dr (X* ,X*), and wP'dx so wP'rx since assumed 
de Dr (X* ,X*). vP'rx follows by quasitransitivity, and IIA gives vPrx. Hence c r. d e 
Dr(v,x) and arbitrainess of v,x allow cr. de Dr (X* ,X-X*), as desired. 
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Turning now to ii), to show the first part, choose d = N and let c range over the members 
of Dr (X* ,X*). 
Finally to show pan iii), notice that if c fl d = cp e Dr (X* ,X-X*), then closure under 
superset gives that Dr (X* ,X-X*) = 2N. QED. 
REMARKS (Weakly Decisive and Strictly Weakly Decisive Coalitions) 
Let U,V c X; recall that a coalition C c N is said to be weakly decisive for U over 
V just in case 'VR e R., Vue U, Vv e V (uPcv =>uPrv v uirv). Recall also that Cis said 
to be strictly weakly decisive for U over V iff C e WDf(U,V)- Df(U,V) - Br(U,V). Thus 
a coalition C e SWDf(U,V) will never suffer the imposition of any v e V over any u e U 
contrary to the coalition's strict preference. However, for at least one choice of u e U, v e 
V, andRe R it must be the case that uPcv but ulfv so that cis not decisive-- C e Dr(U,V); 
and also, for at least one choice of u' e U, v' e V, and R' e R , u'P'cv' but u'Pr'v' so 
that Cis not merely blocking-- C E Br(U,V). 
The next proposition represents another assessment of the size of the family of 
coalitions with decisive power for X* over X-X*. By weakening the definition of 
decisiveness somewhat it is possible to dispense with the specialized assumption of the 
previous proposition. Notice Proposition 6 implies that the alternatives in X-X* can never 
be socially ranked by f above those in X*, regardless of individuals' preferences. By 
identifying the collection of alternatives at which the Pareto principle fails, the structure 
of imposition in social preference can be illuminated. 
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PROPOSITION 6. (Imposition of X* Over X-X*) 
Suppose that X* :;e <1> and #{X-X*} ~ 2; then elements of X-X* are never strictly 
socially ranked over elements of X*. That is X* is imposed over X-X*, in the 
following sense: 
i) If C e: Df(X*,X-X*), thenCe SWDf(X*,X-X*). Note that coalition C need 
not be non-empty. 
ii) Df(X*,X-X*) u SWDf(X*,X-X*) = 2N. 
To show i), recall it was previously shown that N e Df(X*,X-X*). Let C ~ N such that 
C e Df(X*,X-X*) be given. Then 3R e R, 3x e X*, 3y e X-X* (xPcY 1\ --,xPry) . 
Now -,xPrY allows for two cases: a) xlrY or b) yPrx. Observing that Bf(X*,X-X*) = <!>, if 
a) obtains, nothing remains to prove. Hence suppose b), yPrx, is the case. Since it has 
been assumed that #{X-X*} ~ 2, choose we X-X* distinct from y above. Construct R' 
eR. such that: 
1) R'l {x,y} = Rl {x,y}• 
2) wP'NY• and 
3) wP'ccx. 

















Now since yPrx, IIA yields yP'rx. Notice next. that w,y e X-X*, and as previously 
demonstrated Pareto holds on this set. Thus xP'NY gives wP'rx. It will now be shown 
that CC e Dt(w,x), which is a contradiction since we X-X*, x e X* and so as shown 
earlier Dt(w,x) = <j>. Let R" e R be given such that wP"ccx. Observe that both wP"ccx 
and wP'ccx. and also that the relation between x and w under R' was left unspecified with 
respect to the members of C. Thus R' can be constructed to satisfy not only 1), 2) and 3) 
above but also the additional requirement: R'l {x,y) = R"l (x,y)· Then having established 
wP'rx. IIA gives wP"rx. Hence CC e Dt(w,x), which is the desired contradiction. Notice 
that ii) is simply a restatement of part i). QED. 
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REMARKS (Properties of SWDr(X*,X-X*)) 
Notice that SWDr(X*,X-X*) is contained within an ideal2 on N. This result 
obtains since Dr(X-X*,X-X*) is both a filter and is also contained within Dr(X*,X-X*). 
Notice that N E SWDr(X*,X-X*); furthermore, if Df(X*,X-X*) * 2N, then <P e 
SWDf(X*,X-X*). However, unless Df(X*,X-X*) is also a filter, the closure of 
SWDf(X*,X-X*) under union will fail. Hence, in general, it can only be asserted that 
SWDr(X* ,X-X*) is contained within an ideal, not that SWDr(X*,X-X*) is itself an ideal. 
Consider the following conjecture. Let Y be some set of alternatives. If given 
Df(Y,Y) and SWDf(Y,Y) which are in fact dual, it is possible to solve the backwards 
problem: Does the social welfare function f which generated Df(Y,Y) and SWDf(Y,Y) 
satisfy transitive range, quasitransitive range, Pareto, and IIA? 
2. Recall that an ideal on N is a family of subsets of N satisfying the requirements: N 




families under superset allows in particular that N e Dt(z,v), N e Df(v,y). Thus N e 
Df(z,v) n Df(v,y) c Df(z,y) = <j>, a contradiction. 
To show ii), suppose not. As above, since y e X*, 3v e X-X* such that Df(v,y) = <j>. 
The negation of the claim allows some x e X-X* such that Df(x,y) :F. <j>. Since v,x e 
X-X* and PARETO[X-X*], Df(v,x) ¢ <j>. In particular N e Df(v,x) n Df(x,y) ~ Df(v,y) 
= <j>, a contradiction. 
Finally, to show iii) observe that Df(X-X*, X*) = n {xe x-X*,yeX*} Df(x,y) = 
n (xe X-X*,yeX*} <j> = <j>, as desired. QED. 
REMARKS (Bf(X-X*,X*) and Af(X-X*,X*)) 
In what follows, suppose that X* :F. <j>, and #{X-X*};?: 2 We now seek to 
characterize Bf(X-X*,X*) and Af(X-X*,X*). An important unresolved problem is to 
develop interesting conditions which guarantee N e Bf(X-X* ,X*) or N e Af(X-X* ,X*), 
as these two sets are disjoint. 
PROPOSITION 8. (Properties of Bf(X-X*,X*) and Af(X-X*,X*)) 
i) Bf(X-X*,X*) n Af(X-X*,X*) = <j>. 
No coalition is both blocking and antidecisive for X-X* over X*. 
ii) Vv,w e X (Af(v,w) = <l> :=:} (N e Df(v,w) v N e Bf(v,w))). 
iii) Af(X-X*,X*) = <l> :=:} N E Bf(X-X*,X*). 
If no coalition is antidecisive for X-X* over X*, then the grand coalition is 
blocking for X-X* over X*. 
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Part i) is straightforward. To show ii), suppose not. Then Ar(v,w) = <j>,but N ~ Dr(v,w) 
and N e Br(v,w). Now Ar(v,w) = <1> => N ~ Af(v,w) => VR e R (vPNw 1\ -,wPrv), 
where the last implication obtains from IIA. N ~ Dr(v,w) and N ~ Br(v,w) give, again by 
IIA, that VR e R ,(vPNw 1\ -,vPrw 1\ -,view). But this violates completeness of social 
preference. 
Finally, to show iii), recall that Dc(X-X* ,X*) =<!>,and apply part ii) above. QED. 
The reader may wish to compare the next proposition with proposition 6, which 
established similar results concerning coalitions decisive for X* over X-X*. Notice 
below that since the empty coalition is at least antidecisive for X-X* over X*, alternatives 
in X-X* can never be socially ranked strictly above those in X*. 
PROPOSITION 9. (Every Coalition is Weakly Antidecisive for X-X* Over X*) 
Let C c N, if C ~ Ac(X-X* ,X*); then C e W Ac(X-X* ,X*). 
IfC ~ Ar(X-X*,X*) then 3R e R, 3x e X*, 3y e X-X* (yPcx /\ -,xPry); please see 







Thus either a) xlfy, or b) yPfx. Should a) obtain, there is nothing to prove; so suppose b) 










Since yPfx, IIA gives yP'fx. Recall that Pareto holds on X-X* so that wP'fY· By 
quasitransitivity then wP'fx. Now xP'Nx, so by ITA it follows that V'R" e R, (wPN"x => 
xPr"x). Thus N e Dr(w,x)-- which is a contradiction since it has been previously shown 
that we X-X* and x e X* require Dr(w,x) = (j>. QED. 
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REMARKS (Bf(X-X*,X*)) 
The preceeding development will allow the following (albeit somewhat weak) 
characterization of Bf(X-X*,X*). SinceBr(X-X*,X*) is not in general a fllter in the 
quasi transitive case, sharper results would not seem attainable. 
PROPOSITION 10. (Characterization ofBf(X-X*,X*)) 
Let c!:;;;; N. If c e Bf(X-X*,X*), then cc e WAf(X-X*,X*) and cc e SWDf(X*,X*-X). 
If coalition C is blocking for X-X* over X*, then the coalition consisting of all those 
individuals not members of Cis both weakly antidecisive for X-X* over X*, and strictly 
weakly decisive for X* over X-X*. 
Recall that the following results have been shown previously: 
i) Ifc e Bf(X-X*,X*), then cc ~ Af(X-X*,X*); and 
ii) Ifcc ~ Af(X-X*,X*), thencCWAf(X-X*,X*); 
If c e Bf(X-X* ,X*), then cc e WAf(X-X* ,X*). 
And it has also been demonstrated that:: 
iii) If c e Bf(X-X*,X*), then cc ~ Df(X-X*, X*); and 
iv) Ifcc~ Df(X-X*,X*),thencce SWDf(X- X*,X*); 
Ifc e Bf(X-X*,X*), thence SWDf(X-X*, X*). (**) 
The two conclusions(*) and (•*) above form the conjunction claimed. QED. 
281 
REMARKS (Ar(X-X* ,X*)) 
The following claims bear upon the characterization of Ar(X-X*,X*). Note since 
X-X* n X*= <j>, there is no necessary contradiction if <1> e Ar(X-X* ,X*). 
PROPOSITION 11. (Closure Properties of Ar(X-X*,X*)) 
Suppose #{X-X*} ~ 2 and X* ;t; <j>. 
i) Ar(X-X* ,X*) is closed under intersection. 
ii) Ar(X-X* ,X*) is closed w.r.t. complementation inN. 
Notice that i) is trivial if Ar(X-X*,X*) = <j>, so suppose this set is not empty. Let c,d e 
Ar(X-X*,X*), x e X-X*, y e X* andRe R such that xP(cnd)Y; see figure 6. Then 








£::d &..O..d d::£ £::d &..O..d d::£ 
[x,y] X [x,y] z z z 
y [x,y]R X [x,y]R 
y 
Table4 
Now zP'cY so yP'tz since c e At(X-X* ,X*); and zP'Nx so zPrx since PARETO[X-X*]. 
Quasitransitivity gives therefore yP'rx, and by IIA yPrx obtains. Thus c n d e 
At(X-X* ,X*), which completes the proof of i). 
The proof of ii) is similarly trivial if At(X-X* ,X*)= <j>; again suppose this set is nonempty. 
Referring to figure 6 above, let c e At(X-X*,X*), x e X-X*, y e X*, andRe R such 











Now zP"cY so yP"rz since c e At(X-X*,X*); zP"Nx so zP"rx since PARETO[X-X*). 
Quasitransitivity gives yP"rx, and IIA allows yPrx. Thus cc e At(X-X*,X*), and so 
completes the proof of ii). QED. 
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PROPOSITION 12 (Triviality of Af(X-X*,X*)) 
Af(X-X* ,X*) = <!> or 2N, when # {X-X* } ~ 2 and X* '# <j>. 
Either no coalition is antidecisive for X-X* over X*, or else every coalition is. 
If At(X-X* ,X*)'# <j>, then closure under superset inN gives N e Af(X-X* ,X*). Closure 
under complementation gives <1> e At(X-X* ,X*); and so closure under superset gives 
At(X-X* ,X*) = 2N. QED. 
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VII. ALTERNATIVES IN X* vs. ALTERNATIVES IN X* 
Having gathered the unbeatable alternatives into X*, one can consider this set not 
only as a part of X but also as a collection of alternatives in its own right. This viewpoint 
leads naturally to the questions: Does the social welfare function f satisfy Pareto principle 
over the members of X*, and what properties characterize Ar, Br and Dr on X*? To 
answer these questions the * operator can be applied to X*, thereby partitioning the set into 
(X*)* = x2* and X*-X2*. The analysis of the previous sections can then be applied; 
nevertheless, it will still remain to analyze the decisive, blocking, and antidecisive 
coalitions on x2*. However X2* itself can also be partitioned by * ... This section 
investigates the outcome of this process. 
PROPOSITION 13. (Properties of the* Operator) 
i) X ~ X* :;;;1 X2* ~ ... ;2 xn* ;;;;1 •••• 
ii) PARETOr[X"*l => x(n+l)* = <j>. 
iii) #{xn*} = 1 => x(n+l)* = <j>. 
iv) Suppose xn* = x<n+l)*, then "v'm E N(m ~ n ~ xN* = xm*). 






vi) Both Df(X0 "',xn"') ~ Df(Xn"'-X(n+I)*,xn*-X(n+l)*), and Dr(Xn*,xn*)!:: 
Df(X(n+l)*,x<n+l)*), 'V n ~ 0. 
vii) Suppose #{xn*-x(n+l)*} ~ 2 and X(n+l)*-:#: q,, then: 
or(xn* -x<n+I)* ,xn* -x<n+I)*)!:: Dr(x<n+l)* ,xn* -x<n+I)*). 
Furthermore, ifXD*-x(n+l)*-:#: q, and 3w E x<n+l)* such that Df(X(n+l)*,w) * 
q,, it follows that: 
Dr(X(n+ I)* ,x(n+ 1)*) ~ Dr(X(n+ 1)* ,xn* - X(n+ I)*). 
The proofs of parts i), ii), v), and vi) are straightforward. To show iii), let xn* = {x}, and 
observe that not 3 y e x such that Df(y,x) = q,. In the case of iv), observe that x<n+2)* = 
(X(n+l)*)* = (Xn*)* = x<n+l)* = xn*, and proceed by induction. Finally, to show vii) 
recall it has been previously demonstrated that Dr(X-X*,X-X*) ~ Df(X* ,X-X*), and 
again proceed by induction. QED. 
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REMARKS (Extending Proposition 6) 
It seems likely that Proposition 6 can be generalized in the following manner. 
Suppose xn* ;;e cp, and #{Xn*-x(n+l )*} ;;:: 2, then every coalition is either decisive or 
strictly weakly decisive for x<n+l)* over xn*-x(n+l)*. In this case it would be possible to 
assert that the alternatives in xn*-x(n+l)* could never be socially ranked above those in 
X(n+l)*, thus further characterizing the structure of imposition in the social order generated 
by f. 
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REMARKS (Iteration of the *-Operator on X) 
Consider what happens as * is iterated on X; suppose nonempty xn* has been generated. 
The next action by * will purge xn* of those alternatives which are unbeatable only against 
some alternative(s) outside ofxn*, in x<n-1). The elements surviving the purge are exactly 
those which are unbeatable against some alternative which is itself a member of xn*. This 
new elite collection forms x<n+l)*. 
PROPOSITION (PARETO Fails Forwards and Holds Backwards Over the *-Chain) 
i) Dt(xn*,xCn+l)*) = q,, and N e Dt(X(n+l)*,xn*). 
ii) Let i, n e N and i ~ 1, then N e Dt(X(n+i)* ,xn*). 
The proof of part i) is exactly analogous to the case n= 0. The first equation holds since 
every member ofX(n+l)* is unbeatable against some member xn*, and so x<n+l)* s;: xn*. 
In case of the second statement, let x e x<n+l)* andy e xn*; if Dr(x,y) = q,, then y e 
X(n+l)*-- a contradiction. Since x andy were arbitrary, N e Df(X(n+l)* ,xn"'). 
In the case of ii), notice that it has been shown in part i) above that the claim holds for i = 
1. Suppose as an inductive hypothesis that the result is true for i = m. Consider the 
consequences if the claim fails fori = m+ 1: N e Dt(X(n+m+ 1)"' ,X0 "') ~ 3x e x<n+m+1)*, 
3y e xn* (N e Dt(x,y)). Closure under superset of decisive families then requires Dt(x,y) 
= q,. By definition, x<n+m-1)* c x<n+m)* so that X E x<n+m)"'' but then N E 
Dr(XCn+m)"' ,xn"') which requires N e Dt(x,y), a co~tradiction. QED. 
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The proof appears as part of the remarks below. QED. 
REMARKS (Usefulness of the* Construction) 
Case 3) bounds the explanatory power of the * construction. For in this case X 
contains a set of elements each of which is unbeatable against some other alternative in the 
set. The most dramatic version of this scenario occurs if every member of xn * is 
unbeatable against every other member of xn*. These appear to be quite complex 
situations, and no analysis of them has been undertaken here. Case 2) is actually just the 
degenerate instance of 3). The reason that x<n+l)* =<I> instead of x<n+l) = xn* as in 2) is 
that unbeatability of an alternative, as defined here, requires unbeatablility against a distinct 
second alternative. Hence a singleton cannot contain any unbeatable alternatives. 
Recall earlier that the conditions #{X*}~ 2 and 3w eX* (Dr(X*,w) ,e<j>) were 
employed to show Dr(X* ,X*) c Dr (X* ,X - X*) where X - X* ,e <j>. Trivially in case 3) 
and 4) Dr(X*,X*) =$.so the claim obtains regardless of the conditions. In case 2), where 
xn* = {x}. if n > 1, then Dr(X*,X*) = <j>, and the claim again holds trivially; ifn = 1, X*= 
{x} so Dr(X*,X*) = 2N- <1> and it cannot be asserted from the previous development that 
2N - <1> c Dr (X* ,X - X*). In case 1) there is a collection of two or more alternatives in 
X* such that Pareto holds among them. Then, just as it was shown Dr(X* ,X*) c 
Dt(X*,X- X*), it can be shown that Dt(Xn*,xn*) ~ Dt(X*,X- X*). If #{Xn*} ~ 3 then 
Dr(X"* ,xn*) is a filter; and the oligarchy composed of its generating set can not only dictate 
social preference on xn* but also between X* and X - X*. In fact Dr(Xn* ,xn*) c 
Dr(Xn* ,X), which will give that Dr(X""' ,xn*) = Dr(X0 * ,X), as will be shown below. 
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PROPOSITION 15. (Decisive Coalitions if PARETO Eventually Holds) 
Suppose that case 1) holds; that is for some n, #{Xn*} ~ 2 and PARETOf[X0 *]. 
i) Dr(Xn*,xn*) cDr (X*,X-X*) cDr (Xn*,X-X*). 
ii) Dr(Xn* ,xn*) = Dr(X0 * ,X*). 
iii) Dr(xn* ,xn*) = Dr(X0 * ,X). 
To show i), recall the first containment has been shown for n = 1; the extension to Pareto 
holding on xn* instead is transparent. The second containment holds since xn* s:; X*. 
To show ii), notice that Dr(X 0 * ,X0 *) c Dr(Xn* ,X0 *) since xn* c xn*. Next, 
Dr(Xn* ,xn*) c Dr(X0 * ,xn*) will be shown by induction. First it will be established that 
Dr(X0 *,xn*) c Dr(xn*,xCn-1)*). 
Choose any c e Dr(X0* ,xn*) and let X e xn*, z e xcn-1)*. Trivially c e Dr(x,z) is z e 
















Now xP'cY so that xP'rY since C e Df(X0 * ,X0 *) by assumption, and yP'Nz so that yP'rz 
since N e Df(X0 * ,x<n-1)*), as previously shown. Therefore, by quasi transitivity, xP'rz 
and by IIA, C e Df(x,z). Arbitrariness then gives C e Df(X0 *,x(n-1)*). Suppose, as an 
inductive hypothesis, that C e Df(X0 * ,x<n-m)*) , form < n. It is required to show that C e 
Df(XD* ,x<n-m-1)*). To this end let X E xn* ' v E x<n-m-1)*' and u E x<n-m)*. If v E 
x<n-m)*, c E Df(x,v) directly from the inductive hypothesis. Hence, suppose that v _E 











Now xP'cu gives that xP'ru since C e Df(X0 *,x(n-m)*) by the inductive hypothesis. 
uP'Nv gives that uP'rv since N e Df(X(n-m)*,X(n-m-1)*), as demonstrated earlier. By 
quasitransitivity xP'rv obtains, and IIA gives xP'rv so that C e Dr(x,v); and again 
arbitrariness of x,v allows C e Dr(X0 * ,x<n-m-1)*). Since C was arbitrary, the conclusion 
can be universalized to give Dr(X0 * ,X0 *) c Df(X0 * ,x<n-m-1)*), where m < n. In 
particular, this is true form = n-2, in which case Df(X0 * ,X0 *) c Df(X"* ,X*). 
Finally to show iii), proceed as above but now choose m = n-1, and recall that X= X 0*. 
QED. 
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To complete the investigation of the properties of X*, the families of antidecisive 
and blocking coalitions on X* will be partially characterized. 
PROPOSITION 16. (Antidecisive and Blocking Coalitions if PARETO Eventually Holds) 
Suppose that case 1) holds; that is for some n, #{Xn*} ~ 2 and PARETOr[xn*]. Then 
Ar(X* ,X*) = Br(X* ,X*) = <j). 
Suppose Ar(X* ,X*) ¢:. <j), then N E Ar(X* ,X*). Let x,y E xn*, then V'R E R, xPNY ~ 
yPrx, which is a contradiction. However, N e Dr(Xn* ,X0 *) ~ N e Dr(x,y) ~ 
(xPNY ~ xPry), a contradiction. The argument for the case of Br(X*,X*) is similar. 
QED. 
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VIII. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
It would appear that the next task in the analysis of the decisive coalition structure 
on X* is to investigate B f(Xn* ,xn*), and Af(X* ,X*) in case 3). It seems easiest to start 
with the simplest version of the case, namely 'Vx,y e xn"'(Df(x,y) = <j>). In this instance 
'Vx,y e xn*(N e Af(x,y) v N e Bf(x,y)). Thus the set of ordered pairs xn* X xn* can be 
partitioned according as N e Af(x,y) orNe Bf(x,y) --both cannot occur. This will hardly 
be an equivalence relation in the quasitransitive case; nevertheless, some regularity 
properties do obtain. The A half of the relation is its own transitive closure, since N e 
Af(w,x) and Af(x,z) imply N e Af(w,z). Unfortunately the situation is not so 
straightforward regarding symmetry or transitivity. Wilson [1972] proceeds by analyzing 
the structure of a similar relation-- which is an equivalence relation; however, unless social 
welfare functions are transitive valued, the analysis of "Social Choice without Pareto 











NOTATION and DEFINITIONS APPENDIX 
a finite set of individuals, N c N. 
the set of all subsets of N. 
a coalition, C c N. 
the complement of C in N. 
a set of alternatives. 
individual i's complete, reflexive, transitive preference relation on X. 
indifference and strict preference for individual i; obtained from Ri. 
set of all complete, reflexive, transitive proflles for N on X. 
some one profile; a profile is an N-tuple of preference relations. 
set of all complete, reflexive, quasitransitive relations on X. Recall that a 
relation Ri is said to be quasitransitive on X iff Vx,y,z e X (xPiY A yPiz => 
xPiz). 
a social welfare function; JR. : ~Q; notice a social welfare function f must 
be defined over the entire domain R.. 
the family of all such social welfare functions as above. 
social preference corresponding to R e R under f; Rr = f(R). 
social indifference and social strict preference relations associated 
with Rr. 
'VR e R , Vx,y e X, VC c N (xPcY ¢::>(Vie N (i e C => xPiy))) ; 






Vfe F, VU,VcX, VCcN(Ce Dr(U,V)¢::) 
(VR e R, Vue U, Vv e V [uPcv ~ uPfvJ)). This is the set of coali-
tions decisive for U over V. 
the set of anti-decisive coalitions for U over V; defined exactly as Dr(U,V) 
above, except the expression in square brackets should be replaced by 
[uPcv =:) vPtu]. 
the set of blocking coalitions for U over V. Defined as above but with 
[uPcv => ulfv]. 
family of coalitions weakly decisive for U over V; defined as above except 
for making the replacement: [uPcv => --.vPfu]. 
weakly antidecisive coalitions; as before, but with: [uPcv => --.uPfv]. 
SWDt(U,V) the family of strictly weakly decisive coalitions for U over V; 
SWDt(U,V) = WDr(U,V) ~ Dr(U,V) ~ Br(U,V). 
SW Af(U,V) the family of strictly weakly anti-decisive coalitions for U over V; 




If x,y e X, Dt(x,y) will be written for for Dt({x},{y}). The same 
convention will adopted for Ar(x,y) and Br(x,y). 
{ x e X I 3y X(x ::!= y A D r(y ,x) = cj>)}. Unless there is risk of confusion 
the subscript "f' will be omitted. This is the set of all alternatives in X 
which are unbeatable with respect to f against at least one (different than 
itself) alternative in X. 
{x e Xfl* I 3y e Xfl* (x "~: y A Df(y,x) = cj>)}. Again the subscript will be 
suppressed; note also that Xl* = x•, and xo• =X. 
PARETOf[V] Vf, VV c X (PARETOt[V] ¢::) (VR e R, Vx, y e V(xPNY => xPfy))). 
If there is no possibility confusion the subscript "f' will be omitted. 









A social welfare function f e F is said to satisfy IIA just in case: 
VR,R' e JR., Vx,y e X (R I {x,y) = R' I {x,y) ~ Rr I {x,yJ = R'r I (x,yJ). 
A social welfare function f e F is said to be QUASITRANSITIVE iff: 
'v'Re JR., Vx,y,z e X (xPrY A yPrz ~ xPrz). 
A social welfare function f is said to satisfy UDOM iff f is defined over all 
of R; notice that all members ofF satisfy this property. 





exponentiation; a""b = ab. 
set theoretic minus. 
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